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ABSTRACT
“What role does gender have in determining a legislator’s method of
representation?” This dissertation examines the correlation of gender to
representative focus, constituency responsiveness, and representative goals.
Based on the literature regarding focus, responsiveness, and goals, I form the
Representative Method model. The development of the model utilizes interviews
with legislators in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, as well as analyses of the
legislative institutionalization and participation in the areas of committee strength,
committee membership, bill authorship, and leadership. I find that gender has the
most consistent relationship with representative behavior. Quantitative analyses
have also shown that development, culture, institutions, experience and party
ideology are associated with both representative behavior and the level of
descriptive representation of women in a legislature. I utilize these factors as
independent variables. This work utilizes both quantitative and qualitative
approaches. While differences in and within a country’s development, culture,
and institutions as well as diversity in a legislator’s level of experience and choice
of party membership are correlated to distinct representative behaviors, gender is
most consistently connected to variations in representative method.
In order to create a context for the model analysis, I present observations
of the Argentine, Brazilian and Mexican Congresses. This dissertation also
utilizes representation literature to provide the theoretical basis for the model. In
addition, historical and political science literature concerning each nation’s
political structure provide not only theoretical arguments from which to build, but
also insight into the development, culture, and institutions as they differ in
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
This dissertation presents a model which examines three facets of
representation. The study of legislative representation has been discussed within
the categories of representative focus, constituency responsiveness, and
representative goals. I argue that that only through the combination of these three
categories can a full understanding of individual level representation occur, and
the prioritization of the subsets within representative focus, constituency
responsiveness, and representative goals create a Representative Method for
legislators. Since the focus, responsiveness, and goals of legislators are correlated
to the gender of the legislator, and to a lesser extent, the party membership and
experience of the legislator and the particular development, culture and
institutions in and within each country, a discernable pattern of Representative
Methods may exist among legislators who share similar characteristics across
systems. This analysis indicates that two ideal types of Representative Method do
exist, each highly correlated to gender. This research further shows that the
Representative Method of a legislator is highly individualized and not clearly
subject to particular institutional and structural patterns. Finally, in showing that
gender is correlated to changes in the prioritization of focus, responsiveness, and
goals of legislators, this dissertation firmly makes the empirical case that
descriptive representation has substantive representation implications. Without
descriptive representation, substantive representation suffers.
1
Part I: The Representative Context
“It is a matter of the highest importance in forming this representation,
that it be so constituted as to be capable of understanding the true interests
of the society for which it acts, and so disposed as to pursue the good and
happiness of the people as its ultimate end. There is no possible way to
affect this but by an equal, full, and fair representation; this, therefore, is
the great desideratum in politics.” Brutus the Anti-Federalist
The study of legislatures and their members in different institutional and national
contexts provides insight into the functions of representative democracy in terms of
governance and most, importantly, representation. This chapter briefly addresses the
appropriateness of the Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican national legislatures to this
study, the role of representation in legislatures, and the final pages provide an overview
of the dissertation as a whole. This dissertation attempts to answer the question: “What
role does gender have in determining a legislator’s method of representation?” The
findings and questions evoked by an examination of the developmental, cultural, and
institutional contexts of these three legislatures and the personal characteristics of its
members are indispensable, however, this dissertation shows that it is gender, that is most
correlated with who, how and why a legislator will represent.
The three countries in this analysis were selected for their size, democratization,
institutional, developmental and cultural similarities as well as their differences in
strength and design across their institutions. In each of these three nations, however,
these similar institutions have differences that offer important opportunities for
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comparative study. The provisions regarding electoral systems and the powers of the
executive and legislature diverge, the party systems vary in strength and composition, the
legislative organization and level of institutionalization differs, federal system strength
varies, and there are different levels of female membership in the legislatures of the three
nations. While the degree of democratization in each of these nations is similar, the
political histories that resulted in the current developmental and institutional
configurations are distinct. A fuller examination of each of these nations and their
legislatures is the subject of the third chapter of this dissertation. In the first chapter,
however, a discussion of the physical and relational differences and similarities present in
each capitol city and legislative house provides an important context for understanding
the legislators in these nations. While a sophisticated traveler could make these
observations, this discussion does lend a certain insight concerning the organization and
power structure within each legislature.
This dissertation is premised on the idea that representation matters and is, in fact,
the most important aspect of a democratic government. In political science scholarship,
this democratic function is often overlooked in favor of the traditional measures of
government: power, security, stability, and administrative effectiveness (see Morgenstern
and Nacif 2002). For regime stability these measures are important concerns, but as
democracy is not necessary to achieve power, security, stability, and effectiveness, and is
indeed sometimes detrimental to these goals, it is curious that we would continue to
measure democratic governments by these standards, relegating democratic functions to a
secondary status. This dissertation is also premised upon the idea that the representation
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of individual and group interests through a legislative body is critical to a free society and
the progression of human potential and ability.
The most important component of a constitutional representative democracy is
found in the expression of the people’s will through a legislative body (see Jefferson
1816; Madison 1787 Federalist Papers Nos. 6, 8, and 10; Montesquieu 1748 Spirit of
Laws book 11, chapters 6 and 7; Locke 1694 Government ii. 141 xi.). The legislature
can only effectively express the will of the people if it is responsive to the interests,
preferences, and demands of its public (see Paine 1776, 1791; Mill 1862/1989; Pitkin
1967). History, culture, and individual choices determine the institutional structure of
that legislature (see Berger and Luckmann 1966: 51-55; Jepperson 1991: 145; Scott
2001). While this dissertation certainly presents evidence that particular countries are
related to particular representative behaviors, and may have institutions that are related to
these behaviors, there is no discernable pattern of representation that can be gleaned
based upon particular institutional differences. Rather, this dissertation demonstrates that
it is the gender of the legislator that most consistently demonstrates a relationship to
particular representative behaviors and is more likely to impact a legislator’s
representative method.
It has certainly been argued that the first function of a government is the security
of its people, for without that, there is no ability to provide any other service, much less
representation (Hobbes 1651). It may also be argued, however, that without
representation of the people there is no security in one’s person and property (Locke
1694). I argue that emphasizing security relegates questions of representation to
normative and secondary concerns. Further, this sentiment relegates legislatures to a
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secondary concern as well. In order to justify the role of legislatures, legislative strength
is often a concern of political scientists, and it is measured in terms of power in relation
to the executive, efficiency of the political process, and legislative production (see
Morgenstern and Nacif 2002). While these concerns are critical, and useful for the
comparison of systems within a study, they are not the ideal foci of a study of a
legislature or a democratic government. Hanna Pitkin argues that if a legislature does not
formulate policy that both meets the needs and is generally responsive to the people, it is
not substantively representative (1967: 232). This infers that security concerns and
effectiveness are merely one aspect of representation in the democratic system, and thus,
representation is not a secondary concern, but the entire concern of democracy, of which
security is merely a component.
Legislatures are the governmental bodies most closely connected to the people
(Madison 1787 Federalist Papers No. 6, 8, and 10). The representational link between
the people and their representative in the legislature is clear and individual legislators
have career constraints that require them to be responsive to their constituents, whether
those constituents are in a geographic district or in an ideological group or party. The
legislature is thus the most important body in a democratic government, and scholars of
democratic government should not subject the legislature to performance standards that
are wholly dependent upon questions of strength, as this is merely one part of its
representative function. Representative functions also include working to ensure the
efficacy of the public, the communication between the public and its agents, service,
allocation, and the policies aimed to help the public that is without resources (Mansbridge
2000; Eulau and Karps 1977).
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This dissertation addresses the three facets of representation and with the
supposition that legislative representation is the key to democracy. Developmental,
cultural, and institutional constraints are examined in each case in order to frame the
actions of the legislators within the context of a particular country. In addition, the
personal characteristics of gender, experience and party ideology are utilized as variables.
The analysis in this dissertation concentrates on the behavior of individual legislators in
providing representation in these democracies. The institutional level and the individual
level of representation are complementary in providing representation in a democracy
(Eulau and Karps 1977). A disconnect between the individual representative and his or
her constituents, which at the institutional level may still be generally responsive to the
will of the people as a whole, creates a void in a representative democracy. While a
national legislature may produce policies that are approved by the majority of the people,
thus providing substantive representation at the institutional level, it still may not address
the needs of all sectors of society. It is through individual representatives that the voices
of each sector of society are heard.
The role of the individual legislator in representation has been the subject of many
approaches. Eulau and Karps (1977) address representation in terms of constituency
responsiveness at the individual legislator level. Whereas, Loewenberg and Patterson
(1979) address representation in terms of an individual legislator’s focus. Finally, a
discussion of representation would not be complete without the inclusion of the role of
individual representative goals as discussed by Fenno (1973). In addition to analyses of
the particular cultural, developmental and institutional environments present in each
nation, I analyze the preceding three sets of individual legislative behaviors in this
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dissertation. Individual legislator behavior is analyzed based upon cultural and
developmental variances across countries, institutional structures and personal
characteristics in order to determine what factors or combination thereof are related to
particular legislative behaviors. A legislator prioritizes certain subsets within the
categories of focus, responsiveness and goals, this combines to form what I call an
individual’s “Representative Method.” The Representative Method is a more complete
understanding of representation at the individual legislator level as it includes all three
measures of representative behavior that have evolved in the literature.
In order to address all aspects of individual legislative representation, this
dissertation compares legislators within their institutional frameworks. In Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico, the legislatures have gained democratic strength over the last fifteen
to twenty years. As democracy has taken hold, the power of the congresses in Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico has each grown as well, expanding the avenues to political power
within each systems. These legislatures, often propelled by divided party government,
have been increasingly successful in establishing their strength, and exhibiting
substantive representation at the institutional level. This dissertation will provide a
discussion of these increases in substantive political power and institutional level
representation, and will also discuss the structures and institutions that condition the type
of representation and political power in each country. The dissertation will then address
the role of the individual legislators as conduits of representation and the relationship of
institutional factors which differ within and across the countries to their representative
behavior. These institutional factors include district magnitude, state factors, and
committee membership. In addition, the relationship that personal characteristics, such
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as sex, political experience, and party membership, have on the individual level
representative behavior of legislators is examined.
Qualitative analyses of the legislative environment, legislative content,
institutional factors, and interviews, as well as quantitative analysis of interviews,
legislation data, institutional factors, and individual characteristics of legislators are
utilized. I examine party membership, political experience, and sex and how these
variables relate to the particular representative behaviors of focus, responsiveness and
goals. I also use institutional factors such as district magnitude, the varying levels of
female membership in the state legislature, committee membership, and country which
due to the small number of legislatures examined, three, includes the both cultural and
developmental factors and the institutional factors of internal organization, committee
system strength, party system strength, federal structure strength, and constitutional
provisions within a simplified variable. The interview data provide ways to gauge
representative activities by recording individual legislators’ responses concerning their
representative focus, their constituency responsiveness, and their representative goals. In
addition, the interview data yields clues about the institutions, the structures, and the
work styles of individual legislators.
Representative activity is a broad area, and while the interview data provides
insight regarding the intent of legislators, it does not provide data on the actual activity.
The representative activity of leadership, legislative authorship and committee
participation is measured on a large scale in these congresses. The examination of
leadership and committee membership is part of the contextual analysis and is not part of
the Representative Method model, while the legislative authorship analyses are utilized as
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verification for the findings that stem from the interview data to support the model itself.
The data sources for these examinations are the 255 Argentine legislators, 513 Brazilian
deputies, and 500 Mexican deputies serving from 2002-2003. The party membership of
the legislator, the sex of the deputy, the deputy’s district magnitude, his or her political
experience, the level of female legislative membership at the state level, and country
(which encapsulates the cultural, development and institutional factors discussed above)
are factors that are used as independent variables on a large scale.
For my discussion of the particular types of representative focus, constituency
responsiveness, and representative goals, as well as analyses of particular avenues of
constituency responsiveness, I utilize interview data from 21 Argentine, 20 Brazilian, and
37 Mexican legislators. Of the legislators interviewed, 19 are women and 59 are men.
This represents approximately 8% of the legislative body in both Argentina and Mexico,
and 4% of the legislative body in Brazil. In each area of analysis, gender, more
consistently than other personal, institutional, and country characteristics, shows
relationships to particular representative activity and behavior.
While the limitations of this study do not provide the opportunity to show a clear
pattern across institutions that may shape particular Representative Methods, the findings
do suggest that some institutions may be connected, and that gender is clearly related to
particular representative behaviors. Indeed, the clear correlations between the focus,
responsiveness and goals demonstrate that there are two ideal types of Representative
Method. These ideal types are closely related to gender, but not to any other factors.
This dissertation also demonstrates that, along with gender, it is the individual choices of
a legislator which most determine his or her Representative Method.
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The representative focus, constituency responsiveness, and representative goals of
individuals in each of these legislatures is critical to our understanding of representation,
and this dissertation sheds light on the role of gender in shaping a particular
Representative Method. This dissertation builds on the premise that female legislators
represent the interests of society in a substantively different manner than do men
(Mansbridge 2000). The representation of distinct interests requires that a group be
represented by members of that group (Guinier 1994, Mansbridge 2000). Descriptive
representation has been shown to be a useful means to increase efficacy among the public
(Mansbridge 2000). The election and effective representation of women and ethnic
minorities from within a society lead to a legislature that is more capable of the
responsiveness that is critical to representative democracy (ibid). This dissertation
substantiates this claim. Consistently throughout this dissertation, it is gender that is
correlated to particular representative behaviors, thus, descriptive representation has
substantive representation consequences.
Overview of Chapters
The first four chapters examine the appropriateness of Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico to this study. Part One also briefly discusses the representation literature
associated with legislatures and the importance of studying representation. It also
provides the reader with the basic framework of the dissertation, the variables examined
and the model.
Chapter One provides an introduction to the modern congresses of Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico. It acquaints the reader with the environment in which legislators
work and represent their constituencies, and gives an indication of the physical
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constraints that separate citizens from their representatives. In addition, it is meant to
provide a larger picture of the individuals who form these institutions.
Chapter Two addresses legislative representation in a Congressional-Presidential
system. Representation occurs at both the institutional level and at the individual level in
a legislature. The literature in this chapter addresses both of these levels as well as the
role of substantive and descriptive representation within the legislature.
Chapter Three addresses the factors affecting the legislative environment and
institutions in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. These include the political history, party
systems, strength of the federal systems, constitutional provisions, and the role of women
in the public sphere. This chapter discusses the important similarities and differences
between these systems, and aids our understanding of how institutions and structure are
associated with differences in the representational environment.
Chapter Four addresses the internal institutional and participation structure within
each legislature in terms of committee systems, bill authorship, seniority and leadership.
The committee system strength, the degree of individual legislator sponsorship, and the
legislative power structure indicate how and to what degree an individual legislator is
able to pursue his or her individual goals. In addition, participation in these legislative
structures determines a legislator’s access to resources and may affect his or her
representative behavior. A logistic regression is used to determine what factors are
correlated with the probability of social committee membership, and a second analysis is
conducted to determine the factors that condition the probability of holding a leadership
position.
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In Part Two, I present the methodology and theoretical model for an examination
of individual level representation. Part Two provides a fuller framework for the
Representative Method model. This model utilizes the theoretical elements of
representative focus, constituency responsiveness, and representative goals as they
correlate to legislator characteristics, institutional characteristics and country variables.
The interaction of the prioritization of these three sets results in an individual legislator’s
Representative Method.
Chapter Five provides a discussion of the elements of the Representative Method:
representative focus, constituency responsiveness, and representative goals. This chapter
then has a more extensive examination and a quantitative analysis of the elements of
representative focus. Representative focus is the “who” or “what” a legislator chooses to
represent. The four categories of representative focus include: party, functional groups,
social groups, and geographic constituencies (Loewenberg and Patterson 1979). The data
for this logistic regression analysis are based upon the 78 legislative interviews.
Legislators indicated one or more constituencies that they represented. The findings
indicate that gender is correlated with a legislator’s representative focus, as is right party
membership of women. Country factors are also correlated, but not consistently.
Chapter Six provides a quantitative analysis of the theoretical elements of
constituency responsiveness. Constituency responsiveness is the “how” by which a
legislator responds to his or her constituency. A legislator’s preference regarding policy
output, allocation, service, and symbolic output are analyzed using a logistic regression
(Eulau and Karps 1977). The data for this statistical analysis is drawn from interviews
conducted in the legislatures of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. In addition, an ordinary
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least squares regression is utilized to analyze individual legislative output. The analysis
uses all 1269 subject legislators to bolster findings regarding policy responsiveness,
allocation responsiveness and symbolic responsiveness. While again gender seems to be
consistently related to particular forms of responsiveness, as do women in right parties
and country variables, district magnitude is infrequently linked as are the other factors.
Again, it appears that gender is the most consistent difference between forms of
responsiveness.
Chapter Seven addresses the representative goals of legislators in terms of good
policy formation, personal power, continued office holding (Fenno 1973) and institution
building. Representative goals are what an individual legislator is trying to accomplish
while in office. Utilizing interview data, a logistic regression analyzes the correlations
between characteristics and emphases on one or another of these representative goals. In
addition, legislation authorship of institutional reform legislation is utilized as a
dependent variable for institution building, and it is analyzed using an ordinary least
squares regression. Finally, an analysis of how legislators work to accomplish goals,
whether in groups or as individuals and through particular policy avenues, is included. In
this chapter, there is less of a consistent relationship between gender and particular goals
than in previous chapters, and institutional factors and country factors also have a limited
role.
In Chapter Eight, I discuss the implications of this research and my conclusions.
The analyses demonstrate that country, institutional factors, and party membership have
some association with individual legislator behavior, but more consistently, it is the
gender of legislators that most correlates with differences in a legislator’s representative
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behavior. This model is meant to demonstrate a method for determining what factors are
correlated with a legislator’s Representative Method, and while the limitations of the data
do present opportunities for expansion, there is no clear pattern discernable beyond that
of the role of gender in representation. This three-pronged individual analysis does,
however, present the opportunity to consider the possibility of a model of representation.
Throughout this dissertation, the activity of representing rather than the outcome
of that representation is discussed. A legislator’s Representative Method indicates for
whom he or she acts, how he or she responds to the represented, and what representative
goals he or she pursues. I argue that in terms of representation, the means are the ends.
In other words, while legislative outcomes are important, it is the representative action
itself which is the essence of representation. Further, while this dissertation does not
empirically analyze the relationship between individual level representation and
institutional representation, it is a critical assumption of this work that representation is
possible at the institutional level only if individual legislators are employing an effective
Representative Method.
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Chapter One: The Representative Environment
As there are relatively few federal legislative-presidential systems, democracies
such as those in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico provide valuable insight toward an
increased understanding of legislative behavior. In order to introduce the reader to these
legislatures, the focus of this chapter is the physical and relational environment of the
lower house of each legislature, the subjects of this dissertation. An important clue to the
institutional constraints on representation lies in the environment of the congress itself.
Each nation’s legislative configuration is unique, and a brief description of the physical
configuration of these legislatures offers insight into institutional differences. The
following descriptions are given in order to acquaint the reader with the uniqueness of the
legislative institution in each nation.
Argentina
The Argentine Congress is a resplendent columned and domed architectural
beauty built at the end of the Nineteenth Century, this is in stark contrast to the modern
blocky Mexican Congress or the modern architectural wonders that comprise the
Brazilian governmental complex. The large ornate building is positioned in the midst of
downtown Buenos Aires, hemmed in by the growth of the city all around it. Its
ceremonial doors face the open Plaza del Congreso, whose fountains and open area offer
the only free space. On one side sits a glass and steel office building, which, on a sunny
day, reflects the copper domed Congress, but normally appears as an ordinary office
building. This building is the modern home for the offices of the Argentine deputies. It
is separated from the Chamber, library and committee rooms by a busy and crowded
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street. The office building is non-descript, lacking the elaborate workings of the stately
congress building, and at a casual glance, this structure would not appear to be related to
the legislative building.
The congress building is open to the public for three daily tours, but only the
chambers are available for observation. It is large, elegant and spacious, and the seats are
arranged according to party affiliation. It has the feeling of a grand opera house. The
committee offices also occupy this building as does the Congressional library. The
public cannot access the committee offices or the library, but requests for library research
are available in a separate building. The secondary library building is not modern or well
organized, with stacks of bound legislation filling creaking metal shelves. While there
are tables provided for research work, students and researchers often sit on the floor,
sorting through legislative session material. This material is all available on-line in an
easily researchable, very complete, and modern resource bank, but it is not kept in a
similarly orderly fashion in hard copy. More extensive materials are kept in other
locations, but research of these materials usually requires specific requests through the
librarians. These requests may be met quickly, or the production of materials can take
several days.
The Plaza and the surrounding streets are filled with people, both the foot traffic
of tourists as well as people going about their daily business. The wide central location
also often serves as the starting place for the protests and marches that occur on a nearly
weekly basis in the streets of Buenos Aires. These protests, which range in topic from
economic to indigenous rights to civil liberty concerns are frequent and often cause major
traffic problems in the city. The starting location of these protests indicates that the
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people are directly alerting Congress to their petition, and the crowded lobby of the
Deputies’ office building indicates that there is a strong link between the constituents and
the members of Congress.
The entry to the Members’ office building is right on the street and through a wall
of glass. The congressional office building has a wide lobby, with a separate entry for
staff and Members. Visitors, however, queue before an administrative desk or are seated
around the edge of the lobby. Throughout the day, this lobby is teeming with people
seeking appointments with deputies. The Argentine legislature has half as many deputies
as the Mexican and Brazilian legislatures, and while a count is not available, it appears to
this researcher that the number of people seeking entrance is much greater than the
number seeking entrance in Mexico or Brazil. In order to gain entry to the elevators that
lead to the deputies’ offices, it is necessary to have a scheduled appointment and proper
identification. Once credentials are presented, checked, and held at the desk for security,
visitors are given a pass that allows them to go to a single floor. Showing the pass to the
guard allows a person to enter the elevator bank and ascend to the floor for which the
pass was issued.
Within the building there are two sets of elevators. The visitors’ elevators can
only access odd floors, while the deputy and staff elevators stop at even floors. Leaving
the elevator, each public access floor looks the same. A series of cramped hallways lead
off the glassed elevator lobby, and fluorescent lights guide the way to the deputies’
offices. The offices for the Argentine legislators appeared to be uniform across parties
and levels of experience. As aforementioned, while visitors enter the offices on odd
floors, and each Member has an anterior office that is accessible from this floor, deputies
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enter, and maintain, their primary workspaces of the split level offices on the even floors.
A visitor has access to the cramped administrative office that serves as the workspace for
the Deputy’s personal staff. Usually this space is staffed with three persons, one or two
computers, and has shelves that are filled with binders containing legislation. The
staffers are friendly, helpful and busy. The office, although crowded, is bustling with
activity. The majority of these staffers are women. All staff members wear business
attire and serve both as coordinators of the legislator’s schedule and as legislative
liaisons.
The upper level staff office has an interior window that overlooks a portion of the
Deputy’s office below as well as the two floors of windows that look upon the Chamber
of Deputies and the city beyond. Stairs lead down to the Deputy’s office from the upper
floor, and it is spacious and airy, unlike the cramped lobby, hallways, and administrative
offices. The Deputy’s offices have room for a desk area as well as conference or work
area, and the offices are filled with work product and a feeling of permanence. While the
furniture was generally of the same quality and type in each office, as was the
architectural layout of each office, deputies had created more comfortable spaces for
themselves, from rugs and artwork to books and photos. Unlike the organizational
scheme that was apparent in Mexico for example, from an outside perspective I could not
determine any differentiation in the placement of offices and the organization thereof.
Party members and provinces did not appear to be grouped together or to have any




The city of Brasilia rises in the geographic center of Brazil, surrounded by plains
and agricultural land. It is an architectural wonder, designed for travel by car with
limited stops and a flowing expressway system. The people who live in Brasilia are
government workers and representatives from other nations who live and work in the
embassy sector that has been carved out for them. While the rest of Brazil’s cities have
the constant reminder of poverty in the favelas that ring urban centers, Brasilia appears
exempt. What settlements may have formed outside the city do not intrude upon the plan
of the city itself. Brasilia and its governmental buildings are afloat on a clean, efficient,
and isolated island of abstract architecture.
The Brazilian Congress’ famous silhouette is in the center of a wide plaza of
government buildings. The famous bowl which houses the Deputies and the inverted
bowl which houses the Senators sit astride a silent and vast concrete plaza. Very few
people are seen on this plaza on a daily basis, which in its design was meant to host
protests and rallies. Access roads run along the outside of the plaza and the governmental
edifices, and opposite the plaza, and along these access roads are the additional ministry
offices as well as the primary office building for the deputies. Unlike Mexico and
Argentina, where public transportation is just a minute’s walk from the Congress, to
access the Brazilian legislature a person must either take a bus and then a long walk, a
car, or a taxi. For those who have cars, however, free or cheap public parking is available
on the streets that surround the offices buildings, and the front entrance is but a short
walk.
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To enter the Deputies’ office building, a person must pass through a metal
detector at the entrance, and nothing more. A person is not required to sign in, state his
or her business or present identification. From that point, the entire elevator bank is
accessible. While the deputies have two of these elevators reserved, they sit alongside
the other elevators. All of the deputies’ offices, administrative offices, the tunnel to the
chamber and the library are accessible to the public.
The offices of the deputies are set in warm spacious hallways, with wide wooden
doors and each office is exactly the same size, though there are a few subtle distinctions
in layout. Office placement is not dependent upon party affiliation or state delegation; it
is seemingly at random. Each office is made up of two long rooms, although some
Members have carved out a two or three seat waiting area for guests in the outer office.
Each deputy has at least six staff members, each with their own specialized area of
expertise and work area. Each of the staff members is dressed in standard business attire,
and while some are assigned to legislative support, others perform administrative duties.
A large window at the end of each office overlooks either the governmental plaza or over
the undeveloped land and parking areas behind the office buildings. There are relatively
few visitors within the deputies’ office building on any given day, and fewer still with
appointments to see the deputies, but tourists queue to tour the public areas of the
architecturally fascinating chambers.
The administrative offices, from the legislative journal to the legal offices, are
primarily on the first floor and the basement level of the deputies’ office building. These
offices are usually a hive of activity of the daily administration necessary to keep the
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legislature going. The permanent staff members that work here are more casually
dressed, but are helpful and quick to aid in accessing materials.
The Chamber building can be accessed through a long walkway beneath the street
and plaza, and deputies, staff members and members of the press are often seen on the
moving sidewalks between the two buildings. Spacious lounges and hallways surround
the Chamber, where Deputies are often seen giving interviews to the press, and visitors
linger to examine the green room and the interest group display of the week. These areas
are nearly all accessible to visitors, but some portions, like the chamber, the committee
rooms and party organization offices are not. The Chamber cannot be accessed without a
deputy and the committee rooms and party offices require either staff or press credentials,
or accompaniment. The Chamber is as modern in style on the inside as it is on the
outside. The seating area for the deputies is divided by a center aisle, with individual thin
tables and grey chairs that curve around the center. Vote tallies are kept on an electronic
board to the side of the center podium.
The committee rooms and party offices are in hallways off the main lounge. The
committee rooms that I viewed were small, with a row of tables across the front of the
room, with a podium, and both legislators and the press filling the chairs facing the front.
The party offices are as elegantly apportioned as the deputies’ offices, but they are much
less crowded with work space. In addition to these rooms, the library is in this part of the
complex, and provides visitors with research access to its bound volumes, and more
importantly, open and friendly access to a helpful staff of researchers. The library further




The Chamber of Deputies within the Mexican Congress is a large borg-like1
complex. It is not far from the center of Mexico City, but the casual searcher will not
easily find it. The modern congress building was removed from the zocalo, the city
center and home to many government administration offices in 1978 (Mexico Chamber
of Deputies 2005). The city center is a hub of shopping and is filled with people about
their daily tasks. A wide and noisy thoroughfare that loops through the city now
separates the congress building from the flow of pedestrian traffic, but two subway stops
do offer access to the gate. The line through the gate is slow, but it has few petitioners
seeking entrance on a normal day. A citizen must know who he or she is going to visit
when he or she enters the gate, and you must sign in, but no check is made that you have
an appointment, and there is no monitor as to your whereabouts within the complex. As
you cross the concrete and carefully placed greenery, you approach a complex seemingly
of a piece. In fact, the four separate buildings are all connected on the upper levels, but
there are wide walkways between them. A wide plaza serves as the courtyard between
the four buildings, and provides space for weekly artisan displays and sales from each
state. The organization of the complex is based upon three organizing schemes: chamber,
committee, and party.
A grand hallway surrounds the Chamber of Deputies, and committee hearing
rooms are scattered throughout the chamber building. The press room, conference rooms
and party rooms of the lower levels are busy; teeming with people while the Congress is
1 In literature, the Borg is a group of cyborg entities within the Star Trek series of books, television, and
movies. They subsumed all cultures they encountered into their own collective identity and traveled
through space in a large conglomerated cube.
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in session. In order to enter the chamber floor or the party conference areas, you must be
the guest of a deputy, however, there are some viewing rooms separating the chamber
from other guests where they can view the action and floor speeches. Each Deputy has a
desk in the Chamber, and electronic boards keep track of votes.
The committee offices and the general congressional administrative offices,
including the library and open dining room, are scattered throughout two buildings. The
committee offices each have a conference room, several walled offices, and an open
reception area, usually occupied by two or more staff members. Both men and women
serve as staff members for the committees and organizational functions of the Congress.
The committee offices have a professional independent staff, resources, and there is
additional office space for committee chairs. The committee offices have no barriers to
entry, and the library is well organized, and free to the public for research. Other than
staff and Deputies, however, very few people populate the complex, as a researcher, I
came to know and be known on sight by many of the staffers and Members.
Each Deputy has individual office space, but the office is within a party bloc that
covers consecutive floors in the same building. The organization of each party bloc is
very distinct. The offices of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) have no
coordinating front desk and there are no restrictions on wandering through its floors. The
offices of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) require visitors to sign in on
each floor before proceeding through to the offices, but doors do not block entrance to the
floors. The offices of the National Action Party (PAN) require that a person have a
confirmed appointment, sign in, is escorted, and wears a badge consistent with the floor
her or she is visiting. In addition, the offices of the PAN are shielded by guarded,
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electronic sliding doors. The atmosphere among staff and members in each of these party
offices is unique and is an indication of differences in party culture.
The PRI offices feel very open, and within the overall party bloc, the Members’
offices are grouped into state blocs. There are staff offices that adjoin these offices and
three to five personal staffers answer phone calls, coordinate the deputy’s schedule,
research, and work on legislation. The majority of the secretaries and schedulers are
women, and the majority of legislative aids are men. The deputies wear suits, and their
staff members are all dressed in business clothes. Members of the PRI have also carved
out individual offices among the committee offices and off the chamber. These offices
are more opulent than the majority of party block offices. Within the PRI offices there is
a feeling of permanence, the offices are highly personalized, with books and photos and
heavy wooden furniture.
The PRD offices, in contrast, are not highly personal. Each office looks similar,
and the offices are not grouped according to any visible scheme. The personnel are also
distinct in that there are fewer staff members overall than in the PRI offices, and while
the deputies are dressed in business attire, the staffers are more casual, some wear
business clothes, while others wear jeans. There appears to be a lower number of
staffers, 1 or 2 for each Member, and the social distance between the staff and the
Member in the PRD offices is fluid. Each office is set up exactly the same way, with an
outer and inner office for each Deputy. While the members of the PRI appear to have
established their territory for a long stay, the members of the PRD appear to have set up
temporary campaign headquarters.
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The PAN offices differ from both of these arrangements. A lobby is set off the
elevators on each floor that houses party offices. Each staff member who works for the
party organization is dressed the same way, with pale blue shirts and black suits. On each
floor, two women act as receptionists and oversee visitor sign in, confirm appointments,
and issue security badges. Visitors are then directed to wait in a lobby area for their
escort. A member of the Deputy’s staff arrives to direct visitors through the guarded
electronic doors and you enter a corporate headquarters. Most of the walls between
offices have been removed, and so instead of the long narrow hallways with doors on
each side that you find on the PRI and PRD floors, there are a series of open workstations
broken up by an island of a walled office for each Deputy. There are three or more
staffers for each Member in the PAN, but while one staffer is responsible for scheduling;
a core of party staffers primarily handles the administrative duties. The offices have a
modern feel as opposed to the ornate wooden offices of the PRI, but these offices, unlike
the PRD offices, also emit a feel of permanence. While staffers are also subject to high
levels of turnover in the chamber, and none have secure positions, you can sense that
within the PAN it would be possible to create a cadre of experienced and permanent staff,
which continues as the Deputies alternate.
A final note on the physical organization of the Chamber of Deputy relates to the
constituency outreach organization. Oddly, while the PAN has the most coordinated
office structure in the legislature, as a party, its members are the most dedicated to
constituency service on an individual level. PAN members are individually required to
communicate and establish links to their constituency, whereas no such pressure exists
within the PRD or PRI. Within the PRD, the members offered that they had individual
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ties to the district, and were more likely to encapsulate their legislative role as a crusade,
a one shot effort to address the needs of their constituents, but did not indicate that they
had a uniform constituency outreach. The PRD staff members were the most likely to
return to Congress and continue to work for the party.
The PRI has specialized party offices among their office blocs, which serve as
liaisons to particular interest groups. For example, one office is the party office for
farmers, while another meets the concerns of labor. The coordination at the party level
for district and constituency group interaction creates both organized funnels as well as
barriers to communication and responsiveness for the individual legislator in the PRI.
The farmers and ranchers of Mexico physically broke these barriers as they stormed the
doors of Congress on horseback in December of 2002. Unfortunately, this research
concluded on that day, and so whether these physical activities had an impact on the
organizational structure of the constituency communication for individual legislators in
the following legislature is unknown.
Role of Institutional Setting
While internally the offices of Brazilian and Mexican Deputies are inviting, they
are situated in such a way as to preclude a stream of visitation. The central location of
the Argentine legislature in the nation’s largest city, despite its barriers to entry and
uninviting architecture, provides a legislature more conducive to constituent contact than
the legislatures of Brazil and Mexico. People fill the streets around the Argentine
legislature, and crowd in to make appointments. The Brazilian legislature was designed
for two purposes: to prevent intrusion by the masses should the need arise and at the same
time provide an outlet for mass movements on the governmental plaza. The remote
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location of the capital city has so far made the former largely unnecessary, and the latter,
highly unusual. The Mexican Chamber of Deputies feels removed from the bustle of
Mexico City, even though it is only separated from city foot traffic by a wide road. It
may be the gates that surround the complex that accomplish this goal. The Mexican
legislature is often the site for mass protests, but the protestors are effectively kept
outside of the gates and far from of the assembly workspace. Since 2002, when farmers
on horseback broke through the external security, horse armor has been added to
reinforce these barriers
Much of the information and communication with congresses in these nations is
accessible via the digital resources available to the public through the Internet. In the
face of this innovation, do these geographic constraints pose an important constraint on
the effective representation of the constituencies of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico?
Access to the national legislatures of each country requires different degrees of
knowledge and resources of the constituents. While the Internet is a useful tool for some,
it is not a resource most citizens are able to use. The location of the Brazilian legislature
is not unknown, but is far removed from the populous coastal cities. The Argentine
legislature, on the other hand, is in the midst of life and commerce in Buenos Aires.
While the Mexican Congress is within the largest city in Mexico, it is isolated by a
freeway from the daily foot traffic of its people. Perhaps the constraints on entrance are
unnecessary in Brazil as people are effectively dissuaded from entrance by the relative
isolation of the locations. In Argentina, people are confronted on a daily basis with the
reality of the legislature, and as a result, the constraints upon movement and the
uninviting lobby are the final checks upon popular entrance. Each of these constraints
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limits public input, and thus the dyadic relationship of representation, but what of
institutional constraints on representation created by political history, constitutional
structure, federal systems, electoral systems, district characteristics, party systems,
congressional organization, and the legislature’s institutional power within the system?
How does a legislator’s personal characteristics such as sex, experience, leadership status,
committee membership, and party membership relate to the type of representative
behavior he or she utilizes?
The political history of a nation includes those events that have shaped the
internal governmental structure, ideology and political divisions. Each political history is
unique, but similarities between nations from which to draw comparisons may be found.
The constitutional structure of a nation is the set of rules, restrictions and powers that
create and empower the different organs of government within a nation. This
constitutional structure may be drawn from the experiences of a nation’s political history,
but it may also be derived, in whole or in part, from other governments’ constitutional
constructions.
Federalism is a political system in which power is constitutionally divided
between two levels, a central government and component political units, such as states or
provinces, which are partially self-governing. These two levels of government are
interdependent, vary across systems depending on their relative strength to one another,
and share sovereignty over many areas of governance. Electoral systems are the method
by which election to public office are determined. Electoral systems differ in terms of
magnitude, the number of seats elected from a district, in terms of nomination systems,
the method by which a person’s name is on the ballot, and in terms of the method
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determination of a winner or winners, proportional, plurality, or majority. Federal
systems interact with electoral systems in terms of the geographic basis for the creation of
districts.
District characteristics, such as the rural/urban split, the economic bases within
the district, the income of the constituents, the levels of descriptive representation within
the state government, and the literacy levels of the constituents, vary within a nation and
across nations. District characteristics create unique institutional constraints on
legislators within a nation. Party systems determine how many political parties are
capable of winning the majority of seats in a legislature. Single Party or Dominant Party
systems produce only one party that has a realistic chance of winning the majority of
seats in a legislature. Two Party systems have two parties that, through election, may
have an opportunity at governing, whereas Multi-Party systems have three or more
parties that may win the majority of seats in a legislature. Party systems are closely
connected to the type of electoral system that a nation has, but they are not necessarily
highly institutionalized. A highly institutionalized party system is one that is pervasive
in the society and its parties have historical electoral strength. The institutionalization is
measured by the degree of electoral volatility, the parties’ linkage to society, the degree
to which parties are the route to power in government, and the internal party organization
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 5).
Congressional organization is the method by which legislation is written,
introduced, amended, and passed within a legislature. The organization includes the
committee system, the seniority system, and the leadership structure of a legislature. The
relative power of a legislature within the governmental system is the power that the
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legislature has in initiating, amending, approving and overseeing public policy.
Congressional organization is connected to both the party system and the degree of power
congress wields in determining each step of policy enactment.
Legislators also have characteristics personal to them that are intertwined with
institutional structure. In order to separate these characteristics, experience is measured
by the number of years served in elected or appointed office at any level, as the electoral
system, the strength of the federal system, the relative power of the legislative institution
and congressional organization each may be correlated with careers in the legislature.
Leadership status and committee membership are positions within the congressional
organization structure, but ultimately represent the individual’s specific preferences and
political power in the institution. Leadership may be measured many ways: one method
includes a leadership ranking, another, if a legislator holds a committee leadership
position, and yet another, if a member holds a chamber leadership position, or a party
leadership position within the institution. In order to account for systems that do not
place power in committee leaders, the measure of leadership for the purpose of this
analysis is limited to deputies in the chamber leadership or in party leadership.
Authorship of legislation, while perhaps limited by institutional structures, is an
indication of an individual legislator’s level of activity and focus. Authorship is the
introduction of legislation to the chamber as the primary author. Two personal
characteristics are more easily separable from institutional characteristics: the ideology
and the sex of the legislator. Political ideology is the set of cohesive political beliefs a
person espouses. Ideology may be measured along a spectrum from right to left in terms
of the role of government in the regulation of economy and the role of government in the
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regulation of individual liberty. Individual ideological ratings are the best measure for a
legislator’s ideology, however, the ideology of his or her party is a proxy that may be
used to show ideology as well. In this analysis, I utilize party membership in either a
right party or in a centrist or left party as the ideology measure. Right party membership
is distinguished because the literature has shown both significant differences in levels of
descriptive representation and also in legislator behavior among right party members as
opposed to other party members (Rule 1987 and Evans 2005). A legislator’s gender is
perhaps the best measure of differences in preferences between persons. It is best
understood on a sociological scale ranging from masculinity to femininity, however, as
individual gender determinations are difficult to assess, the legislator’s sex, male or
female is used as a personal characteristic. This variable provides some insight into the
sociological differences of gender, as well as the different experiences created by
biological differences.
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Chapter 2: Legislative Representation
The legislative character is an intricate balance between representation and
governance. Legislators must navigate labyrinthine routes created by external
institutional constraints to achieve this balance. A legislature must organize itself so that
it is an effective policy making body, an effective partner with the executive, and an
effective representative of the people. Individual elected legislators, along with party
organizations, are responsible for the myriad of electoral and internal configurations.
These policy makers must make choices based upon the constitutional structure and
historical background of their nation, as well as their individual experiences. As a result,
legislative behavior and representational styles vary across systems and according to
experiences. The degree to which institutional structure and individual characteristics,
particularly sex, is correlated with differences in these representative behaviors and styles
is an important consideration when examining behavior in representative bodies.
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico serve as the subject of this research, and the
association that a legislator’s sex, the institutions within these nations, alone, and in
conjunction with sex, have had on legislative behavior and representational styles is the
focus of this dissertation. These constitutional systems are similar, drawing heavily from
the United States’ constitutional model. Each nation has a bi-cameral congress in a
federal presidential system. The similarities in structure invite the application of theory
across systems, but the differences in each nation provide context and add depth. In
questions of legislative behavior, process, and linkage, there are an abundance of theories
that explain and predict, but these theories are often embedded in the American
institution of Congress. While these theories of legislative behavior and representation
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formulated in the U.S. Congress have been applied extensively to state legislative arenas
in the United States (see for example Thomas 1991, Rosenthal 1999, Bratton and Haynie
1999, Reingold 1992, Kathlene 1994, Welch and Thomas 1991, Squire 1988, 1992,
Thompson and Moncrief 1992, Thompson, Kurtz, and Moncrief 1996; Richardson and
Freeman 1995, Jewell and Whicker 1994), to studies in Latin America (Carey 1996;
Morgenstern and Nacif 2002), Australia (Studlar and McAllister 1996) and to
parliaments in Western Europe (Wooley and LeLoup 1989) in an attempt to answer
questions concerning the representative behavior of legislators, they have not been
combined. The reliance of these studies upon the particular political history, legislative
structure, electoral structure, party structure, and power structure of the United States
leave questions unanswered. What correlation do changes in internal legislative
structure, electoral structure, party structure, power structure, and cultural framework
have with particular patterns of responsiveness, representative goals, and representative
focus in male and female legislators?
Case Selection
Legislative Character
Legislative character refers to the constitutional configuration, power, and internal
organization of a legislature. The national scope and similarity of powers present in the
congresses of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico make ideal arenas for applying theories of
legislative behavior and representation. As discussed earlier, the governmental systems
in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico share similar constitutional characteristics, bi-cameral
legislatures, federal structures, sizes, degrees of democratization, and cultural settings.
These three nations, however, each have distinct electoral systems, distinct party systems,
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distinct internal organization, political histories, varying levels of female membership,
and varying degrees of institutional strength.
It has been argued that the legislatures in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico were at
best obstructionist, and at worst ineffective and impotent (Morgenstern 2002:3)
Morgenstern argues that the reality and perception surrounding the legislatures have
changed as “democracy has become the only game in town” in Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico (ibid: 3). In each of these nations, a higher value has been placed on democracy
than ever before (ibid.) and that has translated into more power at the legislative level in
each of these nations. This similarity is another of the primary reasons for their inclusion
in this study.
Representative bodies are the most democratic of all governmental bodies, and as
more value is placed on democracy, more power is placed in the hands of the legislature.
Differences in the utilization of this power through policy indicate another important
reason for their inclusion. The Mexican legislature has had an important role in peace
negotiations and tax reform, as has the Argentine legislature (ibid: 2). In Brazil, the role
of the legislature has been important for economic reform, uncovering corruption, and
inter-branch negotiation (ibid.) These roles have been enhanced in the last ten years in
each of these nations, but in each case different catalysts have been responsible for the
increase in power (ibid).
Catalysts for Change
Divided government has allowed the Mexican legislature to flex more
constitutional muscle regarding the budget and public policy (Nacif 2003:2). In
Argentina, the electoral alliance of FREPASO and the Radicals led to a period of
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coalition building between the parties in the legislature (Tedesco 2001). In Brazil, the
state based career paths of politicians create a legislature that is responsive to geographic
interests and the amount of resources that go to individual districts (Samuels 2002, 2003).
As democracy has taken root in Latin America, the legislatures have slowly
increased in power. While the constitutional power granted to each of these legislatures
is significant, informal presidential power and party power have historically
overwhelmed these formal powers. In the past ten years, changes in party power and
increases in democratic sentiment have allowed the legislatures of Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico to more effectively use these constitutionally granted powers (Morgenstern
2002).
Critical policy areas in which these legislatures have demonstrated their power are
fiscal and budget policy (Ames 2001; Morgenstern 2002). In both Argentina and Brazil,
state level interests are critical to decision-making (Ames 2001; Samuels 2002, 2003;
Tedesco 2001). The battle between the states and the central government in each of these
nations has been historically strident in regard to economic resources and allocation
(Ames 2001). In Mexico, while the federal units have significant constitutional powers
within the legislature, such as the ability to introduce legislation, it is only as of 1997 that
the states have used this power. Additionally, party agendas have included state interests
in recent years to shore up party power at the sub-national level (Flamand 2004:4). As
Nacif points out, it is the centralized party structure that provides incentives for
individual legislators, not district level electoral concerns (2002). In Mexico, the
Congress has only been utilizing its constitutional power and aggressively seeking policy
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change by using its budgetary powers since the advent of divided government (Nacif
2003).
In Brazil, the internal organization and focus on progressive state-level ambition
(Samuels 2002, 2003), leads many legislators to work together in state-based coalitions to
negotiate with the executive for important additions to the budget. The legislators often
seek state-level office following their service in congress, but more and more legislators
are seeking to shore up constituencies for the purpose of congressional reelection as well.
For the most part, these negotiations are extra-legislative, but negotiations at the
committee level are also important to assure that the Congress accepts allocation
amendments (ibid 2003, Ames 2001).
In Argentina, legislators are bound more by party than by constituent concerns,
but even those in the president’s party are conflicted in terms of loyalty. These
legislators amend and negotiate on the behalf of their provincial party in addition to
supporting the national party organization (Eaton 2002: 314). These negotiations in both
nations end in significant policy changes.
The “meta-constitutional powers” of the president in Mexico had previously
proven to be a barrier to congressional input on the budget (Weldon 2002). Divided
government in Mexico has resulted, however, in a much more powerful congress that is
exercising its constitutional powers in determining the budget. The three budgets
presented to the Congress since 2001 have either been rejected in whole or have been
highly amended (Mexico Chamber of Deputies).
Reelection rates are important differences between the legislatures of Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico. While immediate reelection to the national legislature is forbidden
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in Mexico, legislators are allowed to seek election in another legislative chamber in
successive elections. As the power increases in the Mexican legislature, more politicians
are seeking legislative seats as an important route to power. In Brazil, the number of
legislators seeking reelection has steadily increased since the consolidation of democracy
(Samuels 2003: 37) and ranges above 80%. In Argentina, however, that number has
slipped as parties exercise greater control over legislative posts. Only 25% of legislators
are even allowed on the party lists for a second term (Eaton 2002). These important
differences shape legislative behavior.
A final change in legislative power is in the number of bills that originated in the
representative body. According to data on the Argentine legislature, bill sponsorship
originating in the legislature has increased over the last twenty years (Argentina Chamber
of Deputies, Mustapic 2002:44). Similarly, in Mexico, authorship has had a dramatic
increase since 1997 (Mexico Chamber of Deputies). While there has not been an increase
in legislative authorship in Brazil, amendments to the president’s initiatives have had a
significant impact on policy outcomes (Samuels 2003).
Morgenstern and Nacif (2002) utilize models derived from the U.S. system to
investigate executive-legislative relations, parties and legislative structures, and the
policy-making process. The several authors in this volume focus on the power and
efficiency of the Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, and Mexican legislatures, and classify
these legislatures as “reactive” as opposed to “proactive” law-making bodies
(Morgenstern 2002: 8). The evidence presented in these nation studies leads
Morgenstern to argue that “Latin American legislators (a) are not homogenous reelection
seekers, (b) follow different strategies into office, (c) are restrained by different
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constitutional arrangements, and (d) operate within vastly different party alignments”
than those found in the United States (ibid: 18). While the authors in this edited volume
address legislative power, institutionalization of the legislative structure, and individual
motivations of legislators in each of these nations, the focus does not include either an
examination of the translation of these behaviors into representation or the relationship of
institutions and a legislator’s sex to his or her representative behavior.
This work seeks addresses these two aspects of the legislative character.
Individual characteristics of legislators and their institutional constraints have a
significant relationship with representative behavior. Constitutional structure, such as
presidential or parliamentary design (Linz 1994), electoral structure, such as district
magnitude, method of attaining seats, quota systems (Farrell 2001; Lijphart 1994), party
structure, such as degree of institutionalization and ideology (Matland 1998, Rule and
Zimmerman 1994); federal systems, in terms of degree of centralization (Rosenthal and
Huckaby 2003); congressional organization, in terms of committee structure and strength
(Hall 1996), and political histories (Huckaby and Jones 2000) each have a relationship to
representation. Male and female legislators work differently within the legislature, relate
differently to their constituents, and have different policy agendas (Thomas and Wilcox
2005, Swers 2004, Rosenthal 2002). This dissertation will show that these factors are
correlated with differences in individual representative behavior both individually and as
they intersect with one another.
Representation at the legislative level has been studied at the level of the
individual representative, at the institutional level, and as a dyadic relationship. I will
address legislative representation at the individual legislator level in three national
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legislatures: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The trustee-delegate-politico triumvirate
(Walhke, Eulau, et al 1962) has been a somewhat successful classification system, but it
does not fully capture the essence of legislative representation. Loewenberg and
Patterson (1979), Pitkin (1967), Wahlke (1971), Fenno (1973), Eulau and Karps (1977),
and Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987) present important insights into the formulation of
the different types of representative roles and the differing representative goals that are
central to legislative behavior. Utilizing the representative focus classification created by
Loewenberg and Patterson (1979), the constituency responsiveness classification created
by Eulau and Karps (1977), and the representative goals classification created by Fenno
(1973), I will show that it is the combination of these three models that illustrate a true
picture of the representative behavior of legislators.
Political Representation and Responsiveness
Pitkin (1967) identifies substantive political representation as both systemic and
responsive. Systemic political representation occurs at the level of the legislature as a
whole. One can easily imagine a legislature as a representative system, with its many
points of input and output. It is the definition and quantification of responsiveness that
has caused problems in this area of scholarship. Pitkin uses the idea of systemic
representation to replace the classification of representative behavior as either trustee or
delegate or politico in nature, however, the vague description of independent legislative
action leaves the question, “What constitutes individual responsive legislative behavior?”
unanswered.
Miller and Stokes (1963) had previously conceptualized responsive legislative
behavior as policy output. Utilizing both sides of the representative relationship, they
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measure responsiveness as the degree to which the representative’s policy actions reflect
the will of their constituency. Wahlke (1971) argues that the policy output model is not a
complete model of responsiveness. Wahlke argues that the constituency base is not
sufficiently informed to make this a true measure of response. Wahlke adds support
input to the model of responsiveness. This is the activity that makes people feel
supportive of the government and confident in the operation of governing. This type of
activity focuses on the role of constituency service and outreach (Wahlke 1971).
Eulau and Karps (1977) address the problem of forming a construct for
responsiveness. They specify four components of legislative responsiveness. They do
not abandon the role of policy in responsiveness, but limit its scope only to policy that
has a large impact on the population. They define policy as “great public issues which
agitate the political process” (241). Eulau and Karps identify service responsiveness,
which “involves the efforts of the representative to secure particularized benefits for
[constituents]” (1977: 241), as the second component of responsiveness. They define
allocation responsiveness as a third component, wherein the representative makes efforts
on her own initiative to obtain generalized public goods benefits for her constituents.
The final component in the Eulau and Karps framework is symbolic responsiveness.
Symbolic responsiveness encompasses all activity that is designed to create trust and
support in the constituents for the representative and the government. Symbolic activity
manifests in many ways, and it is important to understand not just at the individual
legislator level, but in the sense of trust for the whole system as expressed by the
constituents. The component of symbolic representation is the manifestation of
descriptive representation (Mansbridge 2000) and/or district fit (Fenno 1978).
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This theoretical definition is somewhat difficult to operationalize. Cain, Ferejohn,
and Fiorina (1987) utilized it to develop a model to describe responsiveness for the
purposes of reelection in The Personal Vote, and it is also this theory of responsiveness
that Studlar and McAllister (1996) operationalize to examine the process of
representation in Australia. Herrera and Yawn (1999) also utilize this four-fold approach
to responsiveness to re-examine the data collected and utilized by Miller and Stokes
(1963). Each of these studies properly examines responsiveness as a dyadic relationship
between legislator and constituent, but responsiveness is only one aspect of legislative
behavior. A legislator’s goals or motivations are important determinants of legislative
behavior as well. Understanding goals and motivations completes the picture of how a
legislator will behave in the context of the representative system.
Representative Focus
Representation literature has identified four representative foci: political parties,
functional groups, social groupings, and geographically based constituencies (Judge and
Earnshaw 2003: 91, Loewenberg and Patterson 1979: 170-8, Wahlke et al. 1962). A
legislator has a chosen or preferred focus of representation, but this is not based entirely
on personal choice. Personal preference plays an important role in the choice of
representative focus, but as Loewenberg and Patterson (1979:192) argue, it is also
“determined for them by the electoral system through which they are chosen and by the
political culture of the nation in which they live.” Institutional structures such as the
electoral system, the party system, and constitutional constraints, as well as personal
experiences, play important roles in determining a legislator’s representative focus.
41
Representative Goals and Representative Behavior
Fenno (1973) identified the goals of legislators as being three-fold: good public
policy, power within the institution, and reelection. This theory has been empirically
proven in the context of the United States’ institutional structure (see for example: Rohde
1991, 1994; Smith and Deering 1984, Jacobson 1987), and has been tested in the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany with similar results (Wooley and LeLoup 1989). The
legislators in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are expected to have motivations and
responsive behaviors that reflect their institutional structures. As seen in Costa Rica
(Carey 1996) and Brazil (Samuels 2002), power within the system as a whole rather than
just in the institution or through reelection is perhaps a better extrapolation of the power
goals identified by Fenno (1973).
Finally, the experience and descriptive characteristics of a representative are
associated with differences in his or her behavior. While men and women build careers
in much the same way, empirically, women and ethnic minorities in the United States are
more likely to be policy driven than majority group men (Rosenthal, ed. 2002; Bratton
and Haynie 1999). Evidence also suggests that the political associations in which these
actors operate affect this behavior. In conservative parties, a member of a
disenfranchised group will find it difficult to gain personal power in the institution if she
emphasizes policy goals, and conversely, she will suffer electorally if she does not make
policy a priority (J. Jones 2002). There is also evidence that as disadvantaged groups
attain a level of representation greater than tokenism, these groups both lose supporters
among majority group members of leftist parties, and they also begin to experience an
increase in legislation supported by conservative parties that is detrimental to issues that
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most affect them as a descriptively distinct group (Bratton and Haynie 1999). Once
disadvantaged groups receive a substantial degree of representation in the legislative
arena, it would be assumed that they become a Madisonian minority faction (Madison
1961).
Logically, women who are below the critical mass (Matland 1998) are at token
level. Women at this level of representation will act in pursuit of policy. Once women
achieve critical mass, they will continue to pursue policy goals, but will begin to
experience backlash in terms of lessened support from left parties and increased hostility
from right parties (Swers 2002). It is at this point that they will have to adjust their
strategies to fit the accepted legislative strategies. Additionally, if group members are
representatives of right parties, they will have to increasingly balance strategic party
activity with policy activity in order to gain power in the institution and win reelection.
Finally, at the point of substantial minority, those behaviors that distinguish a minority
group from the majority group will be absorbed into the behaviors of legislators as a
whole. Legislative behaviors and styles will be similar among all legislators.
As this dissertation addresses representational behavior in democratic systems, it
is important to understand all aspects of that representation. The diversity of culture and
experience has often been an obstacle to overcome in the development of democratic
institutions. Representative democracy, the preferred form of national governance,
comes in many forms. In order to understand how representative democracy functions
and what factors influence its form, one must understand both its foundational theories
and the modern conceptions of what it should be.
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Representation in Democracy
The process of representative democracy has many forms that facilitate popular
participation, empowerment, and discussion. For truly representative democracy, there
must be participation by all segments of society in the democratic process, and so, it is
essential that we understand what factors engender greater participation by historically
disenfranchised or discrete insular minority groups. Polyarchy as defined by Dahl (1971)
does not require horizontal accountability. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset add to the
definition of polyarchy that multiple channels of representation of citizens’ interests as
well as public officeholder accountability to citizens and to other officials within
government are also implied within a complete definition of democracy (Diamond, Linz
and Lipset 1995: 7). The current processes and procedures of democracy in place in
many nations, including the United States, are not completely facilitating this
participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1996).
The formation of democratic institutions in developing countries created
opportunities for some disadvantaged persons and gave a voice to some ideologies, but
not all. The factors that facilitate greater participation and representation of under-
represented groups may not be the same factors that are thought to facilitate institutions
of western democracy. If we isolate the distinctions between factors that lead to a certain
type of democratic institution and factors that lead to a more representative democracy,
we will be able to identify electoral institutions and institutions of governance more
suited to foster truly representative democracy within a particular culture or society. This
representation is by nature at once descriptive and substantive. One of the fundamental
assumptions of this research is that a desirable system of government is one in which all
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people are empowered and have the opportunity to affect decisions regarding their
governance.
Democracy and Descriptive Representation
A large portion of this study is devoted to the examination of descriptive
representation of women in the national legislatures of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico and
the relationship of a legislator’s sex to distinct representative activities. These
distinctions demonstrate that transformation of descriptive representation to substantive
representation. Descriptive representation “requires that the legislature be so selected
that its composition corresponds accurately to that of the whole nation” (Pitkin 1967: 60).
Descriptive representation requires that a representative’s characteristics reflect those
whom she represents, it does not concern itself with the actions of the representative.
Pitkin argues that representation requires a transfer of information and a “certain distance
or difference as well as resemblance or correspondence” (ibid. 68). Substantive political
representation is more properly defined as:
Political representation is primarily a public institutionalized arrangement
involving many people and groups, and operating in the complex ways of large-
scale social arrangements. What makes it representation is not any single action
by any one participant, but the overall structure and functioning of the system, the
patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people. It is representation
if the people (or a constituency) are present in governmental action, even though
they do not literally act for themselves. Insofar as this is a matter of substantive
acting for other, it requires independent action in the interest of the governed, in a
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manner at least potentially responsive to them, yet not normally in conflict with
their wishes. (ibid. 221-222)
This definition focuses on a responsive government that is based on the institutionalized
structure that can take action, judge, and initiate government activity.
Representation is a component of modern democracy that is given more weight in
some democratic systems than others. A true representative democracy can not function
with a "winner-take-all" mentality, but needs "a positive-sum solution ….an integrated
body politic in which all perspectives are represented and in which all people work
together to find common ground" (Guinier 1994:6). When we examine “the impact of
social identity on policy preferences and legislative choices ... [we are able] to consider
the implications of the under-representation of women and other social groups for the
democratic process” (Swers 2002: 19). This study seeks to show that institutional
structures and descriptive representation in the legislature have an important relationship
with substantive representation and thus, democracy.
The degree to which descriptive representation has been regarded as an asset to
democratization has been debated for over two hundred years. At the inception of the
American experiment in democracy, John Adams argued for a microcosmic
representative body, while James Madison argued the representatives who choose
political careers and are selected through a competitive election will have more
“commitment to the public good than individuals chosen through a representative
sample” (Mansbridge 2000). Likewise, Williams (1998) argues that “fair representation
for historically marginalized groups requires their presence in legislatures” (4). Pitkin
argues that descriptive representation, when representative bodies mirror the
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characteristics of societies that they represent, is insufficient as it lacks “leadership,
initiative, or creative action” (Pitkin 1967: 90). In response to this argument, Mansbridge
argues that for the functions of
1) adequate communication in contexts of mistrust, and 2) innovative thinking in
contexts of uncrystallized, not fully articulated, interests -- descriptive
representation enhances the substantive representation of interests. For the other
two functions – 1) creating a social meaning of ‘ability to rule’ for members of a
group in historical contexts where that ability has been seriously questioned, and
2) increasing the polity’s de facto legitimacy in contexts of past discrimination –
descriptive representation promotes goods unrelated to substantive representation.
Mansbridge 2000: 1
A line of inquiry involving female and minority membership in representative
bodies focuses on its significance for the furtherance of democracy. For example,
Eliason (1997) found that comparatively, the majority of social democratic state services
are aimed toward women, and the public sector employees who provide these services are
primarily women. However, “women do not constitute the majority of the decision-
makers who formulate the rules governing the administration of these benefits” (Eliason
1997: 193). She encourages scholars to look at the acts of female and minority legislators
to determine the significance of equal representation. She uses a “critical act” analysis to
show that numbers of a particular group are important for constituent representation, in
that these representatives disproportionately sponsor legislation and support policies
which have the greatest impact on the interests of their individual characteristic groups.
They are able to enunciate the problems as they see it (Eliason 1997).
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The Role of Women and Minorities in Policy-Making and Party
Both women and members of minority groups add critical insights to legislative
politics. The majority of the literature that discusses the role of descriptive representation
focuses on western democracies. These studies have shown that women adopt a different
style of governance than men and have a different range of priorities (Phillips 1991).
Burrell echoes Phillips, arguing that the “policies that officeholders enact are a crucial
aspect of the representative process” (1997: 566). Burrell finds that female public
officials have different policy priorities than men do, are more active on women’s rights
legislation, and are more feminist and more liberal on major policy issues. She suggests
that these apparent differences may have a great deal to do with the institutions of
representation, which are decidedly not gender-neutral (ibid).
The literature also suggests that social policy is primarily aimed toward women
and their self-sufficiency (Skocpol 1992). Female legislators care more about, place a
higher priority on, and more actively pursue social welfare issues (Carroll, Dodson and
Mandel 1991; Burrell 1997). As a whole, female legislators place a higher priority upon
policy that addresses the needs of women and children.
Agenda setting and policy initiation are two ways in which women legislators
differ from men. Matland and Taylor find that legislator sex matters more on agenda
setting than on policy adoption, as women and men both usually follow the party line
(1997). Barker notes that traditionally, women’s policy initiatives have come through
informal avenues of politics (1997). It has also been argued that women have different
experiences than men, which lead to a different kind of policy agenda (Anderson 1999).
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Anderson encourages us to understand the policy agenda gap as a response to
public policies and the behavior of governments as an “experience gap” rather than a
gender or a racial gap (1999). This “experience gap” explains more fully the distinctions
between the sexes and ethnic groups in their policy agendas. Simply put, people are
drawn to and support policies that are within their experience (ibid). These expositions
on descriptive representation essentially argue that there is something distinctive about
descriptive representation. Descriptive representation has the ability to empower the
historically disenfranchised, build public trust, promote greater political participation
within the entirety of the electorate, and produce a more accurate reflection of the
electorate’s policy priorities.
Women are more likely to be party loyalists and party activists (Costantini 1990).
Thus, women have a tendency to vote the party line. The primary differences involve
their policy priorities and their participatory style (Milne, 1997; Skjeie, 1995). Women
are more likely to make politics “real” for their constituents (Taylor 1997). Jaquette’s
study demonstrates that women are generally more likely to be pacifists, more interested
in environmental and social issues, more likely to mobilize to protect the family or local
community, and more likely to support state regulation of business to protect the
environment and society’s weakest members (1997). Skjeie states that “representation of
women by women was necessary. Men could not negotiate the values or interests of
women” (1995: 28; see also, Karl 1995).
Likewise, Barker finds that black representatives in the United States are more
active in race equalization legislation, and are more likely to be liberal on major social
policy issues (1994). While it has been shown that agenda setting and constituency
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connection are connected to descriptive characteristics, voting behavior has not been
linked in this manner. Carol Swain, examining the roll call votes of African-American
and white Members, found party to be the only significant factor in representation (Swain
1993).
Descriptive Representation and Electoral Connections
Katherine Tate (1993) has examined the impact of African-American Members of
Congress on the attitudes and political efficacy of African-American constituents. While
Tate (1993) also finds that party continues to be highly significant for constituents, she
also finds that race is also an important factor in a constituent’s political efficacy. In
sum, her “research indicates that Blacks in districts that have Black representatives are
more satisfied with their representative, more knowledgeable, and more interested in
politics than those in districts that have White representatives” (Tate 1993: 5). This is
consistent with the findings of Williams (1989), who found that both blacks and whites
believed that candidates of their own race were superior to candidates of another race
(Williams 1989). Constituents identify more and feel more connected to the political
process if their representative looks like they do.
Tate’s research leads to questions regarding voting cues. If women and members
of minority groups feel greater efficacy when represented by similar candidates, does that
efficacy translate into votes at the ballot box? Studies show that women and minority
candidates provide voting cues to constituents. Plutzer and Zipp (1997) find that sex of
the candidate as a cue competes with party identification for precedence in vote choice.
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Role of Culture in Descriptive Representation
The deepest and long-lasting influences on women’s participation in the public
sphere are cultural mores. The roots and influences of this variable have been addressed
in a variety of ways. More theoretical works have suggested that the religious
dimensions of a culture influence its conduciveness to democratic development (Lipset
1963 and 1997; Huntington 1991). Huntington, for example, suggests that:
A strong correlation exists between Western Christianity and democracy. Modern
democracy developed first and most vigorously in Christian countries. As of
1988 Catholicism and/or Protestantism were the dominant religions in thirty-nine
of forty-six democratic countries... In contrast, only seven, or 12 percent of fifty-
eight countries with other predominant religions were democratic. Democracy
was especially scarce among countries that were predominantly Muslim,
Buddhist, or Confucian. This correlation does not prove causation. Western
Christianity emphasizes, however, the dignity of the individual and the separate
spheres of church and state... It seems plausible to hypothesize that the expansion
of Christianity encourages democratic development. (Huntington 1991: 72-73)
The socio-cultural impediment that most hinders female participation are
stereotyped gender roles that stem from religious or cultural traditions. Specifically, the
image that politics is in the public sphere, and thus, belongs to the realm of men, has been
detrimental to the participation of women in politics. For this reason, some suggest that
cultural factors are the most important factors to the representation of women in national
legislatures.
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Though the nature of politics, type of political system or ideology, and structure
of political institutions are contributing factors to determine the degree of
women’s participation, the socio-cultural and historical conditions appear to have
stronger influence. ... The public-private dichotomy is still very much prevalent
and it hampers women’s active participation in politics. (UNESCO 1998: 14)
Some of the first studies of female voting behavior attempt to explain why women are not
involved in politics. Randall suggests that women conceptualize politics as a public and
therefore, dirty, realm. Women exhibit a distinct lack of aggressiveness and lack of
interest in politics. Their participation in national legislatures is limited because of
attitudinal differences between men and women. They are further disadvantaged by voter
and party elite prejudice (Randall 1982).
Recent studies have questioned these assumptions and attributed these female
attitudinal and behavioral traits to the political socialization within the culture. Women
are socialized to fulfill certain roles. This is most evident in research conducted by
Costantini (1990) in California and Jennings and Farah in Michigan (1981). There is a
definite gender gap in political ambition between men and women. This gender gap,
however, declines by nearly fifty percent between 1964 and 1984. Constantini suggests
several variables correlated to increased political ambition in women: community
organization activity, religious affiliation, age, employment outside the home, feminist
activity, and most importantly, the passage of time (1990). From his work, he concludes:
The closing of the ambition gender gap is most likely to occur where
politically active women are highly integrated into their community and
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the larger society, where they may be described as ‘modern’ in social
background terms, and where the feminist impulse is strongest. (ibid. 759)
Panayotova and Brayfield find that the culture of the United States supports a
much more egalitarian view of gender roles than Hungarian culture, yet has less liberal
policies and structural characteristics, and less female political representation (1997).
Jaquette, in her overview of female representation, also suggests that culture can only
partially explain differences in levels of women’s political participation. Jaquette
recognizes the coupling of long traditions of gender equality in Nordic and North
European countries with high levels of descriptive representation, and conversely the
coupling of inegalitarian traditions in the Arabic Muslim states with the lowest levels of
descriptive representation, and agrees that culture appears to be a factor (1997).
Culture does not prove to be a consistent factor, however. The United States and
Great Britain, the incubators of feminist and democratic ideology, have had consistently
low levels of female representation in their national legislatures. While at the same time,
Syria and Indonesia, traditional, patriarchal cultures, have had much higher levels of
female representation; and, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Turkey, predominantly Islamic
nations, have had female heads of state (Jaquette 1997).
While culture does appear to influence representation, it must be viewed as one
among a complex network of factors. Cultural analyses do indicate the context in which
in-depth studies of politics can occur. In order to fully understand how structure,
ideology, and policies are formed and operate within a nation, and how these perspectives
are related to women’s representation and political roles, the underlying culture must be
examined.
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Role of Electoral Structure and Party Institutions
Two components of electoral structure are associated with levels of descriptive
representation: proportional party representation versus majoritarian representation and
single member districts versus multi-member districts. Lovenduski in a comparative
study of Great Britain (with a majoritarian electoral system) and West Germany (with a
proportional representation system) finds that the “institutions of representation matter
more than the strength of feminist organizations” (1997: 202). She suggests that a
proportional representation system is more conducive to female representation than a
majoritarian electoral system.
Welch and Studlar isolate the structure of multi-member district systems and
single-member district systems within a majoritarian representative context. They do not
find a substantial difference in the degree of descriptive representation between the two.
While they conclude that “these cross-national data cannot be accepted as definitive
evidence about electoral structure because the impact of electoral systems may be
confounded with other political, social, and cultural variables,” they nonetheless state that
proportional representation must be the more crucial difference (1990: 93).
This finding is consistent with the view that there is prejudice in the structure of
many electoral systems. Studies have shown that more women are elected to the national
legislature in multi-member, proportional representation systems that in single member,
majoritarian systems. Some scholars have found that proportional representation is the
single most significant factor determining percentage of women in the national legislature
(Rule 1987; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1987; Duverger 1955; Lakeman 1976; Eduardo
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1981; Kohn 1980; Castles 1981; Lovenduski and Hills 1981; Norris 1985, 1987;
Lovenduski 1997; Matland and Taylor 1997; Matland and Studlar 1996; Karl 1995).
If this view is correct, then clearly another institution plays a significant role in
determining the amount of women and ethnic minorities in the legislature. In a
proportional representation system parties play a much larger role in the nomination and
order of preference of elected officials than they do in plurality or majority systems.
Thus, the party elites have a greater role in determining who sits in the legislature than do
constituencies.
Matland suggests that the percentage of women that are currently in the
legislature is directly associated with the increase of descriptive representation above a
critical mass (1993). Critical mass theory suggests that women’s initial entry into the
legislative arena is a prerequisite for greater representation. There must be trailblazers
who may not impact policy, but instead only serve as examples or role models to other
women. This symbolic role is critical to provide an avenue for women to be elected in
sufficient number for them to have true policy power (Thomas 1991). A critical mass is
achieved when women comprise 15 to 20% of the legislature (Matland 1993).
A similar argument is the “contagion” theory. This theory revolves around the
premise that parties feel pressured when a smaller party, usually on the left, institutes a
practice of nominating an equal number of men and women. In order to shore up votes,
the larger party, usually the centrist-left party, adopts a similar policy. This forces the
large centrist-right party to adopt some sort of formal or informal policy within that party
as well, thus increasing women’s representation throughout the system (Matland and
Studlar 1996). This theory involves the institutional party structures within a nation state
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and how and when these party structures aid in the increased representation of women.
This theory demonstrates the interplay between parties and electoral structure. Matland
and Studlar find that the contagion theory is relevant for proportional systems, but not for
single member majoritarian systems (1996).
The most significant study of party nomination patterns and its relationship to the
representation of women in the national legislature is Matland’s analysis of Norway
(1993). In this particular case, he finds that district magnitude (the number of seats
elected from one district) has an association with the representation of women, but more
significantly, party magnitude (the number of party members elected from a particular
district) has an impact upon the proportional representation of women (1993). He finds
that party nomination practices have the “greatest influence when agitation for greater
representation has a base, but is not firmly established” (Matland, 1993: 752).
Once women have an established base of representation, party magnitude is no
longer significant. A woman then has an equal chance of election even in the smallest
districts. In Norway, once 20% of the seats in the legislature were held by women, party
and district magnitude were of little consequence. Matland surmises that Welch and
Studlar (1990) and Beckwith (1990) may have found that district magnitude had a greater
impact if they had controlled for that 20% representation barrier (1993). Recent studies
of Costa Rica confirm that women’s representation is positively associated with increases
in party magnitude and district magnitude (Matland and Taylor 1997).
Matland argues that party leadership, while elitist, is more open to change than
the larger populace. Thus, reforms imposed by party leadership affected change more
quickly than if representation decisions had been left to the public as a whole (1993).
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This is consistent with the findings of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady regarding the
American elite. They find the elite to be more tolerant and supportive of egalitarian
policies than the public at large (1998).
Within the study of parties, studies have revealed that rightist parties have far
fewer female representatives proportionally than do centrist and leftist parties. Rule
suggests that the percentage of seats held by rightist parties is inversely related to the
level of descriptive representation women enjoy in the national legislature (1987, 2001).
This is consistent with Matland’s findings in Norway. He shows that only the extreme
rightist parties fail to have female representation proportionate with their membership
(Matland 1993). Additionally, rightist parties have been slowest to utilize another
important institutional aid to descriptive representation: quotas.
There has been a significant increase in the use of quotas to promote
proportionate female and ethnic minority membership in legislative bodies. These quotas
can be found at the national, regional, and party level. Htun and Jones find that electoral
structure, type of mandate and party support interact with quotas to produce higher
female representation (1999). Drude Dahlerup echoes this finding, and asserts that it is
an essential aid to women once a certain level of participation is established, however,
she, like Htun and Jones, find that quotas are nearly inconsequential without proper
implementation and support (1989). The most recent work in this area indicates that
quotas, in combination with proportional representation, have a huge impact on the
degree of descriptive representation (Jones 2004).
A final critical variable in the degree of descriptive representation is time and
modernity. Critical mass theory indicates that in order for women to enter the legislature
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at a rate equal to that of men, women must first achieve a substantial percentage of seats
(1993). This suggests that women’s initial entry into the legislative arena, which does not
have a significant correlation with policy changes, is a prerequisite for substantive policy
representation. Constantini’s findings regarding increased political ambition also clearly
indicate the significant role of time and modernization (1990). He finds that women
raised in egalitarian households, with emphases on the equality of education and career
interests are more likely to demonstrate political ambition, and thus, run for seats in the
legislature (ibid).
Extension to Cases
It is appropriate to extend these discussions of institutional structure,
responsiveness and motivation to similar but distinct systems to determine whether the
unique systemic configuration in the United States is responsible for the specific form of
legislative behavior. While Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were patterned on the
American example, each nation having a constitutional structure which is both
presidential and federal, the similarities have historically ended there.
These nations have had a steady record of democracy for less than 20 years. The
legislative party loyalty in Argentina and Mexico is greater than that in the United States,
historically, and each has more active parties within their systems. The electoral
structures in each nation are not strictly winner-take-all in nature, there has been a
historically uneven power balance strongly favoring the executive over the legislature,
and each nation has cultural structures that were not considered conducive to democracy.
While the legislatures in these nations have not historically been strong, they have been
steadily increasing in power, and the consolidation of democracy appears to have
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occurred. This change in the power balance makes it an appropriate time to examine
these legislatures more closely. In particular, both the power of the individual legislator
has increased and the numerical power of women in these bodies has increased. These
changes make studies of representative behavior in the legislatures of Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico highly salient.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the theoretical framework and
literature regarding political representation in legislative institutions. The importance of
representation and representative behavior is addressed in order to provide the reader
with an understanding of the impetus for this dissertation research. Political
representation is an action that is shaped by the individual characteristics of the legislator
and the institutional framework in which it operates. The behavior of legislators at both a
congregate and at an individual level provides the evidence of representative action. In
the following chapters, the specific institutions that shape representative activity in
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico will be discussed. Additionally, the representative output
of individual legislators within this framework will be analyzed. Finally a framework for
understanding legislative roles, derived from this research, will be formulated.
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Chapter 3: The National Setting
Latin American nations share similar origins and governmental designs. These
similarities illuminate the role that differences in governmental and societal structures
have upon stability and democracy. Four significant points of departure among Latin
American nations are the particular political histories, the degree of party system
institutionalization, the strength of the federal system, and the specific constitutional
provisions of their legislative-presidential governmental design. In addition, the roles
that women have fulfilled in the political history and the party system of each of these
nations are distinct and form the basis for women’s roles in government and society
today. These differences have shaped the institutional structures in each nation, and have
significant associations with differences in the legislative behavior and the representative
styles of legislators.
Political History
The political history of each nation is distinct. This history is responsible for the
choices and differences in institutional structure in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. A
brief exposition of the differences in these histories provides a better understanding of the
underlying political-cultural frameworks present in each nation.
Argentina
The Argentine population is primarily the product of immigration from southern
Europe, and as a result it is racially homogenous. A historical “split between those who
favored a centralized independent country directed from Buenos Aires and those who
demanded a greater level of autonomy for the provinces,” the large landholders in the
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Pampas is a cleavage that shaped politics from the outset (Jones and Samuels 2005:2).
After independence was won from Spain in 1820, the leadership was primarily dictatorial
until the fall of Rosas in 1852. Upon this occasion, the liberal intellectuals seized the
opportunity to create a republic. The constitution of 1853 created a governmental system
that was very similar to the United States’ system, including federalism and an electoral
college for electing the president (ibid). The legislature, however, remained fairly
ineffective, and the majority of decisions concerning candidates and policies were made
by an agreement, or acuerdo, among the leaders of the parties (Alonso 2000).
The Great Depression, in addition to a change from government by agreement to
more inclusive electoral laws, greatly changed the shape of Argentine politics. As
workers received more electoral power, the far right was left out of the governing
coalition, and in reaction to this loss of power, the military was spurred to disrupt eighty
years of democratic evolution with a coup in 1930. The military leaders dissolved
Congress and all political parties, and as a result the power centers changed. The new
powers were labor and the military, with each at opposite ends of the political spectrum.
Over the next forty years, these two powers would compete for governmental leadership
through a series of seven coups (Alonso 2000).
Two groups were critical to leadership during this time: the military and the
working class. The military leadership led the right, and while Juan Perón had been an
instrumental member of the military leadership, he, along with his wife Eva, became the
leaders of the working class. In either case, the leaders were clientalistic rather than
ideological in policy performance. Throughout this period the Radical party, which had
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become the party of the middle class, were unable to effectively govern and perpetuate
free and competitive elections (Norden 1996).
The military’s involvement in politics evolved between 1930 and 1976. After the
1930 coup d'état, the military gave up power quickly, in less than two years, but they
seized it again in subsequent revolts, most importantly in those of 1943, 1955, and 1976
(Norden 1996). The 1943 military leadership, a group of officers led by Colonel Juan
Domingo Perón, did not present a clear platform from which to govern. They relied on a
shared ideology of extreme nationalism, resistance to U.S. and Allied hegemony, anti-
democratic sentiments, a defense of military prerogatives and an unspecified commitment
to social justice (1996: 23-25). The military adopted this as the core of its political
ideology, modifying it to include the intensification of cultural conservatism and anti-
subversion.
General Perón’s ideology, however, moved away from these core beliefs, and
became an icon of the Argentine working classes. Perón was elected president in 1946,
and attempted to transform the military. He "sought personal loyalty, rather than
institutional obedience" (1996: 26). The military, with the support of the Catholic
Church, ousted Perón in 1955. Perón's legacy, however, of a nation polarized between
Peronistas and anti-Peronistas, remained an attribute of Argentine society.
The next two decades saw an ongoing contest among the military, the repressed
Peronista movement, and weak democratic forces. The Radical Party was attempting to
govern in the midst of this turmoil, but presidents Arturo Frondizi and Arturo Illia were
unable to prevent the military from an active involvement in politics. Neither Frondizi
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nor Illian were able to institutionalize the armed forces, and were instead forced to allow
the military to continue to act as an independent player (Norden 1996).
In 1966, the military seized and maintained power until 1973. In the face of a
weakening economy, violent guerrilla movements, and the continuing popularity of
Perón, who was then in exile in Spain, they ceded their rule (1996: 39-45). After the
death of Perón in 1974, the weak governments of his supporters that followed prompted
the military to launch its last successful coup.
The final military dictatorship began with a coup in 1976 and ended with an
ineffective war for the Falkland Islands in 1982. The repressive nature of the military
dictatorship, also known as the “dirty war,” during which 9,000 people disappeared and
estimates of as many as 30,000 people were tortured and killed, in addition to the military
failure resulted in an increase in the popular demand for elections (Skidmore and Smith
2001). Since 1983, the leadership constitutionally changed hands six times, with three
parties alternating in power. Charismatic leaders, however, continued to have an impact
on Argentine politics (Jones 2002).
At the prompting of President Menem, the constitution was amended in 1994 to
allow reelection of the President, which would allow Menem to run for two additional
four-year terms. He was unsuccessful in getting the constitution interpreted to allow him
an immediate third term attempt, and left office (Jones 2002). In 2003, in his third bid for
the presidency, he was unsuccessful, perhaps signaling a move away from the
personalistic politics that have been present in Argentina for the last century. The active
parties are based upon parties that have been present and struggled in Argentina
throughout the last half of the twentieth century, Justicialista Party, a populist right-wing
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Peronist party, the centrist Radicals, the left of center FREPASO, and the cultural right,
pro-military MODIN party (Jones 2002).
Brazil
In contrast to the ethnically homogenous Argentina, Brazil is highly diverse, and
the different regions mark out the differences in immigration patterns. In the early 1800s,
one-half of the four million in the population were slaves of African descent, and a larger
indigenous population than that of Argentina (Skidmore and Smith 2001:25). The
society was very agrarian, and points of power were spread throughout the large nation.
While a colonial state, Brazil won its independence from Portugal in 1823 through more
negotiation than revolution (ibid: 35-36). The political structure was continuous from
colonialization through independence, and the adoption of a constitution in 1824 was not
a departure from this political structure. The primary addition to the existing structure
was a set of significant human rights guarantees. It guaranteed liberal rights under a
monarchy, which pulled together power under the monarch in Rio de Janeiro (Skidmore
and Smith 2001: 138).
The Northeast rebelled against the Rio government, but they were brutally put
down by hired soldiers and British money. The British extracted a price for their aid: the
end of slave trade by 1830 (ibid: 139). The rebellions did not die, however, and the
monarch abdicated in 1831. The new constitution, drafted in 1834, gave increased
powers to the provinces to appease the separatist movements and was ruled by a regency
until the son of Emperor Pedro, Pedro II was crowned as the new monarch in 1840 at age
14 (Skidmore and Smith 2001: 140-1).
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For fifty-five years, the executive power was highly dominant. The legislature
could be dissolved at the will of the emperor, leaving the legislature with very little
power. In South America at this time, wars regarding borders were still highly prevalent.
The most notable of these wars was the Paraguayan War that lasted from 1865 until
1870; the war splintered one of the two parties, so that the party system enlarged. Two
other important outcomes were the advent of a more professional army, and an improved
status of Africans, as those slaves who had enlisted were given their freedom (Skidmore
and Smith 2001: 142).
Abolitionist forces grew stronger at the end of the century as the need for cheap
labor from Europe increased. Nonetheless, abolition took an additional seventeen years
and culminated in the rise of provincial republicanism and the dismantling of the
monarchy in 1889. Like the separation from Portugal, neither of these critical events
occurred with bloodshed and neither changed the bureaucratic structure of the Brazilian
government (Skidmore and Smith 2001: 143-5).
In 1889, the country became the United States of Brazil, and was a constitutional
democracy until 1930, with regular alternation in presidential power between the states of
Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais (ibid: 153). This republic ended in 1930 at the hands of a
military junta (ibid: 156). President Vargas was a dictator, then the legislatively elected
president, then used the military to continue his authoritarian rule until his flight into
exile in 1945 (ibid: 161). Vargas was briefly out of power, but then was democratically
elected as president in 1950 (ibid: 163). Vargas utilized populist appeals to reach the
citizens in the cities and the middle class, but the many political enemies and intrigues
eventually led to his suicide in 1954 (ibid: 164). Kubitschek was inaugurated in 1956 and
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with the use of an economic expansion progress plan and the creation of an inland capital,
Brasilia expanded his base of support, these ambitious plans, however, led to economic
destabilization (ibid: 166). This economic destabilization, and ensuing stabilization plans
over the next two administrations, in addition to greater expansion of the leftist base
among peoples in the rural areas and the military enlisted, led to a military overthrow of
Goulart’s presidency and the democratic government in 1964 (ibid: 166-169). The
military government lasted until 1985, during which time thousands of Brazilians were
deported, imprisoned, tortured, and killed for political purposes, and external debt
crippled the economy (Skidmore and Smith 2001: 172).
In 1985, the first civilian president following the long military dictatorship was
elected, and four constitutional changes in regime have occurred since that time (Power
2003). Collor, elected in 1990, was impeached two years later by the Congress when his
brother exposed the corruption within his administration that included 40% kickbacks on
all government contracts (Power 2003). The first leftist president in Brazilian history was
elected in 2002, but Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva first ran for president in 1989, 1994,
1998 as a candidate for the leftist PT party. He utilized grassroots movements to increase
his base of support, but only after he forswore his informal clothing style and his strident
disagreement with the paying of Brazil’s foreign debt could he attract a wide enough
consensus to win the 2002 election (Branford and Kucinski 2005). As a president he has
moved even further to the center, as Lula has declined to raise the minimum wage and
inititally raised the interest rate to over 30% a year, against the wishes of Congress. The
purpose of these policies was to reign in the public debt created by the military
dictatorship (Samuels 2003).
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The long period of dictatorial rule throughout the Twentieth Century, as well as
the slow urbanization of the population, led to unique population patterns. While the
cities, particularly Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, have very large populations, they are
balanced by a very large and populous countryside. The political history and the diverse
population centers have had a significant impact upon the balance of political power in
Brazil.
Mexico
While Mexico is has been historically less diverse than Brazil, it does have more
ethnic cleavages than those present in Argentina. These traditional ethnic differences
have been between those of Spanish descent, those of both Spanish and indigenous
descent or mestizo, and those of indigenous descent. Today, only two ethnic distinctions
remain: mestizo and indigeneous. The mestizo population, as of 1995, comprised 93% of
the population, whereas the indigenous population made up the remaining 7%. These
distinctions are not based on descent, but rather, culture (New York University 2005).
Spanish colonialism encompassed three hundred years, from 1521 to 1821. Mexico was
part of a large colony, New Spain, which extended through the current Southwestern
United States to Costa Rica, and throughout the Carribean (Skidmore and Smith 2001).
The war for Mexican independence started September 16, 1810. The Spanish
throne had been taken by Napolean, and Mexican Conservatives and rich land-owners
objected to the comparatively more liberal policies. An unlikely alliance was formed in
Mexico: Liberals, who favored a democratic Mexico, and Conservatives, who favored a
Bourbon monarch to restore the status quo. These two factions both agreed that Mexico
required independence to determine her own destiny (Skidmore and Smith 2001).
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After eleven years of war and two years of Mexican empire, the Republic of
Mexico was established in 1823. The Nineteenth Century was marked by turmoil.
Successive dictatorial presidents, wars which resulted in loss of territory with both Texas
and the United States, a civil war over the role of the Catholic church, and an Austrian
emperor, Maximillian marked the century. In 1867, the emperor was ousted, the republic
restored, and a new constitution was written. The most significant aspect of the
constitution was the stripping of power from the Catholic church and the complete
separation of Church and State (Skidmore and Smith 2001).
A Liberal, Benito Juarez, had led much of this reform and served as President
both before and after the monarchy. Porfirio Diaz, also a Liberal, but one who neither
attacked nor defended the church, rebelled against the reelection of Juarez, and served as
the president of Mexico for 35 years, also known as the Porfiriato (ibid. 224). The brutal
repression of dissent, the unfettered sale of resources and unregulated capitalism, and the
blatant election fraud in the 1910 presidential election led to the Mexican Revolution.
There were five charismatic and different leaders throughout the country, and as the war
raged, Diaz resigned in exile in 1911. A civil war to determine the direction of the
country, in particular regarding the role of church, education, and women’s rights
continued for twenty years. During this tumultuous period, the Mexican Constitution of
1917 was adopted, and is still followed today. The Partido Revolucionario Instituticional
(PRI) was formed in 1929, and was seen as the end of the Revolution (Skidmore and
Smith 2001).
The distrust of the Mexican people for politician’s ambitions while in power led
to the ban against reelection of leaders to public office, but the PRI was somewhat co-
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opted, as it ended the policy of land reform and prohibited activities which caused social
unrest under Obregón. There was, however, an extensive land reform that reversed this
trend was initiated under Cárdenas (ibid: 234). The PRI was never an ideological party,
rather, it gathered support from clientalistic allocations and policies in favor of certain
groups in order to maintain power. The electoral laws in Mexico favored the PRI,
making it impossible for another party to gain power until recently (Skidmore and Smith
2001). This hegemony meant that Mexico, regardless of its democratic institutions, did
not meet the basic requirement of polyarchy, free and fair elections (Dahl 1971).
Political and electoral reforms enacted by the PRI leadership after the 1988 election, in
addition to the economic and ethnic conflicts in the mid-1990s, led to the fall of the PRI
from its seventy-one year reign as the governing party of Mexico. While Mexico has
arguably had a democratic constitution since 1917, the reality of the political situation has
led observers to agree that democracy was not fully realized in Mexico until the electoral
reforms of 1989 went into effect in 1994 (Skidmore and Smith 2001).
The political history of each nation is critical to understanding how political
institutions were formed. The role of women in this political history is also an important
piece of the puzzle. In each of these nations, the role of women is a distinct chapter in
the overall political history.
Women in the Political History
Women have used different paths to power in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
Brazil granted suffrage to women relatively early, in 1932. In Brazil, while feminist
movements existed, women were not voices for change (Jaquette 1989:3). In contrast,
while Argentine and Mexican women had strong feminist groups which struggled for half
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a century for the right to vote, these women were not granted suffrage until after World
War II (Bergmann et al 1990: 4; Valdez and Gomariz 1995: 159-160). While the
influence of American and European women’s rights movements had a role in the
development of feminist ideology in Latin America, a unique “feminist critique of society
arose out of the distinctive experience of the Latin American women themselves”
(Bergmann, et al 1990: 1). “Women intellectuals worked and fought side by side with
men for … revolutionary change in Mexico, and for profound social reform in Argentina
and Brazil,” only to be excluded from full citizenship in the newly formed republics
(ibid: 4). Argentina were at last granted women’s suffrage in 1947, with Mexico
following in 1953 (Bergmann et al 1990: 4; Valdez and Gomariz 1995: 160).
Women in Latin America, particularly Argentina and Brazil, have had a large role
in movements associated with human rights and the end of authoritarianism. In
Argentina, Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo de Argentina, “came to symbolize the moral
outrage of civilian society against bureaucratic authoritatian regimes for the region as a
whole” (Jaquette 1989: 4). In Brazil, it was the technocratic development of the
authoritarian regime that “fundamentally altered middle-class women’s roles in social
relations of production and reproduction” (Alvarez 1989: 19). These women, in
conjunction with the Catholic Church, “began working with [and on the behalf of]
thousands of poor and working class women’s groups” (21). It was “the politicalization
of gender within Church-linked community women’s groups [that] provided nascent
Brazilian feminism with an extensive mass base” (22). Women have been very effective
in “representing the interests of other social groups” such as the poor, children, and the
elderly (del Carmen Feijoo 1989:92).
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Mexico has a long history of women’s activity in politics, and from the
Revolution to the present, women are the backbones of most grassroots organizations in
Mexico (Rodriguez 1998). “There were four basic roles filled by women which
contributed to the Revolution during the years between 1910 and 1917: the intellectual,
the soldadera, the female soldier, and the victim” (Goetze 1997: 1). In the northern
revolutionary bands there was no division of labor between men and women at all (ibid).
Another important role played by women in Mexico during this same time is as labor
activists. Porter argues that women's participation in mutual aid societies in the late
1800s paved the way for women’s prominent roles as revolutionary labor activists
(2003). Women protested in streets and factories from 1911-1914 to gain better working
conditions (Porter 2003). Feminine discourse was a part of public discourse about
women workers and “women's work” long after the revolution's violent phase ended in
1920 (ibid). Women were active in achieving labor legislation following the revolution,
including the 1931 Federal Labor Code, which dealt with women's working conditions,
but also included some language regarding feminine weakness (ibid).
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico were the only nations in Latin America where
feminist groups were actively militant to gain the vote (Craske 1998: 44). Eva Peron in
Argentina led the way toward a long-lasting women’s movement which has been
successful in advancing women’s and feminist goals (Alvarez 1989; Zabaleta 2000).
While feminist movements were active in demanding the vote, they were not the reason
for the extension of suffrage. Brazil’s feminist movements, for example, have only been
successful on behalf of other social movements (del Carmen Feijoo 1989).
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The vote and the right to run for office did not mean that women ran for office or
won electoral contests. After a half a century of suffrage in these nations, only Argentina
approaches a representative number of women in the national legislature. Other elected
offices are even less representative. While Argentina has the highest number of women
in parliament in democratic Latin America at 33.7% (International Parliamentary Union
2005), this is mostly attributable to electoral quota laws. In global terms, Mexican
women have also achieved relatively high levels of representation, primarily due to party
instituted quotas. In Mexico, representation has been increasing steadily, in 1997, 17%
of the elected seats in Congress were women, and by the 2003 Congressional election,
22.6% of the Congressional seats were made up of women (Rodriquez 1998: 1;
International Parliamentary Union 2005). Brazil, however, has not benefited from either
party or electoral quotas, as 9.1% of the Congressional seats were held by women in
2005. In 2005, 16.1% of all elected seats to national legislatures in the world are held by
women, so it is clear that these three systems demonstrate an appreciable difference in
female representation around this mean number (International Parliamentary Union
1995).
While it appears that in Argentina and Mexico, women have made significant
strides in representation, women are highly disadvantaged in state and department
governments. In Argentina, no women headed regional governments, and in Brazil and
Mexico only one woman has been elected in each of these nations. Across the three
nations, only 3.8% of the members of the executive leadership were women in 1997
(Rodriguez 1998: 1). Additionally, municipal councils and state legislatures also fall
behind the national legislative percentages (166).
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Party System Institutionalization
An institutionalized party system demonstrates the linkage between society and
government. Party system institutionalization requires that the party system has
autonomy, coherence and complexity. The party system is a distinct organization
separate from other aspects of society and the organization has its own rules and
developed sub-units (Randall and Svasand 1999: 5-6; Mainwaring and Scully 1995:5;
Huntington 1968, chapter 1). Next, an institutionalized party system has adaptability, or
there is “continuity and stability among party alternatives … over several elections”
(Randall and Svasand 1999: 23, also Huntington 1968, chapter 1). In addition,
opposition is a consistent part of the political process (Randall and Svasand 1999: 24). In
an institutionalized party system, parties are the primary route to power in government
(ibid; Mainwaring and Scully 1995:5). Finally, the electoral process provides the only
legitimate route to achieve policy goals (Randall and Svasand 1999: 24-25).
This institutional framework lends more legitimacy to government and the
processes of governance in the face of economic crises, liberalizing movements,
expansion of suffrage, internal conflict and external pressures (Randall and Svasand
1999: 19-20). Additionally, the stability and legitimacy of a democratic government rests
on the ability of the president and the legislature to both effectively govern and to
represent the interests of the people. The party system structure greatly conditions how
the constitutional provisions governing the interaction between the legislature and the
president will work toward this goal. The Latin American example seems to indicate that
the interaction of “party system” and “president’s legislative power” is a significant
73
determinant of governmental stability, legitimacy, and democracy in presidential systems
(Nacif 2003; Mainwaring and Scully 1995).
Argentina
Argentina’s party system is fairly well institutionalized. The party system appears
to have achieved 75% institutionalization on the Mainwaring and Scully scale, and it
ranks in the top half of Latin American nations (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 16). This
scale encompasses electoral volatility, linkage to society, the degree to which parties are
the route to power in government, and the internal party organization (5). Within the last
ten years there has been a fragmentation of the PJ in Argentina and a third party,
FREPASO, has joined the UCR and the PJ as a nationally competitive party. Jones
(2002) argues that this has not changed the classification of the party system as highly
institutionalized.
Prior to this change, the Laakso-Taagepera methodology showed that Argentina
had 2.8 effective parties (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 30). This equation is the numeral
one divided by the sum of each party’s percentage of votes squared (29). Based on this
and case study sources, Mainwaring and Scully ventured an educated estimate of
ideological distance in the electorate, and find that Argentina has a moderately low
ideological polarization (31). Applying this formula to the last national election, one
finds that Argentina’s number of effective parties have not actually changed with the
consolidation of smaller parties into FREPASO.
An important part of this institutionalization is the loyalty among politicians and
the electorate for a party. The basis for this loyalty is a historically strong system and
party list electoral laws (Jones 1997:269). Jones argued that the reforms which required
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either a super-plurality or a run-off in presidential elections and expand the districts to
include more minority party representation were unlikely to alter this discipline (279).
The rise of a new national party was highly unexpected, but did not alter the stability of
the system as a whole. Jones (2002) argues that there are five critical reasons for the
powerful loyalty within the Argentine system. Factors include provincial and national
level party leaders’ control over ballot access; political careers’ link to party; votes
against the party result in expulsion; the party determines resources available to the
legislators at the provincial level; and finally, personal identification is strongly tied to
party identification (159). Legislators are often at cross-purposes regarding loyalty.
They are not responsible for any individual fundraising as all campaign resources are
funneled through the national and regional parties. This does not translate into uniform
interests. The funds are partially from public sources, but eighty percent of these funds
are from private sources, and the contributors are undisclosed (Aceproject 2004). As a
result, legislators often find that the interests of the national party and the regional parties
are at odds.
Brazil
Brazil on the other hand has a vaguely defined party system, expulsion from a
party would merely lead a politician to join another party. Parties are only moderately
perceived to be the route to political power (Mainwaring and Scully 1995:14). The
parties have a high degree of electoral volatility, indicating that changes in percentage of
seats are large and unpredictable (7). The parties are not imbedded in society (13-14),
and the parties are undisciplined and unorganized (16). Brazil scores among the lowest
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of Latin American countries in the degree of institutionalization, and there are only clear
ideological profiles at the elite level (19-20).
Brazil has the highest number of effective parties in Latin America (30). Indeed,
its party fragmentation is so high that it is triple the mean of effective parties in the
lowest half of the party systems studied. Additionally, Mainwaring and Scully indicate
that the ideological distance between the parties is also the highest in Latin America (31).
With the exception of the PT, Brazil has virtually no party discipline (Figueiredo
and Limongi 1995). The cooperation of the president’s party and the governing
legislative coalition is solely dependent on the popularity of the president (Mainwaring
and Scully 1997:59). The legislators spend much more time on constituent service than
policy formation (ibid), and will defect and join another party if they feel the party is no
longer advantageous to them electorally (Ames 2002:189). The party structure in the
legislature only exists to solve “collective action problems” (ibid: 192). While legislators
have a great deal of independence and party voting requires heavy negotiation, party
leaders still control the agenda within which individuals must work (Figueiredo and
Limongi 1995:500). Party affiliation and reelection concerns both condition the finding
of a weak Brazilian party system. Incumbents seeking reelection or legislative careers
are more loyal to the party. Additionally, overall, conservative party members have a
higher degree of loyalty to the party than do more liberal party members (Ames 2002:
214-215). The literature is clearly divided regarding the power of parties and the degree
of institutionalization. Within the Brazilian Congress, parties exercise power over the
agenda and the shape of policy, but movement is fluid between the parties, and there are
no electoral consequences for movement. It appears that among politicians and within
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government institutions, the party system is institutionalized, but externally, in their
relationship with society, parties have not developed strong links with society. As static
ambition increases in the Brazilian system, national party loyalty is expected to increase.
Mexico
Like the Argentine system, the Mexican party system is highly institutionalized,
however, it has not been historically democratic. There is low electoral volatility due the
hegemonic history of the PRI (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 7). Additionally, citizens
have a historical attachment to parties due to “a calculus of economic benefit; [which]
under more democratic conditions … may evanesce” (12). This demonstrates a
clientalistic party which “undermines rules and regularized procedures, reducing the
party constitution if there be one to a meaningless sham. It constrains the possibilities for
concerted party leadership or programme-making” (Randall and Svasand 1999:17). This
is in clear contrast to a more societally-entrenched party system, which would cut across
class cleavages and incorporate social groups in policy formulation and decision making.
While there are strong loyalties to parties among the electorate, they are not involved in
policy formulation and decision making. Mexican social groups only participate and
support the governing party (PRI) to gain state resources (Mainwaring and Scully 1995:
12). Furthermore, the party system and elections are not widely perceived as a route to
power (14), and while the internal party organization of the PRI is very strong, it is
without democratic processes. Many electoral reforms have taken place in Mexico of the
last fifteen years, and with the victory of the PAN, this institutionalized, but
undemocratic party system may be advancing to the ranks of Argentina and other more
institutionalized party systems in the region.
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As of the 1994 elections, the number of effective parties in Mexico was 2.2,
among the lowest in Latin America, which, coupled with a moderately high ideological
polarization facilitated governance, and accommodated democratic liberalization without
destabilizing the institutional structure (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 29-31). As of the
2003 elections, Mexico had 2.4 effective parties, with more than half the districts having
3 competitive parties (Klesner 2005: 108). This change was evident in the decreasing
number of districts in which only one party (the PRI) had hegemonic control (ibid).
Additionally, party discipline is very high, and in the PRI, the leader of the party
is undisputedly the president (Weldon 1997: 227). The president uses this party
discipline to easily advance his policy programs through the congress. The president is
not the party leader in the PAN (256). Weldon hypothesizes that the Mexican Congress
will grow in strength should the president be elected from the PAN (ibid). This
hypothesis seems to have borne out in the Mexican case, as the Congress has repeatedly
exercised its constitutional powers in its relationship with the executive (Nacif 2003).
Women in Political Parties
“Political parties seem to be a real barrier to women’s access to institutional
political power,” women do not exceed 25% in leadership positions in political parties in
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (Valdes and Gomariz 1995: 157, 169). While the
Argentine Peronist party, due to Eva Perón, was identified with women’s activity in the
political sphere from its inception (Zabaleta 2000:43), the separation of the party into the
Women’s Peronist Party kept the women from the decision-making element of the party
(153). Further, it was clear within the speeches of Juan Perón that women were not
inferior, but they were separate, with distinct roles from men (298). The election of the
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Peronist candidate in 1989 was seen negatively by feminist groups, and they responded
by becoming more active in smaller leftist parties (Waylen 1994: 341).
In Argentina in the early 1990s, the composition of the Peronist party leadership
validated the concerns of feminist groups. Only 9.8% of party leadership positions were
held by women. Mexico leads these three nations in overall represenation in party
leadership at 17%, with the old-guard PRI in last place with only 11.2% of the leadership
positions being held by women (Valdez and Gomariz 1995: 169). Brazil has the least
women in party leadership, with only 8% of leadership positions being held by women
(ibid).
Strength of the Federal System
A third institutional factor to be considered in each of these nations is the role of
the federal system. In Argentina and Brazil, the federal system has historically played an
important role in the balance of power in the political system. In Mexico, the states in the
federal system have been less contentious, but the growth of regional strongholds for the
PAN and the PRI, the distinct position of the states bordering the U.S., as well as the
indigenous movement in Chiapas and the Southern states in Mexico may increase the
importance of the federal system on legislative behavior.
Argentina
While historically in Argentina the provinces and Buenos Aires have battled for
power, the consolidation of power in the national government during the military
dictatorship left the provinces with little power in the early years of democratization. In
1994, however, reforms were passed that strengthened the role of local and provincial
governments (Jones 1997: 294-295). This has increased the dispersion of power and
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increased the check that provinces have on the national government (ibid). This has also
led to a dispersion of power in the party structures. National legislators often have split
loyalties as they must balance the concerns of provincial level party leadership and
national party leadership in order to gain access the ballot for purposes of reelection
(Jones 2002: 159). Dissenters among the party often do so on the basis of provincial
party pressures rather than individual or district level concerns (ibid).
Brazil
In Brazil, the distinct nature of the states and regions in its federal system is not
connected to party organizations. “[S]tate loyalties make it more difficult for presidents
to pull together reliable coalitions [in the legislature]” (Mainwaring 1997: 83). In
addition, state and local governments have a large share of the tax income and governors
have a substantial amount of power (ibid). In the Brazilian Congress, “coalitions must
include parties and regions” (84). Governors have a significant influence on state
delegations, and legislators work to pass policies that aid the state. In particular,
legislators work to provide allocative legislation and debt reductions to their state (Ames
2002: 190). This indicates that the federal system serves as an important constitutional
constraint on the policy making process (Mainwaring 1997: 85).
Mexico
In Mexico, the federal system is much weaker as it is highly centralized.
Although Mexico has become more decentralized over the last twenty years, nonetheless,
“Mexico has one of the most centralized governments in the world, even when compared
with unitary systems of government” (Mizrahi 2004:37). The majority of money flows
from federal revenues, and the parties are centralized. This party centralization keeps
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avenues of power centralized as well. As reelection is not a possibility, and as the
national party determines nominations, there is little incentive for legislators to pursue
policies which specifically benefit their region (Weldon 1997: 252).
Constitutional Structure
The specific provisions of the constitutional structures in Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico create constraints and opportunities for legislators and the methods by which they
relate to their constituents. These three nations present variations in structure in their
legislative-executive powers and their electoral system. An examination of these two
types of constitutional provisions provides context for legislative behavior and
representation.
Legislative-Executive Relationship
An important constraint on an individual legislator’s behavior is the legislative
power either constitutionally granted to the executive or the power the president is able to
utilize through his role as head of the party. In Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, these
powers vary dramatically. These variations are important constraints on legislative
behavior.
Argentina
In 1994, the constitutional presidential power in Argentina was dramatically
decreased. Until then, the president had wide power to issue decrees, appoint the
Supreme Court, and possessed a strong veto power (Jones 1997: 297; Mainwaring and
Shugart 1997:43). The veto power is still in effect and requires a 2/3 vote of the
legislature to override (ibid). Additionally, Argentina has a provision for the line-item
veto in fiscal legislation, which greatly increases the president’s ability to set the agenda
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and shape policy (44). The reforms of 1994 reduced the presidential decree power
through specific language, appointees are subject to congressional approval, and the
legislature has exclusive right to introduce legislation in several important policy areas
(49; Jones 1997: 293). The president can rely, however, upon support from a well-
disciplined party delegation in the legislature, as well as the traditional power advantages
of agenda setting, a greater pool of resources to formulate policy, and the inherent
advantage of being Head of State. Mustapic (2002) argues that the president makes use
of legislators within his party to be his advocates in the congress (37). This firm party
discipline, along with other constitutional powers, has helped presidents overcome policy
opposition from opposition legislatures (25).
Brazil
In Brazil, the president has “proactive” constitutional legislative authority
(Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 49). This indicates the ability to issue decrees, and the
right of exclusive introduction of important legislation, coupled with a weak veto (ibid).
The congress is unable to create programs that are not in the president’s budget, so there
is no room for congressional creativity and policy leadership (Mainwaring 1997: 62).
The Brazilian president possesses the most dominant constitutional powers among the
three countries examined. In addition, the de facto extension of decree power, agenda-
setting power, and the high absenteeism of congress each add to the power of the
Brazilian president (Mainwaring 1997: 56, 60, 63, 64-65). “Since 1985, [presidents]
have frequently governed by decree” (56). This excessive amount of power is the result
of an inattentive and fragmented congress. Should congress or other branches protest, the
Supreme Court has overridden Presidential decrees as unconstitutional (63).
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While it is clear that the constitutional powers of the Brazilian President are
substantial, the Congress restricts the President’s policy choices on a regular basis. The
president must negotiate heavily with the congress in order to pass legislation. Often, the
President will choose not to submit legislation to the congress if he does not have the
necessary votes, additionally, the rigorous committee process ensures that presidential
policies do not make it out of congress unchanged (Ames 2002: 189-190).
Mexico
Mexican presidents have moderately strong legislative powers. A president can
initiate legislation himself, the constitution does not require that a Member of Congress
sponsor legislation. In addition, he is able to veto legislation in its entirety or in part, but
it must be sent back to congress in its entirety for approval. The veto override requires a
2/3 majority vote, making the veto a strong tool (Weldon 1997: 227). The president,
however, cannot issue decrees, cannot veto constitutional amendments, and cannot take
emergency actions without congressional approval (ibid). The president derives the
majority of his power from informal means. The president has agenda-setting powers
and has suspended civil liberties when there has been no emergency, creating a precedent
for extra-constitutional activity (ibid). According to Weldon, the “president’s main
power comes from being head of the PRI” (252). The change in party power, the
regional differences in support of the PAN and the PRI, the relatively weak presidential
powers, and the increase in democratic party processes have resulted in a more
democratically institutionalized party system and weak presidential powers.
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Electoral Structure
If representatives are to “act in a way generally responsive to the wishes of their
constituents” (Pitkin 1967: 232) then individual legislators must carve out constituencies
and respond to them. It social groups, such as women, Uighers, or evangelicals are
spread throughout geographic constituencies, then an electoral system that relies
completely on geographic districts might very well squash the voices of these groups. If
an electoral system is utilized that relies entirely on party lists, and the “greater good,”
though ideological parties are the focus, then regions of the nations may suffer from
neglect. Finally, functional (economic) group representation may leave out social groups
and non-developed regions altogether.
A mixed electoral system with flexible parties and a diverse legislature provides
the best opportunity for a diversity of representative focus, responsiveness, and goals.
The electoral structure in each of these nations differs significantly. The district
magnitude, the party’s role in nominations, and electoral quotas each serve as a constraint
on a legislator’s method of representation. As these institutional structures vary across
nations, so to does legislative behavior.
Argentina
In Argentina, the Deputies are elected from large multi-member districts. The
average district magnitude is 6.24 for seats in the Lower House in the Argentine
Congress, and the votes for parties are proportionally transformed into seats in Congress
utilizing the d’Hondt method. Each district is associated with a regional area within a
state. Deputies may stand for reelection to the Congress, and their seats are up for
reelection every four years, but the House is split in reelection, so that half the House is
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re-elected every two years, so not every Deputy is elected concurrent with the president.
Incumbents must be party approved to gain access to the ballot, and the voters choose
their representatives through use of a party vote and list. In the Upper House, Senators
are elected every six years, and there are three elected from each province, this is also
split, and also does not occur entirely concurrently with the Presidential elections
(Schiavon 2004). The national and provincial parties each exercise a firm hand in
determining which names receive a place on the ballot, and in what order of selection
each candidate is placed. National parties have a greater control over reelection prospects
than do district voters or local party leadership, although provincial parties do wield some
power.
Brazil
In Brazil, the Deputies are elected from large multi-member districts. The
average district magnitude is 18.68, and the candidates who gain the most votes gain
seats in the Congress. Each district represents the people within a regional area within a
state, and representatives live in that district. Each member can stand for reelection as
often as she wishes, the voters choose their representatives by name, and elections are
held every four years. As a result, parties play only a minor role in the election of
candidates to office. Candidates run as a member of a party, but individual legislators
have very close ties to the state level party and district and are recognized and chosen by
name. Unlike Argentina, the national party has little voice in the nomination process. In
the Upper House, three persons per state are elected to office, and they are elected to
office every eight years. While the Lower House is elected concurrently with the
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presidential election, the Upper House is only partially elected in the presidential election
year (Schiavon 2004).
Mexico
In Mexico, the electoral system is mixed. In the Lower House, most deputies
(300) are elected from single member districts, but nearly half (200) are elected
proportionally through a single multi-member district. The single member districts are
geographically bound within states, and the single member district vote is for a party
designated and named representative. The multi-member district encompasses the entire
nation, and votes are proportionately transformed into seats in the Congress through the
d’Hondt system. Deputies cannot stand for consecutive reelection to the Congress, but
may stand for election to other elected offices or be appointed to public offices, if the
party nominates the representative. As a result, the national party determines the career
path of representatives. The party at the national level is the sole method to attain career
advancement in the political arena. In the Mexican Senate, the reelection ban also
applies, but instead of the three-year terms served by the Deputies, Senators serve six-
year terms which are elected concurrently with the presidential term in office (Schiavon
2004).
Role of Party in the Electoral System
The role of the party in the electoral system also varies greatly. The role of party
in nominations and the financing of candidates can substantially constrain the choices and
focus of representation for a legislator. Strong party control over nominations and the
sources of funding shapes the focus of representation toward party representation.
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Argentina
In Argentina, the party system is highly disciplined (Larkins 1998). Nominations
for national office occur at the national party level, and indeed, many local office
nominations are made jointly by the national and local party organizations. In order to be
considered for a position, a person must maintain the support of the party (ibid).
Campaign finance is nationally based and is regulated and distributed at the party level.
Less than 20% of funding is public (Nelson 1999). The remaining sources for funds
collected by the party are undisclosed. This implies that the people who are funding the
party not only have a great deal of discretion regarding the direction of the party, but also
are not publicly accountable for their role in politics.
Brazil
Brazil has a lower party discipline (Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán 1997). Party
organization is regionally and state based, with more power residing at the state level
than at the national level (Samuels 2002, 2003). Nominations of candidates to elected
office occur at the local level, and so the state based party structure and values are more
instrumental in the election of deputies than is the national party structure. There is no
limit placed on funding. Political parties provide some funds but outside sources can
give directly to candidates as well. Parties provide a financial report if court review is
undertaken, but there are no sanctions or funding limits, so the court review is merely a
fact-finding exercise (Nelson 1999).
Mexico
In Mexico, party discipline is high. Parties determine who is nominated for what
office, and with no possibility of immediate reelection, it is difficult for Deputies to gain
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personal power within their district. The national party is responsible for the organization
of the local party power structure, and is ultimately the decision-maker regarding
nominations. As immediate reelection is impossible, the party is also the method by
which a person attains his proximate post within the political structure. Campaign
finance regulation has been in place in Mexico since 1993. The source of the majority of
funds in campaigns comes from the public sector and is channeled through the party.
Controls on party revenue and expenditures are enforced through penalties for
overspending. Individuals and non-profit organizations are highly regulated, and foreign
citizens, religious officials, and private corporations are prohibited from giving to
political campaigns. The primary emphasis of laws governing the public money provided
to parties is the support of party building activities. These laws also encourage and
provide funds for small parties (Ullua 2000).
Electoral Quotas
As noted by Htun and Jones, cooperative parties are necessary to the success of
quotas (1999). Party leadership may even be, as demonstrated by the Mexican case,
more important than quotas. The substantially larger proportion of women in party
leadership in Mexico seems to account for the significantly higher number of women in
the national legislature in Mexico as compared to the number of women who hold
national legislative office in Brazil. Table 3-1 below shows the type of national quota,
the percent of women in party leadership, the percent of women in national legislative
seats in 2001 (directly after the advent of quotas), and the percent of women in legislative
seats in 1993 in each nation.
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Table 3-1: Women’s Leadership









Argentina Winnable30% 8.0% 26.5% 13.2%
Brazil 20% 4.7% 5.7% 7.4%
Mexico Party 17.0% 16.0% 13.8%
(Sources: International Parliamentary Union 2001 and Valdes and Gomariz 1995: 164, 169)
In Argentina, the multi-member districts and predetermined party lists give parties
more control over who the candidates in each district will be. In 1997, Argentina adopted
a law mandating that women be nominated for 30% of all “winnable” positions on party
lists. As a result of this strict mandate, and the strict control that the party has concerning
nominations, in the 2003 elections, women gained 33.7% of the Congressional seats.
In Brazil, a similar law mandates that women make up 20% of all party
nominated candidates in each district. This ensures that women make it on to the ballot,
but as votes are cast for individuals rather than parties, the parties do not have control
over who is elected to office. Additionally, as a response to this mandate, the parties in
Brazil merely added more names to the list of candidates for office. While the percentage
of women in Congress has increased since 1993, it has been a slow increase, and not
clearly attributable to quotas. Immediately after quotas were put into effect, women’s
representation levels actually dropped, but currently women sit 8.6% of the seats, an
increase of only 1.2%. The self-determination of candidates in Brazil restricts the
effectiveness of this law in the election of women.
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In Mexico, no law existed prior to 2003 to mandate the number of women who
are nominated for office. Two parties, however, the PRD and the PRI, had internal rules
that required a certain number of women be nominated to office in the national Congress.
The PAN, the conservative party, had not embraced a similar rule, but had increased its
nomination of women as well. The contagion theory espoused by Matland and Studlar
(1996) provides an explanation for this behavior. In the Mexican system the party has
much more control over nominations than in Brazil. Although 80% of the districts are
single-member, the ban against immediate reelection allows the party a great deal of
discretion in the nomination process. As a result, the 2000 elections resulted in the
election of women to 16% of the seats in Congress. These women worked together to
pass a national law which required that 30% of nominees for election be women. The
2003 elections resulted in the election of women to 22% of the seats in Congress.
The electoral quota laws in Argentina and Brazil, which require that a certain
number of women are nominated to legislative seats, are the products of women’s
movements. In some countries, these types of laws have been more effective than others.
In 1991, Argentina became the first Latin American country to institute quotas for
women’s representation in the legislature. By law, 30% of all persons on party lists in
each district must be female (Valdes and Gomariz 1995:137; Rodriguez 1998:10). Brazil
followed suit in 1997. Brazil statutorily requires that 20% of all party lists be comprised
of women. Yet, these laws have not had similar effects. The primary difference has been
in the application of the law by the parties. In Argentina, the law requires that 30% of
“winnable positions” are held by women, in Brazil, this distinction was not made (Htun
and Jones 1999: 6; Rodriguez 1998; Valdes and Gomariz 1995). In Mexico, the PRI and
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the PRD have instituted 30% quotas for women in nominations, but the PAN has not
followed suit. These are self-imposed quotas and not legally binding on the parties
(Rodriguez 1998: 10). In 2002, the Mexican Congress, led by women in the Congress,
passed a quota law for female representation in the national legislature.
While a well-written quota law seems to be responsible for the Argentine
women’s rapid increase in representation, a quota is not the only institutional factor that
leads to increased positions of power for women. In 2003, women’s nominations and
electoral success surpassed the quota requirements in Argentina. Currently, 33.7% of the
national legislature is comprised of women. It is clear that the Argentine jump in female
representatives in their national legislature is more substantial than in the other two
nations. This change may be attributed to a combination of the “winnable” provision in
the quota law and the parties’ cooperation, as well as district magnitude or to the length
of time quotas have been instituted (Htun and Jones 1999: 14).
It also appears that in 2001, women had reached a “critical mass” of
representation in the national legislatures of Argentina and Mexico. As discussed earlier,
a critical mass is theorized to be reached when women attain 15-20% of the seats in a
legislature (Thomas 1991; Matland and Studlar 1996). Achieving critical mass indicates
that policy outputs are much more likely to reflect women’s influence and that women
will be elected at rates equal to men (Matland and Studlar 1996). This is examined in
terms of office holding in 2005, which incorporates changes in quota laws, the
achievement of critical mass, and the effect on policy input and the Congressional
leadership positions held by women in the following table.
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Table 3-2: Women in the Legislature 2005
% Women
Congress
Electoral Structure Policy Influence
Argentina 33.7 Quotas, closed party lists,
30% of winnable positions
are women, multi member
districts
Active on policy and
women’s issues, but do
not hold key positions in
the Congress
Brazil 8.6 Quotas, multi member
districts where individuals
run for office, 25% of the
party nominated is female
Active on policies and
women’s issues: education
children, family, no key
positions in the Congress
Mexico 23.7 Quotas incorporated to the
federal level. The
electoral system is mixed:
Single Member and
Proportional List
Highly active on women’s
issues, hold key positions
in the Congress.
Source: International Parliamentary Union 2005; Original Government Documents Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
Women in the Public Sphere
Women have found much more political space through informal political
participation, but this is at the member level more so than at the leadership level. There
are distinct class differentiations between the formal and the informal level, as noted by
Rodriguez (1998). Those women who achieve office in the formal sphere are middle and
upper-class women, while the informal level is overwhelmingly populated by lower and
working class women participants (Rodriguez 1998:6).
Women have been active in the union movements in Latin America since the
Nineteenth Century. Their roles were marginalized once the unions became more
hierarchical and established and considered a legitimate player in national politics
(Valdes and Gomariz 1995: 171). In the 1990s, women made up less than 9% of the
leadership in unions (172). Neighborhood cooperatives, which are overwhelmingly
populated by women, have an overwhelming majority of male leaders (173-174). This
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same pattern is seen in professional organizations, even in those professions, such as
teaching, which have a greater number of women than men (175).
Conclusion
Latin American nations share similar origins, political histories and governmental
designs. These similarities illuminate the role that differences in governmental and
societal structures have upon stability and democracy. Three significant points of
departure among Latin American nations are the degree of party system
institutionalization, the specific constitutional provisions of their presidential
governmental design, and the strength of the federal system. A more institutionalized
party system creates a strong link between society and government. This institutional
framework lends legitimacy to government and the processes of governance in the face of
economic crises, liberalizing movements, expansion of suffrage, internal conflict, and
external pressures. Additionally, the stability and legitimacy of a democratic government
rests on the ability of the president and the legislature to both effectively govern and to
represent the interests of its people. The party structure greatly affects how the
constitutional provisions governing the interaction between the legislature and the
president will work toward this goal.
The Argentine and Mexican examples seem to indicate that the interaction of
“party system” and president’s legislative power” constitutes a significant constraint on
legislative freedom. These constraints determine how a legislator will act. Both the
Argentine and Brazilian systems strongly demonstrate that another factor is critical: the
role of federalism. Constitutional dispersion of legislative power, in conjunction with
party institutionalization and state based power are critical in understanding the
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environment in which legislators make policy decisions and determine how to represent
their constituents.
While women have made strides toward equality in these three countries, there is
clearly a great amount of ground to cover. The factors that seem to be most strongly
associated with the representation of women in these countries include well-written and
specific quota laws, women’s leadership in parties, and integrated women’s movements.
The date of suffrage and number of women in lower offices seem to have only marginal
association with the representation of women.
Institutions are both the products of these historical patterns and the determinants
of future policy choices and behaviors. Understanding these institutions and the
differences between Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico is essential to understand the choices
that policymakers make. The political history, party system, federalism and the
constitutional powers are important constraints on legislative behavior.
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Chapter 4: The Legislative Framework
The institutionalization and participation patterns of a Congress are important
factors that condition legislative behavior. While the measures of legislative
institutionalization vary and have been adapted by scholars, the measures stem primarily
from Polsby (1968). These measures can be generalized as: autonomy and importance of
committees (Polsby 1968: 153, Chaffey 1970: 192), which is discussed here as committee
system strength, autonomy and specialization of legislators (Polsby 1968: 146), which is
operationalized here as level of individual bill authorship, and use of seniority and
disparate leadership positions (160, Chaffey 1970: 196). Internal organization is
somewhat shaped by the factors discussed in the preceding chapters: political history,
electoral structure, party structure, federalism, and executive power, but legislators are
ultimately responsible for the choices made regarding the internal organization (Battista
2003). The participation choices condition how an individual legislator is able to
advance policy and career goals within the legislature, and the degree to which
underrepresented groups, once they gain representation, are able to advance policy goals.
The effect of quotas in increasing women’s membership in these legislatures is
conditioned by these internal institutions and avenues of participation. In accordance
with this, participation patterns are also discussed in this chapter as a precursor to the
models in the following chapters. These discussions include an individual legislator’s
participation in committees, the type of legislation produced by individuals, and
membership in the leadership.
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The structure of government in each of these nations allows for a similar systems
comparison. While the constitutional structures are similar, each committee system, level
of authorship, seniority system and leadership structure is distinct and offers an important
context for legislative behavior. As constitutional reform, democratic sentiment, and
electoral circumstances change, the legislators of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico respond.
Across all three systems, significant changes have occurred to allow the individual
legislator more discretion in achieving his goals as an elected representative. How the
members of these legislatures choose to use organizational tools such as committees and
leadership indicates how legislators view their roles, policy paths, and career options. .
Institutional factors dictate how much power an individual legislator has over the creation
and amendment of policy through individual authorship. The absence of a seniority
system results in a weak committee system, leaving the power of policy making in the
hands of the few in the leadership. A more centralized leadership system leaves little
opportunity for individuals, and while seniority systems serve as a delaying force to the
advancement of historically disenfranchised groups, the uniformity of this type of system
is an eventual aid to these groups. Informal norms often determine, however, how
effective members may be in a legislature (Anderson et al 2003). The reliance upon
informal avenues to gain power may be the more permanent block to policy power for
outsiders in these systems (Heath et al 2005).
Committee System
An examination of committees is based upon two rationales. The first reason for
studying committee systems, as indicated above, is to understand the structure, which
indicates the degree of institutionalization of a legislative system (Olson and Crowther
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2003). This chapter will utilize measurements of committee system institutionalization to
show differences in institutionalization between the three subject legislatures, so that
degrees of institutionalization may be taken into account as we examine differences in
representational behavior.
The second purpose behind investigating committees is to directly examine
legislative behavior. Individual legislator activity while serving on a committee provides
an important indicator of legislative behavior. Peter Hall in Participation in Congress
(1996) finds that committee activity is the best indicator of the representative and
legislative behavior of Members of Congress. Committee activity includes committee
choice, bill authorship, and amendment participation. Representative activity in
committee provides invaluable insight for understanding the priorities of legislators and
the degree of congruence between constituents and the legislator. Legislator preferences
for certain committee assignments reflect personal policy goals, power goals, and
constituency representation goals (Fenno 1973).
Committee System Strength
The committee system is the key to understanding how a legislature functions.
Committee strength is utilized as a measure of legislative institutionalization, strength
and role in policy making (Olson and Crowther 2003). Several models have been utilized
to analyze committee systems’ degree of institutionalization and the primary players in
committees across legislatures. The differences between these models are the premises
upon which they rest. While the distributive theory (Shepsle and Weingast 1987;
Weingast and Marshall 1988), would posit that the structure of systems is that of
autonomous jurisdiction over distinct policy areas, the informational theory (Gilligan and
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Krehbiel 1989; Krehbiel 1992) would posit that the structure is built for efficiency and
the transfer of information, and the partisan agent model (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991;
Cox and McCubbins 1993) would argue that committees are only the means by which the
party agenda is transferred into legislation. Corresponding to this are the premises that
committees output policy that is the preference of individual legislators who are
preference outliers (Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988), the
preference of the median legislator (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; Krehbiel 1992), or the
party leadership (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993). These
models are most likely useful at different points in a particular legislature’s cycle, and are
dependent for their significance according to the degree of partisanship and the degree of
centralization of power. The less centralized the power is, the more likely that the
distributive model applies to a legislature, as individuals seek independent goals.
Accordingly, the partisan agent model would be most useful in a highly centralized and
partisan legislature, and the informational model may be useful at the center point of this
spectrum.
While each of the above models is useful for the analysis of one legislative
system, they are not as useful for comparisons across systems. The veto player model
(Jun 2004; Tsebelis 1995, 2001; Tsebelis and Money 1997) and the system strength
model (Mattson and Strøm 1995), however, are more useful models to compare
institutionalization across systems. Olson and Crowther (2003), for example, utilize
these committee structure models to examine the comparative degree of legislative
institutionalization in the nations of post-communist Eastern Europe.
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In order to understand the constraints placed upon legislators, one must determine
what degree of power is wielded by a particular legislature’s committee system. This
may differ according to the strength of parties and centralization, as discussed above.
Three models are useful for the examination of a legislature over time: the distributive,
informational, and partisan agent model. The distributive model posits that committees
are autonomous, possess controlling power over policy within their jurisdiction, and are
made up of self-selected members whose interests are skewed from that of the median
member (Shepsle and Weingast 1987). The informational model posits that committees
propose legislation which is preferred by the chamber as a whole, are designed to
improve efficiency and the transfer of information, and additionally, the preferences of
members of committees approximate the preferences of the median member (Krehbiel
1992: 123). The partisan agent model posits committees and members are agents of
parties and represent the interests of the party (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Scholars have
argued that the three preceding models are each partially explanatory and are
complementary when applied to the U.S. system (Shepsle and Weingast 1994; Jun 2003).
These theories address internal structures in a particular time frame in a single legislative
system, and as such, they do not account for the external factors that may impact the
power of committees.
Two models that are more fitting for the examination and comparison of multiple
systems are the veto player model and the system strength model. The veto player model
(Tsebelis 1995; Jun 2003) addresses the role of external influences. In particular, this
model demonstrates that the power of committees is increased by presidential systems,
divided government, a split majority or coalition government in the legislature (Jun
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2003). For the purposes of comparison of systems in this dissertation, the veto player
model in conjunction with the Mattson and Strøm (1995) system strength model is the
most useful means of analysis.
According to the first component of the veto player model, the committee system
in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have a strength advantage over parliamentary systems
by virtue of the congressional-presidential constitutional structure. In each of these
systems the legislature provides an important check on the power of the executive. While
these three legislatures have historically been “reactive” rather than “proactive” (Nacif
and Morgenstern 2002), each legislature wields more power over policy in terms of
initiation and autonomy than does a parliament (Tsebelis 1995).
The second component of the veto player model is the role of divided or coalition
government. It is expected that the divided government in Mexico and the coalition
government in Brazil add to the power of their committee systems. In Argentina, the
veto player model would suggest that the single party government that has been in power
throughout the early 2000s reduces the committees’ ability to set their own agenda and
promulgate independent legislation (Tsebelis 1995).
Committee system strength is gauged by the importance of the committee stage in
policy formation, their authority to redraft legislation, and their methods for obtaining
information (Mattson and Strøm 1995). According to this model, the particular
committee systems in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have the constitutional structures
that would enable them to be significantly powerful on the scale of committee system
strength. In all three of these systems, committee input and consideration is necessary for
a bill to be adopted; however only in Argentina does the committee have the ability to
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freely and completely rewrite a bill. In Brazil, amendment, often significant, is possible
in all legislative stages, but in Mexico there are limits to committee amendment (Weldon
2002). In all three subject legislatures, the committees can summon witnesses and
documents from the executive branch or sources external to the government (ibid).
A final consideration in gauging the strength of a committee system is its ability
to oversee the executive. In Argentina, the bureaucracy and the committees are parallel.
There is little institutional stability in the bureaucracy, as the civil service is subject to a
patronage system. As a result, this system produces an adversarial relationship between
the Congress and the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy is made of political appointees, and
so does not have any loyalty to the Congress, but rather, operates at the behest of the
executive. Committees can call ministers to account and to testify, however, and this is a
regular tool of the Argentine legislature. In Brazil the committee members and the
administrative agencies exist in a symbiotic relationship. This symbiotic relationship is
somewhat detrimental to legislative committees, as there is greater professionalization in
the Ministries. Ministry officials have more autonomy and power than do individual
legislators. In Mexico, the committee system somewhat mirrors administrative agencies,
and these committees use oversight tools to address problems in the executive branch.
The Mexican Congress has the added advantage of special topic committees that are not
directly parallel to departments in the government. These committees demonstrate the
autonomy of the Congress in relationship to the executive.
Committee Participation
Legislators’ committee placement is at the parties’ discretion in Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico (Jones 2002; Nacif 2002; Samuels 2002), but interviews indicate that there is
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also a degree of self-selection. In interviews, legislators from each nation indicated that
they were on certain committees due to their expertise and preference. As one Deputy in
Brazil said, “I am a doctor, so of course I serve on the committee for health.” This self-
selection provides insight on personal preferences, but the overall pattern of committee
placement provides evidence of informal constraints within the system. For example,
while studies on committee membership in the United States have shown that women
have been traditionally placed on committees that pertain to “women’s issues,” these
studies also show that women have received unequal placement on “power committees.”
There is a great deal of debate over whether women are on women’s issue committees
based upon their preference or whether it is the “ghettoization” of women to certain
policy areas (Thomas 1994; Heath et al 2005).
The placement of women on committees that deal with “traditional women’s
issues” may indicate a general preference of women for a distinct set of issues that are not
preferred by men. In order to discuss women’s issue committees, it is important to
determine what, exactly, those are as a definition of women’s issues is not uniformly
accepted across the literature. For example, Swers includes both feminist issues, “those
which seek to achieve role equity or role change for women,” and traditional women’s
issues that include “both liberal and conservative proposals concerning issues such as
health care, poverty assistance and education” which “highlight women’s traditional roles
as caregivers and have served as women’s gateway to political participation throughout
history” (Swers 2002a: 264). Wolbrecht’s definition, however, is more specifically
focused on women; she defines women’s issues as “those for which women are the
intended beneficiary constituency or object. This definition does not include numerous
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policies where women have been traditionally expected to have greater interest, such as
those pertaining to the family, children, and other private or domestic sphere concerns”
(Wolbrecht 2002: 173). This dissertation uses the Swers (2002, 2002a) definition, as it
seems more appropriate. In the 1980s in Argentina, it was women, grieving mothers
acting on behalf of their children, who were aided in a return to democracy. It was also
during this time in Brazil that women acted on the behalf of the poor to change the
autocratic regime. As Swers (2002, 2002a) indicates, the feminist issues are properly
considered women’s issues, but so too are the issues where women act on behalf of
others.
If the issues above are to be considered women’s issues, and of particular concern
to women, then necessarily, they are not men’s issues. If this is the case, then
historically, men would account these issues of lesser value when structuring the
committee system, and as a result, the committees in these issue areas have had less
power traditionally. As a result, even if the placement of women on these committees
reflects their preference, the lack of placement on committees that have more power over
allocations, interest group support and major policy outcomes also indicates their lack of
power in the institution (Thomas 1994; Heath et al 2005).
Argentina
By the measure of committee system strength used above, the Argentine
committee system is the strongest due to its ability to freely redraft legislation at all
stages of the process (Mattson and Strøm 1995). This strength is somewhat depleted,
however, by the environment of single-party dominance (Tsebelis 1995). In Argentina,
the committees have significant power concerning legislative content; however, two
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factors limit this effectiveness. The first limiting factor is the power of the leadership to
bypass the committee structure through use of the committee of the whole. This is used
to fast track legislation and in an era of single party government is often used to advance
the president’s policy goals. The second limiting factor is the extensive overlap of
committee jurisdiction.
Argentine legislators, when interviewed, expressed unanimously that the
committee system was the best method for advancing policy, rather than utilizing party
leadership, bureaucratic ties, individual relationships, or floor action, but a significant
portion of the interviewed legislators cited jurisdiction overlap as a burden to the system.
These legislators differed along party lines as to how best to reconcile this problem.
Members of the governing party favored the use of the committee of the whole, as is
indicated below:
The committee process is problematic because each bill has to pass
through many committees and it is difficult to preserve the essence. The
Chamber provides a better method. (Argentine Deputy 40: 2003)
While Deputies from the opposition parties favored better organization of the system as a
whole:
The rules of technical legislative procedure are not clear, and as it is now,
a project of law is sent to five committees, and as a result, the projects fail.
Fewer committees involved in the amendment of a project would aid this
process. By tacit rule, the projects are taken before the assembly, and
there we are allowed to question, but it is difficult to do so. It is absolutely
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undemocratic. It becomes partisan and the public is not made aware of the
different positions. Argentine Deputy 198: 2003
The Argentine committee system employs a degree of seniority, as legislative
experience is necessary to achieve a committee chair, but as there is a low level of
reelection of legislators, it is not highly sophisticated. Provincial delegations within each
party play a critical role in the selection of committee chairs. This demonstrates that
power is decentralized, and that legislators must be responsive to provincial pressures as
well as national party pressure.
The chamber as whole can undertake important legislation, leaving the
jurisdictional committees out of the loop, but this is a rare occurrence (Jones 2002:181).
Committees within the Argentine system are relatively strong, but in this era of single
party control, the president and the governing party currently wield more power than do
the committees. One deputy noted:
Because the President’s party is in control of the Congress, we usually
must do what the President wants, but we exact conditions in the budget
for our constituencies. Argentine Deputy 301: 2003
In Argentina, committees are organized according to party bloc. Each party
leader has substantial power and provides resources to individual legislators. These
resources include salary for staff. This sum increases if an individual is a committee
leader, or a member of the party directorate, but loyalty also increases the possibility of
greater resources directly from the leadership budget (Jones 2002: 179-180). While
provincial delegations provide pressure in committee placement, these perks provide
added incentives to legislators to adhere to party positions and the party agenda.
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Argentine legislators must carve out a niche that pleases both the national and provincial
parties while trying to pursue their own goals and representative responsibilities.
There are a number of highly valued committees; and membership on and
leadership of these committees allows legislators to gain capital both within the national
and within the provincial party structure. The four most prominent committees are
Impeachment, Foreign Affairs, Budget and Finance, and Constitutional Affairs, while
Energy and Fuel, General Legislation, Justice, Education, Housing, Joint Library of
Congress, and, naturally, the Rules Committee are also highly desired appointments
(181). Jones finds that the vast majority of legislation is dealt with and decided
exclusively in committee, and once a bill leaves committee it is in its final form, for while
floor proposals and speaking are allowed, without party support, these measures are
easily defeated (ibid). While these findings would seem to indicate that committees have
a great deal of discretion over legislation, the overlap of jurisdiction and the use of the
committee of the whole may reduce the ability of independent legislators to make policy
through a single jurisdictional committee.
Women’s participation in the Argentine Congress has gradually increased, and as
of the 2003 elections, women held more than one-third of the lower house seats. Female
Deputies in Argentina are less likely to have experience in the Congress than are deputies
who are men, and thus, female legislators have less seniority. As discussed above, the
seniority system is not the only determinant of power in the Chamber of Deputies, and
this should aid members of underrepresented groups in the attainment of power.
Women’s representation on important committees in the Argentine legislature, however,
does not equal their representation in the Chamber as a whole.
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In 2004, women held one out of twenty-six leadership positions (3.8%), and less
than nineteen percent of the overall seats on the four most important committees. On the
remaining seven important committees, women fared much better. Women held nineteen
of the forty-six leadership positions, or 41%. They also held 62 of 163 seats on these
second-tier committees, or 38% (Argentina Chamber of Deputies). Heath, et al (2005)
address this issue, and find similarly, that women are systematically shunted to gender
and social committees and kept from power committees in Argentina. Women hold
20.6% of all committee chairs, while comprising 33.7% of the total membership in the
legislature (Argentina Chamber of Deputies). While the 1997 quota law mandates that
women be nominated for 30% of all “winnable” positions on party lists, and that has been
instrumental in women winning congressional seats, they have been less successful in
their ability to translate into policy power in the form of committee membership on
power committees and committee chairmanships. The comparatively lower number of
positions on critical committees or as chairs of committees indicates that women as
legislators will have a lesser impact on the most critical policies of the Argentine
legislature.
Female legislators in Argentina do, however, make up a greater percentage of
seats and leadership on social committees. Social committees are those committees
whose primary legislation provides benefits directly to individuals. These committees’
jurisdictions often intersect with issues that are considered “women’s issues.” As
discussed above, there is a debate in the literature as to what constitutes a women’s issue,
however, for the purpose of this dissertation, women’s issues may be divided in two
types, traditional women’s concerns such as education, care for others, children, the
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disabled, the environment and the elderly, and feminist issues, such as economic equality
and reproductive freedom (Swers 2002). While party placement is responsible for
committee membership, interviews indicate that there is also a degree of self-selection.
The number of women on these committees would seem to indicate that women in
Argentina consider social issues to be of a higher priority than do men. In 2003, women
made up 56% of the membership of social committees, while they composed 22% of the
body as a whole. Additionally, women made up 64% of the leadership on these
committees, and on the Family, Woman, Child and Adolescent committee, women
provided the overwhelming voice with 77% of the seats (Argentina Chamber of
Deputies). One female legislator noted:
I work with organizations that represent women, human rights groups,
ethnic groups, educational groups, and organizations which prevent and
treat addiction, because I am a specialist in this work. These are my
issues, my committees and my constituents. (Argentine Deputy 183: 2003)
The Argentine committee system provides the basis for legislation emanating
from the Congress. The leadership positions in this committee system are skewed in
favor of male legislators, as is membership on the key legislative committees. Women,
either by choice or through party relegation, comprise the majority of social committees
and the leadership of those committees, indicating that women have a greater influence
on social legislation. The primary caveat to this rule is the organization of the committee
system. The social committees do not stand alone, and much of the legislation in their
jurisdiction is also subject to review in the key legislative committees, which, due to the
disproportionate number of men on these key committees, ultimately limits the impact of
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women in the policy-making process even in the area of social legislation. In interviews,
both men and women cited the use of the committee system to advance either personal or
party policy goals, they were less likely to cite committee use as a resource to address
geographic constituent interests.
Brazil
The Brazilian committee system is highly integrated with the administrative
agencies with which they correspond. “Executive branch dominates policy making by
controlling the overall agenda and maintaining most of the initiative and technical
capacity for submitting legislation” (Samuels 2003:44). Committees have a “secondary
and imprecise role” (Figueiredo and Limongi 1996: 28). Committee chairs are replaced
on a yearly basis, and deputies rarely remain on the same committee for a full two-year
legislative session. There is no seniority built into the committee system. Samuels
argues that the lack of seniority is due to a limited desire for a long-term career in the
Camara (2003: 89-96). In 2004, 43.3% of Committee Chairs were freshman members in
their second year of their first session (Original Government Documents 2004). Samuels
argues that committee assignment is rarely tied to technical expertise, but rather to
personalistic deals. He further posits that personal prestige proves to be a more important
factor for leadership than is experience in the Chamber (ibid). Interview data with
deputies, however, indicates that committee membership is tied closely to expertise and
policy preferences. Deputies indicated that they use their position to deal with
administrative agencies to procure goods for their constituents as well as fulfill policy
goals. One legislator noted:
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The Chamber of Deputies is a microcosm of Brazil. You have people of
every occupation here and we use that expertise to address problems of
public policy from all angles. I am a medical doctor, so, of course, I serve
on the committee for health. (Brazilian Deputy 328: 2003)
Seven other legislators echoed this sentiment, and as one Deputy stated:
The Chamber … represents states and many professions, many great
people are here and this facilitates more discussion. There are elites and
non-elites who are represented here. (Brazilian Deputy 333: 2003)
In terms of policy advancement, deputies use the close connection with the
ministries to extract allocative goods for their constituents. Working on a committee
provides an opportunity to work with the ministers in a particular policy area, and the
ability to negotiate with the ministry for resources. One deputy noted:
There is no balance between the legislature and the executive, it is 90%
executive, I use my committee to make contacts with the ministry and
apply to the ministry for resources for my state. (Brazilian Deputy 408:
2003)
While this sentiment regarding executive power was prevalent throughout the
interviewed deputies, many deputies saw the possibility for change. As Brazilian Deputy
333 noted, “If the elephant knew its strength, it would run the circus.” There is evidence
in the changes in the committee structure that the elephant is beginning to know its
strength in Brazil.
In committee you can put forth your objectives and defend them, as the
chair of the committee, I am going to defend the interests of the party.
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This session, through agreement of the parties, four committees were
created to organize and reform the structure of lawmaking. These four
committees are all headed by the governing party, and they ultimately
determine whether a law is passed or not. (Brazilian Deputy 272: 2003)
Prior to 2003, only one committee wielded significant power. The expansion of
routes of power in the Brazilian congress indicates that members of the legislature are
building power in the institution. The Joint Committee for Planning, Public Budget, and
Oversight, however, remains the most significant committee in the Brazilian legislature,
and it is responsible for the most important aspects of public policy (Samuels 2002: 317).
During the 2000-2004 period, this committee had a significant amount of retention, in
contrast to earlier findings by Samuels. Over this period, there were no first year
freshman admitted to the membership, and 73% of all members had served on the
committee for at least two years. In contrast to findings on other committees, leaders of
this committee had served on the committee at least three times. This indicates that a
seniority system may be developing in terms of the most powerful committees.
In terms of power and policy power within the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies,
women have been largely unsuccessful. The personalistic and individualistic paths to
power in the Brazilian Congress, and the political sphere as a whole is not conducive to
the election and the advancement of women. While electoral quotas have been made law,
women have not been able to successful use the quotas to gain representative seats in
proportion to these quotas. This obstacle to female election blocks what advantage
women might be able to gain through the high turnover rate and relative lack of seniority
in the committee system. Instead, the loose hierarchical structure in the Brazilian
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Congress makes it difficult to navigate the pathways of power without personal prestige
to back up your legislative deals. In 2004, women made up 2.9% of committee
presidents, and while these positions have little power, and are primarily used as voice
boxes for the party, it is still significant that women comprise significantly less of these
positions than their population in the legislature as a whole would indicate is equitable.
Perhaps more importantly, however, from 2000-2005, women, on average, comprised
2.44% of the seats on the Joint Committee for Planning, Public Budget, and Oversight,
while comprising 8-9% of the legislature as a whole. These two figures give weight to
the comments of one female legislator in Brazil, who stated, “The atmosphere [in the
legislature] is very chauvinistic, it is difficult to get anything done here if you are a
woman” Brazilian Deputy 413: 2003. She further offered that the most productive use of
her time had been in concert with the Ministries. As a respected expert in the field of
education, she planned to move to the national ministry when her legislative term
completed. While the other female deputies echoed this sentiment in terms of policy
production, only one other conveyed that she would seek a Ministry post upon the end of
her term.
Critical aspects of the Brazilian committee system include how legislators utilize
committee and leadership positions to represent their constituent’s interests, advance
policy goals, and expand their personal power in the larger political sphere. Women and
men utilize the contacts with the administrative agencies that are afforded by the
committee structure, but to different ends. Men utilize the committee connection as a
means to gain services and allocations for their district, in order to maximize their
political power in the district, whereas women utilize these connections primarily to
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advance policy interests and somewhat to acquire future administrative appointments.
While the Brazilian committee system is clearly weaker than is the Argentine system,
certain characteristics indicate a growing strength: the increase in power committees, and
thus an increase in power positions, and an increase in deputy generated legislation. The
Brazilian system’s coalition government provides the opportunity for the legislature to
utilize its constitutional powers, increasing its actual policymaking influence and
institutionalization. As the legislature becomes stronger and more institutionalized,
legislative career paths will become more desirable and vice versa.
Mexico
The strengths and weaknesses of the Mexican committee system can be seen in
the procedural safeguards of jurisdiction, duration of tenure, and the lack of seniority.
While the Mexican committee system does not have the power to fully rewrite legislation
as committees do in Argentina, it does have an important safeguard on its power that is
lacking in the Argentine system. The circumvention of committees to the committee of
the whole requires only a majority vote in the Argentine system, while in the Mexican
congress, a 2/3 super-majority is required (Nacif 2002:232). And while Mexican
deputies lack the possibility of immediate reelection, appointment to committees in the
Mexican Congress is for the duration of a three-year session, giving members a degree of
security and an ability to develop expertise (ibid. 273). The lack of reelection and thus,
the inability to build seniority in the institution puts the Mexican committee system at a
disadvantage overall, however, in terms of power and professionalization.
Committee seats are determined in proportion to party representation in the
chamber. Party leaders meet in the Comision de Regimen Interno y Concertacion
113
Politica (CRICP) in order to create a list of party membership. The legislature as a whole
is allowed to discuss the proposed list and must vote in approval of the committee
assignments within the first fifteen days of the session. The absence of a seniority system
and claims on assignments means that this approval is pro forma and as a result,
committee assignments are almost entirely at party discretion (2002: 273).
Nacif argues that the committee reports, while no longer a formality, created by
the leadership and distributed for signatures, are still a result of inter-party negotiations
by “disciplined agents of their political parties” within the committees, and as a result,
have not overall increased the independent power of committees (2002:275). Nacif does
note an exception to this rule in non-partisan policy issues that have the backing of the
executive (276). This observation may in part explain the independence and success of
the Gender and Equality committee, but it does not address what effect divided
government will have on the committee system as a whole.
Committee leadership, while not a product of seniority, is a product of experience
and party power. Unlike the committee system in Brazil, which rewards freshman
legislators with little or no experience with committee chairmanships, the Mexican
congress requires party leadership and experience for leadership appointment. This
power is built both inside and outside of the institution, so it does not indicate that
seniority in the legislature is a critical variable, but experience as a whole is important to
achieve leadership positions in the Mexican Congress. When I spoke with Deputies, they
would often offer names of Deputies who wielded power, and in doing so, would provide
partial lists of service and experience these Deputies had acquired. When I spoke with
those leaders, they would provide a similar list. The leaders’ accomplishments were
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consistent with Nacif’s (2002) observation that the leaders were experienced party agents.
The increase in independent legislation and the shifting of party power, however, has
opened the way for policy entrepreneurs. In particular, policy aimed at either symbolic
groups or the addition of allocations for geographic districts demonstrated an increasing
autonomy for legislators.
The Committee on Gender and Equality is made up almost entirely of female
legislators. Women make up 97% of the committee, as only one man serves. This
committee gave women an opportunity to work across party lines on women’s issues, and
according to interviews, women are the only group outside of parties that regularly ally.
This may have led to the success of female legislators in sponsoring and passing three
critical pieces of feminist legislation: a legally mandated quota system, a national center
for the advancement of women, and a national system protecting victims of domestic
abuse. The legally mandated quota system provides that women must be nominated for a
certain number of national level offices. This took the place of a law that had encouraged
parties to aid women toward leadership and national level representation, but did not set
percentages or make any specific requirements of parties.
The Congress also established a national center for women and gave funding for
victims of domestic abuse. The structure of the committee system allowed women the
opportunity to work together on women’s issues and presented a difficult hurdle for the
more conservative parties to surmount in terms of public perception. As one Panista
noted, “Once the bill [for the National Women’s Center] was on the floor, we had no
choice but to pass it; it looks bad to speak badly about women.” As a result, of these
committee placements, these controversial programs were able to pass the Congress.
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In other committees, women are also significant players, collaborating and
authoring bills. Women have been successful within the Mexican Congress’ committee
system due to the lack of seniority. The lack of seniority, in conjunction with a lack of
institutional staff and difficulty in building institutional memory weakens the committee
system and makes executive oversight difficult. A notable exception to this would be
“PemexGate” the Congressional investigation and action concerning corruption in the
national oil company, Pemex. For women, the absence of the seniority hurdle that has
been difficult to surmount in other systems and the rewarding of faithful party service
aids in women’s integration and institutional power building, as well as advancing policy
goals. With the advent of a fresh Congress every three years, the Congress has been able
to reflect changes in elite cultural norms regarding women’s role in the political sphere.
Women in Mexico also receive the allowances that are made for them by the machismo
culture in Mexico, primarily, a reluctance to speak publicly ill of women, and a certain
deference to women’s issues that focus on women’s traditional roles.
Within committees other than Gender and Equality, women made up 15% of the
committee chairs in the 2000-2003 Congress, and they held 18% of the total seats in the
Congress. As compared to the other systems in this study, this is a relatively equitable
percentage. Leadership on committees and authorship of bills within the committees
other than Gender and Equality, has shown a great amount of participation by women,
and has demonstrated a different emphasis than that of male legislators in the Mexican
Congress.
It is almost impossible for a seniority system to exist in the Mexican Congress,
and as a result, women have been able to achieve great strides in leadership positions on
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committees. Women have also been able to use the specific configurations of the
Mexican committee system and the inability of other social, geographic or functional
groups to work outside of party lines to effectively advance women’s issues.
Social Committee Participation
The committee system is a critical tool for legislatures to use in order to be
successful in fulfilling their constitutional duties of law promulgation, executive
oversight, and problem deliberation, and legislative power is dependent upon the ability
of legislative committees. The particular institutional configurations of the committee
systems in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico provide the environment for legislative
behavior. Women and other disadvantaged groups are able to take advantage of a
committee system that has little jurisdictional overlap, that has allowed them to work
across party lines on policy, are able to use the lack of strict seniority systems to advance
their personal power within the institution, but are restricted in terms by informal norms
in terms of committee placement and leadership. Several female legislators in Mexico
indicated that they chose to serve on the Committee on Gender and Equality, and the
overwhelming majority women held on that committee allowed them to advance
important policy and gain institutional power.
This analysis employs a logistic regression analysis to test the association
between a legislator’s sex and institutional variables with the dependent variable “social
committee membership.” Committee membership is an important measure of legislative
activity. It indicates on what areas of policy Deputies are likely to focus. Social
committees are classified similarly to that of other studies (Dodson and Carroll 1991;
Heath et al 2005). As discussed above, a social committee is a committee that has
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jurisdiction over policies that convey direct benefits to individuals. For the purposes of
this analysis, social committees also include feminist committees, such as Gender and
Equality, as well as traditional social committees such as health, education, social
security, the elderly, the disabled, and children. Social committee membership is a
dichotomous variable, and thus, binary logistic regression is used. Logistic regression
estimates the probability of a correlation between particular variables. The following
hypotheses stem from the literature.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Being a woman will increase the likelihood of placement
on a social committee.
As discussed above, women comprise a large percentage of social committee
membership in each of these nations. Women may be more likely to choose social
committee membership than are men, but party leadership is the final arbiter of
committee placement. Social committees do not have a place among the power
committees, and thus, a disproportionate placement indicates a lack of power for
women.
Hypothesis 2: Less experienced Deputies will be more likely to be
appointed to social committees.
Since social committees are not among the power committees, experienced
legislators will seek and be rewarded with fewer assignments to these committees. Social
committees, do, however, provide an opportunity for members to respond to
constituencies who clamor for greater services.
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Hypothesis 3: Deputies from districts with higher levels of women in the
state legislature will be more likely to serve on social committees.
As mentioned above, social committees provide an opportunity for members to
respond to constituencies who clamor for greater services. Deputies who have lower
district magnitude, along with the pressure of reelection, should have a higher probability
of appointment to social committees. While these committees do not provide the
opportunities that allocation committees do, district responsiveness should lead
representatives to seek committee assignments that allow them to be responsive to
reelection pressures.
Hypothesis 4: Deputies from districts with lower district magnitude,
especially in Argentina and Brazil, will be more likely to serve on social
committees.
A variable is included for right party, and for Argentina and Brazil. The
correlation between Mexico and the dependent variable will be seen in the constant. Two
sets of interaction variables are used. One set is an interaction with sex of the Deputy and
the institutional structure variables. It may be that a legislator’s sex may have a different
correlation with membership depending on institutional structures. The second set is the
interaction between two institutional structures, the nation and district magnitude. This is
to account for differences in the nomination and reelection potential in conjunction with
district magnitude in each nation. The equation for this model is presented in Figure 4-1.
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Ln[1/(1-p)] = α + b1X1 + b2X2 +….. + b8X8 [Figure 4-1]
where:
Ln[1/(1-p)] = Log of the Odds of Social Committee Membership
X1 = Woman
X2 = District Magnitude
X3 = Experience
X4 = Right Party
X5 = State Percent Women in Legislature
X6 = Argentina
X7 = Brazil
X8 = Woman x Right Party
For this analysis, the data from all legislators seated in Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico in 2002-2003 were examined. The results of this binary logistic regression
analysis are found in Table 4-1 below.




District Magnitude -0.090 (.060)
Experience 0.570 (.146)***
Right Party -0.088 (.145)
State % Women in Legislature 0.029 (.013)*
Argentina 0.122 (.329)
Brazil 1.636 (.280)***
Woman x Right Party -0.036 (.359)
Chi2 247.852***
-2 Log Likelihood 1425.455
Nagelkerke R2 .245
Valid N 1232
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001
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The model is statistically significant to the p<.001 level, and it has a Chi2 of
247.852. The estimated R2 is equivalent to .245. This analysis shows the clear
correlation of personal level, country level, and district level characteristics on committee
membership. Social committee membership is associated with female deputies rather
than with male deputies (p<.01). There is a strong positive correlation between female
legislators and social committee membership. Contrary to the hypothesis, a legislator
with more experience is associated with an increased likelihood that he or she will serve
on a social committee (p<.001). In addition, there is a slight positive correlation
associated with members from districts in which women have higher levels of state
legislative representation and social committee membership. A Brazilian Deputy is much
more likely to serve on a social committee than are other legislators (p<.001).
This analysis indicates that women are more likely to be placed on social
committees than are men, regardless of the institutional structures present in a legislature.
It may be that quotas, while giving women more seats in the congress are not effective in
placing women on committees that wield more policy power (Heath et al 2005). This
indicates that a “ghettoization” of women continues even as they gain numbers in elective
office (Thomas 1994). In addition, representatives with more experience appear to be
more likely to concentrate on social issues, through their committee participation, than do
representatives who have a lesser record of public service. District characteristics that
indicate higher levels of female membership also appear to be correlated with legislators
serving on social committees. Finally, institutional structures present in individual




Legislative bill authorship is the second measure utilized to determine the extent
of institutionalization and the type of participation in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
While calculating all the bills initiated in the legislature necessarily includes those that
have a lesser degree of importance, and does not take into account the passage rate of
these bills, it is, nonetheless, a useful tool for measuring the degree of autonomy that
legislators possess. In addition, the amount and type of bill authorship provides evidence
of not only how a deputy participates, but how he or she represents.
The literature provides two principal reasons for examining the level of
authorship as a measurement of institutionalization. First, the role of individual bill
authorship is an important measure of the independence of deputies within the congress
(Polsby 1968). This measurement also indicates the degree to which legislators, rather
than outside entities, such as the executive, parties, and states, are responsible for the
initiation of policy, rather than just the reaction to policy (Blondel et al 1969). In
addition, the literature points to the role of policy as a method of representative behavior
(Eulau and Karps 1977, Bratton and Haynie 1999). Both the type and amount of
legislation a deputy creates is a measure of how he or she represents.
There has been a dramatic increase in individual legislators’ overall bill
authorship in the nations of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico over the past decade. In
Argentina, legislative authorship is higher than in Brazil and Mexico, as it has
consistently been over the past decade. Even in Argentina, however, legislative
authorship has nearly doubled, while increasing the share of legislation that stems from
individual deputies. In 1994, 6792 bills were presented, and of those, 75% were authored
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by either Senators or Deputies, a decade later, in the 2002 session, 11762 bills were
presented, and of those, 93% were authored by legislators (Argentina Camara de
Diputados). In Brazil, legislative authorship has increased as well. In 1994, 441, or 35%
of all bills initiated from individual legislators (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000), but by
2005, the number of bills initiated by legislators had increased to 3011, or 78% of all bills
introduced (Brazil Camara dos Deputados). In Mexico, legislators have also become
increasingly prolific. In 1994, there were approximately 150 bills initiated by individual
deputies, which made up 46% of all bills introduced (Nava Polina and Yáñez López
2003: 20-21), but by 2002, that number increased to 1048 bills introduced by individual
deputies or 77% of all bills introduced (Mexico Camara de Diputados).
The dramatic increases both in total bill authorship and in the percentage share
that stems from individual deputies within these congresses is astounding. Each of the
legislatures demonstrate increased institutionalization, both through the increased
utilization of resources and autonomy of individuals within the congress, as well as
through increased initiation of policy as opposed to reaction to executive policy. It is
evident that in this measure, however, Argentina appears to be the most institutionalized
of the legislatures by a substantial margin. Argentine deputies produce more than three
times the legislation that is produced in Brazil, and ten times that produced in Mexico.
While both Brazilian and Mexican legislators are responsible for a highly respectable 77-
78% of the bills sponsored, in Argentina the percentage jumps to 93% of all bills
authored.
Both institutional constraints and individual choices each have an important role
in determining how much and what type of legislation a legislator will write. While this
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section does not include an in depth discussion of authorship as participation, the
differences in amount and type of legislative authorship will be addressed as part of the
models in the following chapters. Suffice it to say that the amount and type of authorship
varies as dramatically within nations as it does across nations and plays an important role
in a legislator’s representative method.
Seniority and Leadership
Leadership structure is an important component of legislative institutionalization
and has sets constraints for legislative participation. Well established seniority systems
and a distributed leadership structure indicate a higher level of legislative
institutionalization. In each of these nations the distribution of power through seniority
and leadership is limited. As these institutions influence on an individual’s ability to
pursue his or her goals within an institution, they are essential to an understanding of
legislative participation. Participation in the leadership provides access to policy tools,
and thus, if historically disadvantaged groups, such as women, are not in the leadership,
they can not be as effective in accomplishing policy goals.
As has been seen in our discussion of the committee system, the leadership within
the chamber as a whole is critical to the agenda and policy promulgation of the
legislature. In addition, a developed seniority system is an important element of an
institutionalized legislature. The two methods for gaining power and producing policy in
a legislature are the committee system and the leadership structure. If seniority is not an
automatic method for attaining power in the committee system, more informal methods,
which decrease the autonomy of a legislator, will be utilized (Polsby 1968). The
leadership in these nations is held in either the Presidency or the Mesa Directiva or the
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Mesa Diretora. In a stronger committee system, the committees do the work of
legislation, while the leadership sets the agenda for legislation (Polsby 1968). In each of
these systems, however, the role of leadership is more critical than is the committee
system, and no real seniority system exists.
The leadership not only sets the legislative agenda, they are also largely
responsible for its content. The ability of individual legislators and of disadvantaged
groups, such as women, to gain leadership power is critical to their ability to impact the
legislative process as a whole. Without a seniority system, the only opportunities for
power are limited to the scarce number of positions in the leadership structure.
Argentina
In the Argentine Congress, the leadership is found in the respective party
leaderships and in the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies. The executive is
comprised of a President, and a first, second, and third level Vice-President. During the
period of this research, the Partido Justicialista (PJ) held the majority of the seats in the
Chamber. Although this majority was slim, the minority was split among many parties,
with the Union Civica Radical (UCR) holding the largest number of seats, at a fifth. As a
result, the President and the First level Vice-President came from the PJ, while the
Second level Vice-President was drawn from the UCR, and the Third from among the
numerous other minority parties. Party leadership provides another critical aspect of
leadership, and competes with the Chamber Presidency for policy direction.
In addition, the development of a seniority system would indicate the automatic
processes necessary for legislative institutionalization (Hedlund 1984). Seniority system
development was somewhat discussed within the context of committee strength, as it is
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utilized to determine eligibility for committee chairmanship. But, as indicated above, this
process is not automatic, and thus, is not a developed seniority system. While the role of
both the leadership and provincial delegations in the selection of committee chairs
indicates a distribution of power, that distribution is not individual in nature, and thus,
does not constitute a seniority system.
Women in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies have been as unsuccessful in
finding power in the Mesa Directiva as they have in finding power in the key legislative
committees. In 2004, within the two major parties, women held no leadership positions,
either in the party leadership or in the Chamber Presidency. Women did hold leadership
positions among the smaller parties, and a woman represented these parties in the
Chamber Presidency as the Third level Vice-President. In total, women held 19% of
leadership positions among the formal presidential structure of the Chamber and the
presidents of all parties and blocs (Argentina Chamber of Deputies 2004).
Brazil
Power rests in the Mesa Diretora in the Brazilian Congress. There are seven
positions available, it is renewed every two years, and immediate reelection is prohibited.
The composition of the Mesa Diretora is proportional to the party power within the
Chamber of Deputies. Party leaders are also given a short tenure. The maximum time
that a party leader serves within the Chamber is four years, and sometimes that is limited
to only two years. Over the last five years, there has been an increase in the tenure of
party leaders, and the change in the committee system to offer more opportunities for
leadership positions indicates an expansion of power positions and the development of a
seniority system in the Brazilian legislature. Committee leaders, however, are only
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appointed to that position of power for a total of one year at a time. Until committee
membership and leadership becomes a function of seniority, pathways to power will
continue to be limited. The decentralization of power is an important component of
legislative institutionalization (Polsby 1968).
Women have not received many of the benefits of the increases in leadership
positions. While women’s representation in the chamber as a whole is 9%, women have
been excluded entirely from the leadership positions on the Mesa Diretora, and as noted
in the previous section, have been largely excluded from the leadership committees as
well. If a firm seniority system were to develop within the Chamber, this
institutionalized method of advancement would most likely aid women in achieving
political power, as they are currently subject to biased gender norms.
Mexico
The leadership in the Mexican Congress lies in the Mesa Directiva. The parties
determine who is appointed to the governing board. The seats are granted to the parties
proportional to their representation in the Chamber. This, in a time of highly divided
government, provides opportunities to all three of the principal parties in Mexico. As
there is no seniority, power built within the party dictates leadership positions. As in
Argentina and Brazil, the restriction of power to those few determined by the parties
ensure that decentralization of power does not occur. As discussed above, the dispersion
of power is critical to legislative institutionalization (Polsby 1968). The high number of
women in party leadership in Mexico has greatly advanced their representation at the
legislative level as well.
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Women in the Mexican legislature have had a significant advantage using both
leadership office and the committee structure in the 2000-2003 Congress. While the
percentage of female representation overall drops slightly from the previous Congress,
the women of the Congress are uniquely poised to gain critical policy goals in 2002-
2003. In addition to the President of the Mesa Directiva, Beatriz Elena Paredes Rangel,
two other women hold seats in the leadership of the Congress. In total, women in the
Mexican Congress comprise 38% of the leadership in the 2002-3 Congress. This
percentage far surpasses the percent of women in the Chamber, and it also surpasses the
percentage of women in Argentina or Brazil that hold leadership power during this time
period. The leadership in 2004-5 also provides opportunities for women in Mexico, as
women hold 29% of the seats on the Mesa Directiva, a number equitable to the overall
representation of women in the chamber (Mexico Chamber of Deputies 2005).
Factors Associated with Leadership
Leadership is the dependent variable in the following analysis. The leadership
variable includes all members who have an office in the directing organization of the
chamber or who hold an office in the leadership structure of the parties. As discussed
earlier, the leadership structure is critical to a determination of the degree
institutionalization in a legislature. A greater distribution of power in a legislature would
indicate greater institutionalization. In addition, the participation in the leadership
indicates to what degree individual deputies, including disadvantaged groups, have been




Hypothesis 1: Male deputies will have a higher probability of holding a
leadership position than will female deputies.
Throughout this chapter, evidence has been presented regarding the women in the
leadership in each of these nations. This evidence seems to indicate that women have
systematically been excluded from leadership in the legislatures of Argentina and Brazil,
but not in Mexico.
Hypothesis 2: Those deputies with more experience will be more likely
to be leaders than will those with less experience.
While sophisticated seniority systems are not in place in these three systems,
research indicates that leadership is a function of accrued experience. In addition,
reelection is not possible in Mexico, and not the most often used method for attaining
political power in Argentina and Brazil. Using an independent variable that is a sum of
terms of elected public service, allows us to measure experience both in and out of the
congresses in these nations. This gives a more complete picture of the experience of the
legislators upon which their leadership is based.
Hypothesis 3: Members from larger district magnitudes will have a
higher probability of holding leadership positions in the Congress.
Increased district magnitude ensures the election of party loyalists. As district
magnitude increases, parties have more control over the placement of party members, as
a result, party loyalists will be rewarded with seats more often as district magnitude
increases. Party loyalists are more likely to be rewarded with leadership positions than
other elected legislators.
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The analysis of leadership participation utilizes a binary logistic regression. The
data is drawn from original government documents in each nation regarding the
leadership positions, sex, district magnitude, and experience of the legislator. The
equation for this analysis is found below in Figure 4-2.
Ln[1/(1-p)] = α + b1X1 + b2X2 +….. + b7X7 [Figure 4-2]
where:
Ln[1/(1-p)] = Log of the Odds of Leadership
X1 = Woman




X6 = Argentina x Woman
X7 = Mexico x Woman
For this analysis, the data from all legislators seated in Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico in 2002-2003 were examined. The results of the binary logistic regression
analysis are presented in Table 4-2 below.
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Argentina x Woman -2.639 (1.683)
Mexico x Woman 5.202 (1.495)***
Chi2 76.627***
-2 Log likelihood 327.588
Nagelkerke R2 .312
Valid N 1269
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001
Regardless of lack of true seniority systems in these nations, leadership continues
to be a function of experience. Experience is positively linked to a higher probability of
leadership (p<.001). While this was more expected in the Argentine system, the finding
across the systems is particularly interesting. The model is statistically significant to the
p<.001 level, and it has a Chi2 of 76.627. The estimated R2 is equivalent to .312. Each of
the countries is negatively linked to leadership, but the lower improbability of holding a
leadership in Argentina is likely connected to the greater relative distribution of power in
the Argentine Congress. Finally, gender is also statistically linked to leadership. Across
the systems, there is a negative correlation between female legislators and leadership
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(p<.01). Mexican women, as noted above, are a clear exception. Mexican women have a
positive correlation with leadership (p<.001). Women’s lack of commensurate leadership
positions in Argentina and Brazil are likely connected to their historic exclusion from
office, however, women’s consistently strong presence in party leadership in Mexico,
along with the impossibility of a seniority system when there is no chance of reelection
may also account for the differences in leadership parity. While it is apparent that the
seats provided by quota systems do not necessarily turn into legislative power, they do
provide entry for women into the political system. As women continue to build public
service careers, as seniority systems become more automatic, and as women gain party
leadership offices, leadership should follow.
Discussion
This examination of legislative institutionalization and participation in Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico addresses the strength of the committee system, its membership, the
overall bill authorship, seniority, and leadership. The presence of women in the three
congresses, in power committees, in social committees, and in the leadership structures
provides insight regarding the ability of women to effectively utilize quotas, and the
ability of historically disadvantaged groups to turn elected office into resources to
accomplish policy goals. Committee and leadership structures vary across the Argentine,
Brazilian, and Mexican legislative systems. These differences determine how strongly an
individual legislator can affect policy, what type of access disadvantaged groups may
attain to promulgate policy outcomes that are commiserate with their objectives and
interests, and what legislative action legislators are likely to utilize in order to further
their policy goals. From the study of these three nations, several findings are evident.
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The congressional institution provides the opportunity and the framework for
public servants to accomplish representative goals through debate, amendment and
authorship of laws. In addition, personal characteristics, such as a legislator’s sex, have
an important correlation with what roles a deputy chooses and is assigned within the
organization of the Congress. A legislator’s position in the organizational structure
conditions the ability of a deputy to represent his or her constituencies, and that position
also shapes the method of representation a legislator adopts.
The external forces related to increased committee system strength include both
presidential constitutional structure and divided or coalition government. Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico each have presidential constitutional structures, and at the time of this
study, both Brazil and Mexico are in a period of divided government. In addition to
these external forces, an internal examination of committee system strength reveals that
the authority to redraft legislation at all stages, the use of committees structures for the
vast majority of bill consideration, and the consistent use of oversight in the Argentine
Congress indicate that its committee system is stronger than those in Brazil and Mexico.
Additionally, the individual bill authorship of Argentine legislators far outstrips the
authorship in Brazil and Mexico. Also, while no seniority system automatically
determines leadership in any of these three national legislatures, the Argentine system
utilizes seniority more so than either Brazil or Mexico. Finally, leadership power is
slightly more distributed in the Argentine legislature than it is in either Brazil or Mexico.
These elements, when considered together, indicate that the Argentine legislative system,
while operating within a one-party governing era, is, nonetheless, the most
institutionalized of the three congresses. Committee systems that provide distinct
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interests the opportunity to work across party lines increase the likelihood of policy
outcomes that are reflective of those interests. The stronger a committee system, the
greater the individual legislator’s bill authorship, and the more dispersed the leadership
structure, the more likely individual legislators will have a uniform method by which to
accomplish goals through that system.
Participation in committees and in the leadership is also addressed in this chapter,
while individual bill authorship is discussed in the subsequent chapters. With the
exception of Mexico, women are disproportionately excluded from power committees
and the leadership. Across all three systems women are far more likely to be placed on
social committees than are men. The particular institutional structure, however, may be
critical in determining whether this precludes the advancement of policy or not. The
Mexican system, which does not have the degree of overlapping jurisdiction present in
Argentina and Brazil, has provided an opportunity for women to accomplish policy goals
in the furtherance of women’s issues through social committees. These committees,
however, also offer an opportunity for legislators to address individual concerns within
their constituencies. As such, these committees are more likely to be filled with members
who have more public service experience and who come from states with a higher
proportion of women in the state legislature.
Experience, gender, and the unique attributes of the Mexican system are closely
related to the attainment of leadership. While there is little in the way of a seniority
system in these nations, accumulation of public service is essential to the attainment of
leadership positions in the Congress. Women hold few leadership positions across these
nations and this may be a function of both less accumulated experience as well as a
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possible gender bias. In Mexico, women have been able to achieve these positions
despite lower levels of experience, and this may be related to the impossibility of a
seniority system, or to the historically greater role of women in party leadership in
Mexico than in the other two countries, or it may be related to other cultural factors that
are specific to Mexico.
The structure of the committee system and leadership are critical to the ability of
legislators to put forth legislation and accomplish their legislative goals. Independent
legislative action may be the outcome of an individual’s policy and process preferences,
but institutional constraints limit the ability of representatives to act and represent their
constituents. Institutional differences have important ramifications for female legislators’
ability to represent. In the following chapters, the interviews will show that women are
more likely than men to use group processes, such as committee systems, rather than
individual processes, such as personal relationships.
If a committee system is the primary method for the promulgation of policy in a
legislature, women will be more successful in accomplishing legislative goals if they
operate within a strong committee system. As discussed earlier, the greater proportion of
bills that stem from the legislative body, the greater control the legislature and individual
legislators have over the agenda. In addition, an established seniority system, unlike an
informal advancement structure, provides a formal guarantee of equality of opportunity
for all legislators; although, it can depress the ability of historically disadvantaged groups
to make a difference immediately. Finally, a leadership structure that is more dispersed
ensures that a greater number of legislators have access to policy making resources.
Consequently a more institutionalized legislature: stronger committees, greater individual
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authorship, seniority systems, and a more dispersed leadership structure, increases the
opportunity for the representation of a greater proportion of society.
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Part II: The Representative Method
Representation is the most important aspect of a modern democratic republic.
Legislative structures provide the opportunity to measure representation at the
institutional level and at the individual level within legislatures or parliaments. There are
three facets at the individual level of representation: focus, responsiveness, and goals.
Scholars have focused on each of these facets individually, but a more complete
understanding of individual level representation emerges when all the facets are utilized
together. The primary focus in the literature has been on responsiveness as a measure of
representation. These measures are dyadic, meaning representatives’ concerns and their
constituencies’ concerns should be generally the same. There are several problems with
this measure. The first issue is that at the individual level, constituencies vary, and the
second issue is that it fails to address individual goals. These two factors direct a
legislator’s representation. Finally, the responsiveness measure, while useful, is
incomplete because it fails to incorporate the interaction between focus, responsiveness,
and goals. The addition of these other two factors and the intersection of all three factors
demonstrate more completely the “who,” “how,” and “what” of representatives’ concerns
and actions. The amalgamation of the three representative behaviors is the
Representative Method.
Methodology
To measure each dimension of the Representative Method, a number of methods
of analysis are employed. A primary theme this dissertation explores is the relationship
that gender, as well as a deputy’s other personal characteristics, institutions, country, and
the interaction of gender with the factors have with legislative behavior. The correlation
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of the different prioritizations within the facets of focus, responsiveness and goals
demonstrate that there are at least two ideal types of Representative Method, although the
analyses also indicate that representation continues to be highly individualistic. In
addition, the analyses indicate that in particular a legislator’s gender is instrumental to the
form that representation takes, and thus, is integral to the relationship between the
member of congress and the public, and the degree to which substantive representation is
possible.
I had the good fortune to speak with legislators in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
As a whole, these men and women were friendly, open, and excited to speak to me
regarding their work and the work of the legislature as a whole. They were anxious to
point to the governing functions of the congress, and to defend the role of their legislature
in the political process. The legislators also demonstrated an appreciable concern for
their constituents. In particular, they were concerned that their constituents did not know
what the legislature did, were disconnected from their government, and had an
unfavorable perception of the government and its elected officials. They were excited
about the changes in their institutions, excited about the power that their congresses were
(newly) wielding, excited about changing the balance between the executive and the
legislature, and were very clear about their own political ambitions within this system.
While legislative ambition is curtailed sharply by nomination or reelection constraints in
Argentina and Mexico, and the paths of ambition are not traditionally static in any of
these three countries, many of the interviewed legislators expressed unhappiness with this
situation, and expressed a desire to build a legislative career. As one Brazilian legislator
declared, “My passion is for the chamber! I am a parliamentarian at heart; it is much
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more democratic. I want nothing to do with an executive career.” Several Mexican
legislators also expressed desire for reelection to Congress, and explained that they
moved as the party wanted, but tried to move among the Senate, Chamber of Deputies,
and state legislatures. They argued that democracy was in the legislature and that is
where they could accomplish the most. Argentine legislators expressed disgust with the
party system, and the ties they had to keep to the federal and state parties in order to even
be re-nominated for their seat. One legislator sighed, “Future? I do not know; it is not up
to me. I requested nomination, but the party has not even nominated me for this seat, so I
am out.”
Women in each of these nations also shed light on changes in their role within the
legislature and the government as a whole. Female legislators in Mexico form the single
group in the Congress that works across party lines. The organization of the Congress
and committee system helps somewhat, but nearly all female legislators in Mexico listed
women as a primary constituency, and as one Mexican legislator unequivocally stated, “I
am here to work for women; they are my constituents; I represent women.” Women in
Argentina also expressed a strong connection to women’s interests, but these were
couched within party and specific policy objectives, whereas women in Brazil expressed
a desire for greater female participation so that they could overcome what they perceived
as chauvinistic barriers within the institution itself. As one Brazilian Deputy stated, “It
would be nice if we could work together as a team, but this institution was created by
men and it is competitive and individualistic. It is me against 500 others.”
People operate within and change the interweaving rules and mores of
institutional structures; and, in a democracy, provide the accountability necessary for
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responsiveness. The overwhelming sense that came from these interviews is that the
legislators chose public service in order to aid their constituencies, and in almost every
way seek to meet the needs of that constituency. The legislators represent their
constituencies according to their experiences and as a result, the Representative Method
of men and women within each nation differ
Interview Process
Interviews in each nation provide much of the data collected for this dissertation.
Deputies spent from fifteen minutes to an hour answering questions and discussing their
experiences in the legislature. These interviews took place in legislative and district
offices, coffee shops, committee rooms, hallways and the chamber itself, and the
environment gave important clues about the nature of the legislature and the deputy who
was being interviewed. In place of an interview, a few deputies answered a survey
instrument. The surveys and interviews followed the same question format, but the
opportunity for follow up was not available with surveys. Additionally, the deputy’s
interaction with his or her staff, with daily routines and with outside persons could not be
observed if all information came from a survey (see Appendix B). In total, the data
consists of 37 interviews with or surveys of Deputies in the Mexican Congress, ten of
whom are women, 21 interviews with or surveys of Deputies in the Argentine Congress,
five of whom are women, and 20 interviews with or surveys of Deputies in the Brazilian
Congress, four of whom are women.
The process for meeting with Deputies was different in each of the subject
legislatures. In each nation, Deputies responded to an introductory letter (see Appendix
A) either through phone, mail, e-mail, or in person. Overall, the Mexican legislators
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despite a looming budget deadline or perhaps because of the daily requirement of votes
associated with the budget, were the most available among the three sets of legislators.
The Brazilian legislators were the least available, and that may have had a great deal to
do with their weekly trips to their constituency. The Brazilian legislators were only
available for two to three days during the week, making interviews difficult to arrange
during my research window. The Argentine legislators were available for most of the
workweek, but did not arrange meetings outside of their offices, unlike the Brazilian or
Mexican legislators, making it difficult to meet with legislators during their busy
committee schedule. An additional problem in Argentina was the turmoil of
electioneering, which further limited availability. The time spent with each legislator
revealed important aspects of their personality, communication style, and their work
style. From the arrangement of an individual’s office to a legislator’s interaction with
staffers to their activity as they spoke to me, each of these gave small indications of how
a person approaches his or her legislative work. These clues helped to form the overall
pattern of behavior within a legislature and highlighted important differences between
men and women.
Quantitative Analysis
Eligibility for inclusion as a case in the analysis depends upon an individual
deputy’s membership in the legislatures of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico at a particular
point in time in 2002-2003. These individuals were in office while interviews occurred,
and while only a small percentage participated in interviews, all were eligible. The
Deputies in Argentina were near the end of their term, the Deputies in Brazil were near
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the beginning of their term, and the Deputies in Mexico were in the middle of their term
of office. The cumulative valid N for the macro analysis is 1269 cases.
One of the key ways that a member of a legislature represents his or her
constituents is through bill authorship. In order to determine the degree and type of
authorship, I examined the total number of bills a member authored, the percentage of
social bills a member authored, the percentage of economic and security bills a member
authored, the percentage of institutional reform bills a member authored, the percent of
district allocation bills that a member authored, the percent of oversight bills a member
authored, and the number of symbolic bills that were authored by a member. Each of
these were used as dependent variables in an individual OLS regression analysis, and the
independent variables for the bill authorship models included a legislator’s sex, party,
committee membership, experience, district magnitude, and interaction variables as well,
to include female right party members. Also the countries themselves are used as
variables, alone and in interaction with legislator sex.
The data are gathered from a variety of sources. The dependent variables, which
include total authorship, social legislation authorship, allocation legislation authorship,
institutional reform legislation, symbolic legislation authorship, oversight legislation, and
economic and security legislation are all found in original federal government documents
in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. A few of the independent variables, including sex,
party affiliation, experience, and district magnitude also come from original federal
government documents in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The data for each state, female
literacy and women’s membership in the state legislature, came from original state
government data in each state or province. Access to these documents is available
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through the Internet and at the respective libraries of Congress; the documents and links
are listed in Appendix D, and are also cited according to the Chamber from which they
originate in the text of this document.
Three Theories of Legislative Behavior
Three general theories have been applied to legislative behavior. The first theory
that stems from the literature is that legislators in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico will have
distinct representative foci. Deputies will focus their representation in one of four ways:
for social groups, for functional groups, for party, or for geographic constituencies
(Loewenberg and Patterson 1979). The second theory derived from the literature is that
deputies will be responsive to their constituents through policy output which is consistent
with the policy desires of their constituents, allocation of public goods, constituency
service, and as symbolic representatives (Eulau and Karps 1977). The third theory
derived from the literature is that the legislators will have three primary goals: good
policy formulation, personal power, and continued government office (Fenno 1973). A
fourth goal derived from interviews and from legislative data is that legislators also seek
institutional strength (Nava Polina and Yáñez López 2003).
Each country has particular features that will cause a variance in the emphasis that
legislators place on each facet within these theories of behavior. It is important to
examine the developmental, cultural and institutional differences in each country in order
to understand how these theories would differ in application. The institutional constraints
include party system structure and strength, legislative structure and strength, federal
system centralization, electoral system structure, district magnitude, and state
characteristics. Of these, district magnitude and state characteristics vary within nations.
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These factors are utilized throughout these analyses and have important relationships
with representative behavior.
In addition, personal characteristics of individual legislators will likely condition
representative behavior. Personal characteristics included in this discussion are gender,
experience, and ideology. In addition, the interaction of gender and ideology, and the
interaction of gender with country variables form an integral part of this analysis
The preceding chapters provide an indication of which individual legislative
characteristics and systemic characteristics impact legislative behavior. The interaction
of quantifiable characteristics provides an invaluable resource from which to make
theoretical propositions regarding the behavior of legislators, but not all observations and
characteristics are easily quantifiable. The atmosphere in a particular legislative setting
provided by architecture, décor, staff and legislators’ attitudes explain much in terms of
the behavior of legislators and the representation of constituents. These factors include
the degree of empowerment in the legislature and the congeniality of the legislature.
While these two institutional factors also condition the method by which deputies are
able to represent their constituents, these are difficult to measure. The data on
empowerment and congeniality are found in the observations in the first chapter, but are
not central to the model analysis.
Review of Important Institutional Differences
Much of the literature on congressional behavior comes from the experience in
the United States, so it is important to discuss the institutional constraints in the United
States and how these constraints differ from the institutional structures in Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico. In the United States, the pathways to political power have been both
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progressive, from the local and state arenas to advancements within the national arena, to
static, within the Congress itself. Power is built personally both in the district and in the
institution of Congress (Fenno 1978). Congressmen, for the most part, build careers in
Congress with aspirations for power within the institution. A senatorial post or executive
office at the state and national level is also desirable, but only gubernatorial office or the
highest level cabinet offices are comparable to the prestige and power of a Member of
Congress. As a result, many Members are content to build careers entirely within the
House of Representatives. Additionally, the electoral system, single-member district
with self-nomination and reelection, focus the representation on geographic
constituencies. The internal structure of the U.S. Congress, which includes seniority and
committee professionalization, coupled with the personalistic characteristics of the
electoral system combine to make the party a weak player in Member considerations.
In Argentina, the power structure is highly vertical and centralized. While the
provinces have struggled and gained some power, the center of power in Argentina has
historically resided in the capital city of Buenos Aires. The vast majority of policy power
resides in the national executive. Deputies have a role in the policy process as
negotiators for their districts, but unless they are in the President’s party, they have very
little power over questions of public policy. This gives additional power to parties in the
system. The bureaucracy is made up of political appointees and the turnover is in
accordance with changes in political power at the executive level. These appointees have
greater discretionary power over public policy than do the Deputies. Policy power is
centered in the executive and the agenda is primarily in the hands of the President, and as
a result the Argentine Congress has traditionally had very little power (Larkins 1998).
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The pathways to power in Argentina have long resided in adherence to party goals and
advancement through the party hierarchy.
In Brazil, the power structure is locally based. Historically, the conflicts between
the central government in Rio and secessionist powers in the various regions resulted in
concessions that placed a great amount of power in the states. These power centers have
persisted, and as a result, the capital city was moved away from Rio de Janeiro to a
centrally located capital. This capital serves as a power base only somewhat greater than
the state power bases. As one Brazilian legislator explained,
“The stages of political ascension begins with a position as a vereador,
then as a state deputy, and at the next stage either election as a national
deputy or a mayor of a large city are somewhat equal, then a federal
senator, and finally, on to the governor of the state. At this level, many
continue in politics back at the national level, but it is a plateau.”
The national power continues to be highly executive in nature, but national legislators
continue to derive power locally, and so contend for resources at the national level for
their geographic regions in order to shore up power in the local bases. Policy power at
the national level is directed by the executive, but not dictated by the executive (Samuels
2002), interviews indicate that there is good communication between the bureaucracy and
the Brazilian Congress.
In Mexico, there is highly centrist government control of the nation. The national
government has far more power than the states in terms of revenue, resources and
allocation. Additionally, with no possibility of immediate reelection, the legislature
merely becomes a stop on the path of party positions. The parties are important power
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centers, as one legislator stated, “I would like to continue as a legislator, in the Senate or
in my state, but ultimately, I go where the party needs me.” The constitutional powers in
Mexico are much more balanced between the Legislative and Executive branches than
they are in either Argentina or Brazil, but until divided government occurred in Mexico,
there was never any flexing of legislative muscle by the Congress (Nacif 2003). Divided
government has resulted in a more powerful Congress, increasing the power centers in
the Mexican political system. Policy power at the national level is increasingly shared
between the executive and the legislative branches.
Theoretical Model
In representation, I would argue that the means are the ends. The action of
representation is a legislator’s Representative Method. It is the action by which a
legislator creates a connection between citizenry and government, and gives the people
their proper place in the making of policy and in the functioning of government. The
Representative Method is a combination of the factors of Representative Focus,
Constituency Responsiveness, and Representative Goals. These factors are functions of
both personal characteristics and experiences and the institutional structure in which the
representation occurs. Personal characteristics and experiences include such factors as
sex, ideology, ethnicity, education, and socio-economic background. Institutional
structure includes political history, political culture, federal structure, party structure,
party system strength, electoral structure, constitutional provisions, internal legislative
structure and institutionalization.
“Who” the representative views as his or her constituency is called the
“Representative Focus” and is the prioritization of constituencies. These potential foci
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are social groups, functional groups, geographically defined constituencies, and political
parties. “How” the representative responds is “Constituency Responsiveness.” Forms of
responsiveness include policy output, allocation, service, and symbolic action. Finally,
“what” a representative is trying to achieve in public office is classified as
“Representative Goals.” Motivations include good public policy, continued public
service, personal power, and institution building. This Representative Method model can
be expressed as a union of priorities within these three sets of factors for each individual
legislator. It is expressed as an equation in Figure II-1 below and as a drawing in
Appendix E.
RM = RGCRRF ∩∩ [Figure II-1]
where:
RM = Representative Method
RF = Representative Focus
CR = Constituency Responsiveness
RG = Representative Goals
While representation is made up of individual choices, those choices are related to
the experiences of legislators and their particular legislative context. Due to data
limitations and the individuality of representation, it is difficult to discern ideal types of
Representative Method. These following analyses consistently show the significance of
gender, as do the analyses that indicate two ideal types of Representative Methods. The
actions of representatives in the legislature make present the represented in the
government. If a focus is lacking, or a type of responsiveness is not used, or a goal is not
sought by some individuals in the legislature as a whole, then not all segments of society
are substantively represented in the government. The strong relationship of gender to
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these facets of representation indicates the importance of descriptive representation to
substantive representation.
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Chapter 5: Representative Focus
Representative Focus is the “who” for whom a legislator acts. The four types of
representative foci are political parties, functional groups, social groups, and
geographically based constituencies (Judge and Earnshaw 2003: 91, Loewenberg and
Patterson 1979: 170-8, Wahlke et al. 1962). Personal preference plays an important role
in the choice of representative focus, but as Loewenberg and Patterson (1979:192) argue,
it is also “determined for them by the electoral system through which they are chosen and
by the political culture of the nation in which they live.” In keeping with this argument,
the different types of representative focus: social group, functional group, party, and
geographic area are analyzed as they correlate to a legislator’s gender, differing
institutions, and country specific factors in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
In the interviews conducted in each of these countries, several questions were
asked regarding legislator priorities. The series of questions that dealt with representative
focus included, “Do you represent a particular group or cause?” “Who are your
constituents?” “What is the most important need of your constituents?” The answers to
these questions indicated where a legislator focused his or her energies for the purpose of
representation. In many cases, a legislator named one or more areas of focus, and for
each response, the legislator’s responses were recorded. It was possible for a legislator to
indicate all areas of focus, but in fact, none of the interviewed representatives named
more than three, and most named one or two.
Party Focus
The first focus examined was party focus. Those legislators who responded to
questions regarding constituency with answers that included their political party
150
considered the party to be the focus of their representative action. In Argentina,
legislators often indicated they represented their party and ideology, and one legislator
noted, “I am working for the cause of the Liberals in Argentina, the fight against all that
is evil, for the concept of liberty.” Another legislator made it clear that the party was the
focus because it was the vehicle between a deputy and the citizenry, and elaborated by
saying, “The party is the method by which one communicates with the constituents, so it
is difficult to speak to [constituents] directly.” In Brazil, a legislator stated, “I always try
to help my party…” In Mexico, one woman noted, “[My constituents are] the
parliamentary group of the PAN, ” and a male legislator stated, “I work first for my
party….” Other methods would be useful for measuring focus, but are not used here. For
example, another measure of this focus would utilize party unity scores, but, while that
demonstrates the degree of strength of the party, it does not necessarily demonstrate the
representative focus of the Deputy. This dissertation will instead rely on the indication of
the Deputies personal agenda and focus, as he or she states, which provides a more
accurate picture of the focus of legislators.
Functional Group Focus
The second focus concerns functional groups. Functional groups are those groups
in society that are defined by their economic role. This includes business sectors, labor,
agriculture and professional groups. A legislator may identify his or her focus as labor or
as a business concern within his electoral purview. In Argentina, several legislators
noted that their constituents were workers or consisted of specific sectors of the economy
such as finance or the media. While another Argentine legislator noted that she worked
“in defense of the rights of workers and consumers…” A Brazilian legislator’s response
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regarding whether he represented specific groups was, “Not groups, but agriculture, and
agricultural issues.” Likewise, another Brazilian representative answered “I always try to
help … lawyers groups, commercial interests in the area and ... workers.” A Mexican
representative noted that he works to promote artisans in his district, as well as for
“Migrant workers, they go to the U.S. [and encounter] problems of illness, accidents, and
crime.” Another stated, “I work for labor, I was the president of … [a] union.” This
focus could also be measured differently. One other way to measure this would be
through an examination of campaign contributions from economic groups and a score of
votes consistent with particular groups’ goals, but these measures are not as accurate as
the stated focus of representatives. The use of interview data provides more precise input
regarding the legislator’s preferences in each area of focus.
Social Group Focus
Third, some legislators focus on social groupings. Social groupings are
demographic characteristics that cross functional groups, ideological groups, and
geographic areas. Examples of social groupings include women, the poor, the elderly,
children, indigenous peoples, ethnic groups, and religious groups. A focus on a social
group has been linked to descriptive representation, but it can also be achieved through
the representation of other groups’ interests. In Argentina, one woman noted, “For thirty
years I have been working for the cause of democracy, for women, for human rights and
the … political capacity of everyone.” Another noted, “The most acute necessities [for
which I am occupied in writing legislation] are those of unemployment, hunger, and
poverty.” In Brazil, a few deputies also specifically named the poor. Another deputy
specifically pointed to the young, while another two named the evangelical communities.
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One young deputy remarked that he represented the “youth and also women’s interests.”
In Mexico, one woman stated, “I am working for women, the cause of women, more than
my district, all women.” While another noted that she worked for language and cultural
rights. Another woman noted that she worked “Over all else for the indigenous
communities and the women of the nation.” Another measure of this focus might be the
utilization of vote scores on policies of importance to particular social groups, but this,
again, is not as accurate a representation of the preferences of legislators as is the stated
focus of deputies.
Geographic Focus
Finally, some legislators focus on geographic constituencies. Representatives are
most often elected from within defined geographic boundaries and as such, view
themselves as agents for the people, industry, and more broadly, the territory from which
they are drawn. In Argentina, a legislator stated that he worked for “Provincial interests
in [my province] and therefore the problems of my province.” While another Argentine
legislator noted that in his province different economic sectors required his attention, “the
North is more developed with particularized sectors of production and agriculture.”
While many legislators simply stated, “My province, of course.” In Brazil, in addition to
states, legislators noted regions. For example, many legislators noted “the Northeast,”
and the problems endemic in that region, while others were very narrow, naming specific
cities rather than, or in addition to, their states. For example, one Brazilian Deputy
stated, “My region, the Northeast, my state, and cities I represent. I always represent
[these areas] and bring projects to better the lives of the people.” In Mexico, many
legislators also noted geographic representation, specifically their state. One noted that it
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was “the broad interests of my community [and its] security. There are unsolved murders
and drug trafficking is a major problem.” In contrast, another simply stated, “I don’t deal
with local problems.” Another measure that would provide a good indication of a
legislator’s focus on geography would be through a tally of the allocation legislation that
benefits their particular geographic area. This measure, however, would not adequately
distinguish between focus and responsiveness, while the stated focus of legislators
provides a more accurate picture of where the representative’s interests lie.
Hypotheses
A number of hypotheses are derived from the literature regarding a legislator’s
Representative Focus. These hypotheses and the support for each type of focus are found
in the following pages. Each type of focus will be tested in four separate analyses to
determine the correlation of personal and institutional characteristics with a particular
Representative Focus.
Hypothesis 1: Female legislators will be more likely than males to focus
on social groups.
Historically, women have been politically active on behalf of other groups in
society. This includes the Madres in Argentina and abolitionists in the United States.
Women legislators are associated with the representation of others, specifically groups
without voices, whereas men have historically had less of a policy emphasis on the needs
of social groups within society.
Hypothesis 2: Argentine legislators will have a stronger representative
focus on social groups than will legislators from Mexico or Brazil.
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Due to the relative racial homogeneity of Argentina as compared to Brazil and
Mexico, there will be fewer cleavages in society. This lack of cross-cutting cleavages
will coalesce in a greater proportion of legislators who actively support policies for social
groups (Dahlerup 1989). Fewer cleavages will result in a greater awareness and focus on
the needs of existing social groups.
Hypothesis 3: Members of social committees will be more likely to focus
on social groups.
Members of committees that designed to focus on the needs of particularized
benefits for groups in society will be more attune to the needs of groups in society. Both
the subject matter of the committee as well as the division of labor among members will
lead social committee members to increasingly focus their representation on particular
social groups in society.
Hypothesis 4: Legislators who are elected from states with higher levels
of female membership in their state legislators will be more likely to
focus on social groups.
States which have higher levels of female legislators are correlated to higher
degrees of political equality. Deputies from districts that have a greater degree of
political equality between women and men in their home states will have a greater
awareness of the needs of social groups within those states. This increased awareness
will lead to a greater level of representative focus on these groups by members from these
states.
Hypothesis 5: Male legislators will be more likely to focus on functional
group representation than will female legislators.
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Men are associated with links to economic concerns more so than are women.
The traditional gender roles of men and women have placed men in the economic sector
while women were in the private sphere. These traditional gender roles will be echoed in
the experience and emphasis of legislators.
Hypothesis 6: Brazilian legislators will be more likely to focus on
functional groups than will legislators from Argentina or Mexico.
In Brazil, the members have a greater independence from party constraints. The
independence of members from parties increases the need for economic support from the
specialized economic constituencies within his or her district. As power and support is
more concentrated at the state level, the more focused a representative will be on the
particular functional groups within his or her geographic constituency.
Hypothesis 7: Brazilian legislators will be less likely to focus on party
representation than will Mexican or Argentine legislators.
The stronger the party system’s role in determining placement, resources, and
reelection of legislators, the more a legislator will focus on the representation of the
party. As noted above, in Brazil, the members have a greater independence from party
constraints. The focus on party representation should be lesser in nations where party
loyalty is lower and reelection is based on self-determination and district factors.
Hypothesis 8: Female legislators will be more likely than male
legislators to focus on party.
Studies regarding gender differences have indicated that women are more loyal
party members than are men (Constantini 1990; Kapur 1998: 371). This would indicate
that women would be more likely to cite party representation as a focus than would men.
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Hypothesis 9: Brazilian legislators will be correlated with a focus on
geographic groups, followed by Argentina, with Mexican legislators
having the least association with a focus on geographic groups.
A more decentralized federal system will result in a greater focus on geographic
constituencies. The greater the power to be found at the state level, the more focused a
representative will be on geographic constituencies. Likewise, the greater opportunity for
self-determination over nomination and reelection will be linked to a focus on geographic
groups.
Hypothesis 10: Legislators elected from districts with a smaller number
of representatives will be more focused on geographic representation
than will members elected from larger district magnitudes.
The smaller the district magnitude, the more likely a member will be focused on
geographic representation. The fewer persons elected from a particular district, the more
accountable each of the members will be for the issues prominent among his or her
electorate, and as a result, the legislator will be more likely to focus on geographic
constituencies.
Data
The data for this portion of the study is derived from interviews and surveys of
deputies in the Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican Congresses. These interviews were
conducted between November 2002 and September of 2003, and followed the basic
survey instrument (see Appendix B). This instrument included questions regarding the
legislative and career goals of Deputies, the Deputy’s constituency, and the Deputy’s
perception of the structure of the legislative and greater governmental system. The data
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consists of 37 interviews with Deputies in the Mexican Congress, 10 of whom are
women, 21 interviews with Deputies in the Argentine Congress, 5 of whom are women,
and 20 interviews with Deputies in the Brazilian Congress, 4 of whom are women.
Analysis
This chapter examines the data utilizing two methods. First, by using a cross tab
analysis, the interviewed legislators’ identified representative foci are clearly
demonstrated. These tables show important trends particular to countries and gender.
The cross tab shows the frequency of responses among different representative foci,
according to nation and legislator sex, as well as the significance of these frequencies, as
expressed by a Chi2 analysis. These findings are expressed in Table 5-1 below.
Secondly, a logistic regression analysis is utilized to determine the statistical
significance of these trends. The logistic analysis expands the number of independent
variables to include specific institutional structures across nations. These independent
variables provide a thorough basis for examination of the hypothesized correlations. The
equation for this model is in Figure 5-1 and the outcome of the binary logistic regression
analysis is found in Table 5-2 following a discussion of the cross tab results below.
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49% 51% 0.051 41% 59% 2.510
158
159
Across the representative focus categories, both gender and national
factors appear to be linked with particular legislator preferences. Of the two,
gender is the most consistently linked to preferences for a particular focus, as
significant gender differences are indicated in three of the four categories. The
particularities of a country, however, also appear to be linked to legislator
preference. Functional group and party group focus are both clearly linked to
national factors.
Among the legislators interviewed, no clear trend concerning a social
group focus is linked to a particular country. Across all three nations a social
group focus was not indicated as a priority for most legislators. The interviews
did, however, show clear gender differences concerning a preference for a social
group focus.
Women more often identified a social group as the focus of their
representation than did men. These groups included the disabled, children, the
poor, elderly, indigenous groups, and most of all, women. As one female
legislator emphatically stated, “I am here for women, all women.” While men
identified social groups as a representative focus as well, they did so in much
lower numbers. The social groups identified by men included the poor, elderly,
disabled, women, and indigenous groups.
The second potential representative focus is a focus on functional groups.
Functional groups are defined by their economic role in society. Functional
groups may include labor, industry, the financial sector, consumer groups,
agriculture and professional groups. Table 5-1 above indicates that both gender
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and particular legislative systems are linked to legislator preference for a focus on
functional groups.
Men more often identified a functional group focus than did women.
While men are nearly evenly split as to their indication of representation of
functional groups, women are far less likely to focus on functional groups in their
representation. The data further shows that national systems are statistically
linked to difference in preferences among legislators. Brazilian legislators are
more likely to indicate a representative focus on functional groups than are
Argentine or Mexican legislators. Additionally, Mexican legislators are less
likely to support a representative focus on functional groups than are Argentine
legislators. While functional groups are diverse and encompass economic and
occupational groups such as farmers, labor, and the financial sector, particular
economic interests were often linked to particular locations, and thus, were
geographically bound as well.
A legislator’s potential third focus is the party. Both the hypotheses
concerning party focus are borne out in terms of the correlation between country
and party focus and in terms of the relationship of gender to a party focus. There
does not appear to be, however, any statistical link between gender and party
focus. While the differences in response among the sexes were nearly a complete
reverse of the focus indicated for functional groups, with women evenly split as to
their indication of representation of functional groups, and men far less likely to
focus on functional groups in their representation, it was only the country
variables that showed statistically significant differences.
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From Table 5-1, it would appear that a focus on party representation is a
significantly greater priority among Argentine legislators than it is among
Brazilian and Mexican legislators. Further, Brazilian legislators’ responses
demonstrate a significant tendency away from party representation. Interestingly,
Mexican legislators do not indicate a focus on party representation as highly as
expected, and neither do women. In all, it appears to be national factors rather
than gender that have a stronger statistical association with a focus on party
representation.
The final potential representation focus is geographic. In these interviews,
the form of geographic focus varied, some representatives noted cities, while
others noted states or even regions. Geographic representation focus has been
theoretically linked to district magnitude and party strength, but in this analysis it
is gender that is statistically correlated. This analysis indicates that men are much
more likely to focus on geographic constituencies than are women.
While numerically, legislators in Brazil were more likely to indicate
geographic groups and Mexican legislators were less likely to indicate this focus,
the differences between nations were not statistically significant. Surprisingly, it
is not differences in countries that statistically indicate an emphasis on geographic
interests, but rather, gender differences. While there is no direct theoretical basis
for this, it may be that one type of focus precludes another type of focus. As
women are more likely to act as surrogates for women beyond the boundaries of
their district (Mansbridge 2000), they may be less able to focus on geography.
Positively, however, this focus is the strongest tendency that men demonstrate.
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Further evidence of these proclivities is found in an expanded statistical
analysis of the interview data. The model is broader than the cross tab analysis,
and for social group focus, incorporates data on whether a legislator serves on a
social committee, as committee placement would likely either indicate or shape
their policy focus. In each of the focus analyses, right party membership is
utilized, and it is utilized as an interaction variable with legislator sex. The
legislator’s district magnitude is also included in each analysis. The percentage of
women in the state legislature is used as a measure for women’s equality and
activism in the district as that may be connected with a legislator’s representative
focus. Finally, a dummy variable for each nation is utilized in the equation to
separate possible institutional, cultural and historical influences. The equation for
the model is presented in Figure 5-1 below.
Ln[1/(1-p)] = α + b1X1 + b2X2 +….. + b7X7 [Figure 5-1]
where:
Ln[1/(1-p)] = Log of the Odds of an Identified Representative Focus
X1 = Woman
X2 = Right Party
X3 = District Magnitude
X3a = Social Committee Membership*
X4 = Percent Women in State Legislature
X5 = Argentina
X6 = Brazil
X7 = Woman x Right Party
* This independent variable is only utilized in the social group focus analysis, as
it may have an impact on this particular legislator focus.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5-2 below:
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Table 5-2: Representative Focus Logistic Regression3
Social Group Functional Group Party Geographic
B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E) B (S.E.)
Constant -1.138 (.846) -0.065 (0.736) 0.522 (0.755) 0.881 (.768)
Woman 3.043 (1.025)*** -2.581 (1.124)* -0.278 (0.796) -2.740 (1.123)**
Right Party -0.223 (0.716) -0.739 (0.593) -0.090 (0.268) 0.154 (0.605)
District Magnitude -0.024 (0.030) 0.026 (0.026) 0.034 (0.026) -0.004 (0.024)
Social Committee Member -0.207 (.646)
% Women State Legislator 0.015 (0.052) -0.013 (0.046) -0.043 (0.048) -0.077 (0.050)
Argentina -1.009 (1.026) 0.438 (0.846) 1.555 (0.922) 1.536 (0.936)
Brazil 0.790 (0.951) 0.346 (0.839) -2.090 (0.938)* 0.770 (0.864)
Woman x Right Party 1.212 (1.296) 2.768 (1.407)* -0.290 (1.175) 1.834 (1.427)
Chi2 19.309** 14.551* 14.963* 17.439**
2 Log Likelihood 79.987 91.053 93.168 90.692
Nagelkerke R2 .305 .229 .233 .267
Valid N 78 78 78 78
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p<.001
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Even more so than the simplistic cross tab analysis, the binary logistic
analysis shows that the factor most consistently correlated with differences in
representative focus is gender. Women are more likely to focus on social group
representation than are men, and men are more likely to focus on functional group
and geographic constituencies than are women. The remaining focus, party
representation, is the focus that is most correlated to national differences. In
addition, female members of right parties seem to focus on different groups than
do other female legislators. This indicates that while women may have the same
focus across institutions, they may not have the same representative priorities
across the ideological spectrum.
For each area of focus, subtleties in the analysis indicate room for study.
The analysis clearly indicates that gender difference is the most significant factor
associated with a representative focus on social groups. Women are significantly
more likely to focus on social groups (p< .001). Neither right party membership
alone nor the district characteristics are significantly correlated with a focus on
social group representation. It is notable, however, that legislators from
Argentina appear to be less likely to focus on social groups than are legislators
from Brazil or Mexico. While this is not quite a significant correlation (p<.10),
the negative slope indicates that this may be an interesting avenue for further
exploration.
The lack of relationship between social committee membership and a
preferred focus on social groups is interesting, as we would expect that committee
membership would reflect or shape legislator interests. Preliminary analyses of
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this data did not yield any significant differences between social committee
members in each nation either, which indicates that committee placement does not
necessarily coordinate with a legislator’s indicated focus.
Gender is also a significant factor indicating a correlation with a
representative focus on functional groups. Male legislators are statistically more
likely to focus on functional groups (p<.05). An interesting finding is that female
right party legislators are statistically more likely to focus on functional groups
(p<.05). This is particularly interesting because differences in ideology generally
are not significantly linked to functional group representation, and men are
significantly more likely to focus on functional group representation than are
women.
The cross tab indicates that Brazilian legislators focus on functional
groups more so than do legislators from other nations, and Mexican legislators
have less of a focus on functional groups than do legislators from Argentina and
Brazil. This finding is not quite significant in the logit analysis (p<.10). While
these tendencies do not prove to be quite statistically significant, they are useful
observations that deserve scholarly attention.
The statistical analysis indicates that gender is not a statistically significant
factor concerning differences in party focus, and in fact the slope indicates the
opposite of the hypothesized and raw data, that men may be more correlated with
a party focus. This is not statistically significant, however. The national factors
are statistically significant. Argentine legislators are more likely to focus on party
representation than are Brazilian and Mexican legislators (p<.10). The Brazilian
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legislators, however, show a statistically significant association with a lesser focus
on party representation than either Mexican or Argentine legislators (p<.05).
These observations and the statistical analysis seem to point to institutional
structure as a dominant factor regarding a legislator’s focus on party
representation.
Gender again has a statistically significant association with representative
focus in the area of geographic representation. Men are much more likely to
focus on a geographic constituency than are women (p<.01). This is interesting as
there is no theoretical basis for a geographic focus based upon gender, while the
literature strongly supports a finding that institutional structures such as district
magnitude, reelection, and self-determination of candidates has a significant
correlation with the degree of geographic representation. The literature does
support the idea that women are more likely to act as surrogates for women
beyond the boundaries of their district (Mansbridge 2000). This analysis seems to
indicate that the focus beyond the borders precludes a focus within the borders.
The country factors, while not quite statistically significant, do show that
legislators in Brazil and Argentina are both positively linked to a focus on
geographic representation (p<.10). As both Argentina and Brazil both have
federal systems that have considerable levels of power at the state level as well as
some candidate self-determination through reelection, as opposed to Mexico,
which has neither, it is likely that one or both of these factors increase the
possibility of geographic focus.
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The results of these statistical analyses are consistent with the observed
patterns in the data. It was expected that country and institutional factors would
have a larger impact upon representative focus, but in fact, gender is the most
relevant factor in determining the probability of a particular representative focus.
This finding supports theoretical arguments that women and men bring
fundamentally different perspectives to governance.
Discussion
The representative focus analyses above utilize hypotheses and variables
that the representation and legislative behavior literature indicate are appropriate.
While the analyses bear out the hypotheses in several cases, they are not
consistently proved. The analyses demonstrate that gender has a consistent
relationship with differences in representative focus while most other variables
fall away.
Ten hypotheses are put forward regarding representative focus. The first
hypothesis, that female legislators will be more likely to focus on social groups
than men, is borne out by the analyses. The cross tab analysis indicates that
women are statistically more likely to focus on social groups than are men. The
corresponding response percentages echo this significant finding. In addition, the
logistic regression analyses, which includes institutional and ideological factors in
addition to the legislator sex and country variables in the cross tab, also show that
gender is significantly related to a focus on social groups. Women are more
likely to focus on social groups than are men.
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The remaining three hypotheses regarding social group focus are not
significantly supported by either the cross tab or the logistic regression analyses.
The second hypothesis, that Argentine legislators will be more likely to focus on
social groups than Mexican or Brazilian legislators, is unproven. Indeed, while
not significant, higher percentages of Mexican and Brazilian legislators indicate a
focus on social groups than do Argentine legislators. The third hypothesis, that
social committee members will more likely focus on social groups than non-social
committee members, is also unproven. While not significant, the slope associated
with the variable in the logistic regression analysis is negative. The fourth and
final hypothesis concerning social groups is that legislators from states with more
women in the state legislature will be more likely to focus on social groups than
other legislators. While this is not a significant variable in the logistic regression
analysis, the slope does indicate that there may be some connection.
The fifth and sixth hypotheses relate to a focus on functional groups. The
fifth hypothesis, that men will be more likely to focus on functional groups than
will women, is borne out by the analyses. In the cross tab analysis, men are
significantly linked to a higher probability of a functional group focus than are
women. This significant finding occurs although the male legislators are split
nearly evenly regarding whether they focus on functional groups or not. The
logistic regression analysis also indicates that legislator sex is significantly linked
with a functional group focus. Men are more likely to focus on functional groups
than are women.
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The sixth hypothesis, that Brazilian legislators are more likely to focus on
functional groups than are Argentine or Mexican legislators, is only significantly
shown in the cross tab analysis. The variation in response percentages in the
cross tab regarding functional group focus result in a significant positive
relationship to Brazil and a significant negative relationship to Mexico. While the
logistic regression does not quite yield significant results, the positive slope of the
Brazilian variable and negative slope of Mexican variable indicate a pattern.
Brazilian legislators are more likely to focus on functional groups and Mexican
legislators are less likely to focus on functional groups than are Argentine
legislators.
One other variable is important when discussing a focus on functional
group focus: right party women. While the literature indicates that right party
women have some differences from other women, it was not hypothesized that
this difference would manifest itself in relation to functional group focus. The
logistic regression, as discussed above, indicates that men are more likely to focus
on functional groups than are women. Women in right parties, however, are more
likely to focus on functional groups than are all other legislators.
The seventh and eighth hypotheses relate to a focus on party. The seventh
hypothesis, that Brazilian legislators will have a lesser focus on party than either
Argentine or Mexican legislators, is statistically supported. In the cross tab
analysis, Argentine legislators are shown to have a significant positive
relationship with a focus on party, while Brazilian legislators are shown to have
significant negative relationship with a party focus. Further, in the logistic
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regression analysis Brazilian legislators are significantly shown to be less likely to
focus on party than are other legislators.
The eighth hypothesis, that female legislators will be more likely to focus
on party, is not statistically borne out. This finding, however, is not conclusive.
In the cross tab analysis, women are split nearly evenly regarding their party
focus, while the percentages of men are much lower. In addition, the logistic
regression analyses indicates that while, again, women’s relationship to a party
focus is not quite significant, there is a positive slope associated with female
legislators.
The ninth and tenth hypotheses concern a legislator’s focus on a
geographic area. The ninth hypothesis, that Brazilian legislators will be more
likely to have a geographic focus than will Argentine or Mexican legislators is not
significantly supported by either the cross tab or the logistic regression analyses,
although the percentages of the responses are as predicted. The tenth and final
hypothesis, that a legislator from a smaller district magnitude would be more
likely to focus on geographic representation, was also not significantly supported
in the analysis.
The only variable that is significant regarding a focus on social group is
not hypothesized. Once again it is sex of the legislator that is significantly related
to a representative focus. Both the cross tab and the logistic regression analysis
show that male legislators are more likely to focus on a geographic area than are
female legislators. Throughout these analyses, it is gender that has been
consistently linked with a particular type of representative focus.
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While there is a theoretical basis for differences among men and women
concerning social group, functional group, and party focus, no unambiguous basis
exists for the gender differences in focus on geographic representation. There has
been, however, a consistent finding in the descriptive representation literature that
members of historically disadvantaged groups do use surrogate representation far
beyond the borders of their district (Swain 1993; Mansbridge 2000; Carroll 2002).
While neither Swain nor Mansbridge nor Carroll indicate that a focus on a
particular group replaces a focus on a legislator’s district, and indeed, Carroll
(2002) argues that the actual methods utilized to effect surrogate representation
differ according to a female legislator’s district characteristics and ideology, it
would appear that this research shows that there is a shift in focus to surrogate
representation from geographic representation.
Four explanations for the gender relationship with a geographic focus and
the lack of specific scholarly attention seem apparent. First, there have been an
overwhelming number of men in representative bodies. Second, this federal
legislative system comparison is a more similar comparison than comparisons
between parliaments and legislatures in both central and federal systems. Third,
there exists a bias in the literature that a geographic focus is the norm in
geographically drawn districts rather than a product of both institutional and
gendered characteristics of the U.S. Congress. Finally, functional groups often
have a clear geographic base, while social groups do not, and men and women’s
respective predilection for these two foci may spill over into the area of whether
to focus on geographic representation or not.
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It was hypothesized that differences in each country would also condition
a representative’s focus, but this was not as consistent a relationship as expected.
The relationship is most apparent when we examine the representative foci of
party, but functional group representation and geographic representation are also
weakly linked. Argentina provides an environment that is positively, and
statistically, linked to party representation, the Mexican system less so, while the
Brazilian system showed a strong tendency away from party representation. Both
the Argentine and Brazilian systems are positively, if weakly, linked to
geographic representation, but each national system appeared to facilitate some
degree of geographic representation. Additionally, Brazilian legislators are
significantly more likely to focus on functional groups, while Mexican legislators
are significantly less likely to focus on functional groups.
The final independent variables are the interaction variables and
institutional variables. Women who are members of a right party are, like male
legislators, more likely to focus on functional groups. There is also a weak but
positive correlation with female right party members and a focus on geographic
constituencies. This raises interesting questions regarding gender and party
culture. All other interaction variables washed out in terms of representative
focus, as did all hypothesized institutional variables. The most significant
findings concerning a legislator’s representative focus are presented in bulleted
form below:
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♦ Women are significantly more likely to focus on social group
representation than are men, both in the cross tab and in the
logistic regression analyses.
♦ Men are significantly more likely to focus on functional groups
than are women. Only half of all men indicate this focus, but it is
significant in both the cross tab and logistic regression analyses.
♦ Right party women are significantly more likely to focus on
functional groups than are other women legislators.
♦ While men showed a clear tendency away from party focus in the
cross tab percentages, and half of women showed a tendency
toward this focus, this was not quite a significant finding in either
the cross tab analysis or the logistic regression analysis.
♦ Men are significantly more likely to focus on geographic
representation than are women, as is shown by the cross tab and
the logistic regression analyses.
♦ Brazilian legislators are significantly more likely to focus on
functional groups than are other legislators, and Mexican
legislators are significantly less likely to focus on functional
groups than are other legislators. These two tendencies are shown
in the cross tab analysis.
♦ Argentine legislators are significantly more likely to focus on
party, and Brazilian legislators are significantly less likely to focus
174
on party. These tendencies are seen in the cross tab and logistic
regression analyses.
A legislator’s focus, while not the only factor that determines
representative behavior, is a critical first step. As representative focus is clearly
linked to gender, this demonstrates that descriptive representation fulfills some
substantive elements of representation. It would appear that it is the differences in
a legislator’s fundamental experiences, as created by the socialization of their
biological sex that determines how and on whom they choose to focus their
representation. This empirical finding emphasizes the need for greater gender
equality in legislative representation to ensure the adequate representation of all
segments of society. In the following chapter, the second component of
representative behavior, constituency responsiveness, is discussed.
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Chapter 6: Constituency Responsiveness
In interviews, Deputies identified what they felt were their constituencies;
these identified constituencies (or foci) were addressed in the previous chapter.
The legislators addressed concerns of their constituencies and then explained how
they addressed these problems. The types of constituency responsiveness they
chose in order to fulfill this representation were answered by questions that
related to how a person utilized the legislative process, “What is your most
important project in the current legislature? In your career?” “How do you
incorporate constituent needs into your legislative activity?” and “What processes
are most efficient in the legislature?” In addition to supplemental answers
regarding projects and goals, a clear picture formed as to the forms of
responsiveness a Deputy chose to use.
Four Categories of Constituency Responsiveness
Consistent with the model proposed by Eulau and Karps (1977), these
responses fell into the categories of policy output consistent with their
constituent’s perceived needs, allocation, service, and symbolic action. These
responses were not mutually exclusive, and in some cases a deputy emphasized as
many as three of these methods of responsiveness. Each of these categories is
discussed in more detail in the following sections.
Policy Responsiveness
As discussed in Chapter Two, there have been two conceptualizations of
policy responsiveness. One such conceptualization requires that a legislator’s
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policy output, in terms of votes, authorship, and participation is consistent with
the expressed wishes of the majority of his or her constituency (Miller and Stokes
1963). The second conceptualization is less stringent and less delegate centric.
Eulau and Karps (1977) limit the scope of policy responsiveness to important and
salient policy. The constituencies identified by the Deputies are diverse,
somewhat fluid, and not bound by easily determined geographic regions. So,
while these conceptualizations rely heavily on the interaction between
Constituencies and Deputies this analysis focuses solely on the legislator, and his
or her self-reported activities on behalf of their constituencies.
In response to the questions in the section above, a variety of answers
were coded as positive indications of policy responsiveness. In Argentina, some
typical responses included, “I have worked to reform the law to provide access to
credit for the unemployed.” And “I have various pieces of legislation in
consideration…” and also, “The most important matter today in Argentina is the
lack of employment, so of course all the legislation I have presented is meant to
better job prospects.” One Brazilian legislator’s response to how to incorporate
the needs of his constituents into his work was, “Propose legislation and defend
legislation that is good law.” Finally, in Mexico, one legislator responded, “I
write legislation to aid the people: labor laws, environmental laws, energy laws,”
while another stated, “I currently have three pieces of legislation I authored under
consideration … one is general, one is specific and the other is a necessity.”
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Allocation Responsiveness
Allocation responsiveness is the second potential method of constituency
responsiveness. In allocation legislation, the representative makes efforts on his
or her own initiative to obtain generalized public goods benefits for his or her
constituents. An Argentine legislator stated, “I am making laws that benefit and
help my province.” While a Brazilian legislator stated, “There are not enough
resources for every state, so here all 513 of us, everyone, wants to get resources,
so there is competition to write the legislation to get resources for our states.”
Finally, in Mexico, a legislator was quoted as saying that to provide for the needs
of his district he had “… written some pork barrel, gotten money for roads and
police resources.”
Service Responsiveness
The third means of constituency responsiveness is service. Eulau and
Karps identify service responsiveness as the securing of particularized benefits for
constituents (1977: 241). This form of responsiveness is a type of ombudsman
role that the legislator plays between his or her constituency and governmental
agencies. While governmental goods are available, it is often difficult for a
citizen to navigate the shoals of a complex national bureaucracy. The
representative often must occupy his or her time aiding constituents in the
acquisition of available resources. No Argentine legislators that were interviewed
indicated an emphasis on constituency service, and as one member said, “I
communicate through the party.” In Brazil, the role of ombudsmen seemed to be
in a relationship between the legislative and executive branch, and as one
178
legislator stated, “To get resources for constituents, I speak with the Ministry and
convince them that the project is good,” whereas in Mexico, this role was a
communication with constituents. A very telling response to “How do you meet
the needs of your constituents?” among the Mexican interviews was “Do you see
all of these?” As he gestured to a pile of letters on his desk, “They are requests for
aid. My staff and I do what we can.”
Symbolic Responsiveness
Symbolic responsiveness is difficult to quantify. Number of ribbons cut?
Presence in the district? Name recognition? This fourth type of responsiveness is
also an important link between constituents and representatives. Much of the
efficacy that a constituent feels with his or her representative comes from
symbolic acts on the part of the legislator. This is the activity that makes people
feel supportive of the government and confident in the operation of governing.
This type of activity focuses on the role of constituency service and outreach
(Wahlke 1971). Symbolic activity manifests in many ways, and it is important to
understand not just at the individual legislator level, but also in the sense of trust
for the whole system as expressed by the constituents. It is difficult to judge
when a representative will be more likely to prioritize symbolic behavior, but it
may be as legislative systems are attempting to become more powerful. When
legislators were asked how they were viewed, identified, and communicated with
their constituents, there were a variety of answers. In Argentina, when asked how
they relate to their constituents, several legislators stated, “They know me.” In
Brazil, a legislator stated, “I identify with them as a statesman, as person of
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integrity.” Another Brazilian legislator echoed this as he said, “I have the respect
of my constituents.” In Mexico, a legislator stated, “I am trusted,” and another
said, “They know me, I am one of them.” A cross tab analysis and logistic
regression is used to explore the responses of the legislators.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Women will be more likely to respond to their
constituencies through the promulgation of policy than will men.
The literature on differences between female and male legislators indicates
that women will utilize policy more often than men in order to accomplish
legislative goals (Rosenthal, ed. 2002). Legislative goals include the
representation of a person’s stated constituency, and, as a result, women will seek
to represent their constituencies through the promulgation of policy.
Hypothesis 2: Deputies in Argentina will be more likely to utilize
policy responsiveness than will Deputies from Mexico or Brazil.
Argentina has the most highly institutionalized committee system and
produces the most legislation among these nations (Original Government
Documents: Argentine Chamber of Deputies, Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, and
the Mexican Chamber of Deputies). The institutional structures available for
policy responsiveness are more developed in Argentina, and thus, Argentine
legislators will be more likely to use policy to respond to the needs of their
constituents.
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Hypothesis 3: Representatives in Brazil will be more likely to
respond to their constituencies through allocation than will
representatives in Argentina or Mexico.
It would be expected that representatives that are bound to their districts
and who seek reelection from those districts would produce legislation to
facilitate that end. Representatives who have a greater degree of freedom from
their party will be more responsive through allocation legislation.
Hypothesis 4: Representatives in Mexico will be less likely to
utilize allocation responsiveness than will representatives in
Argentina and Brazil.
The literature would support that those institutional structures that allow for
reelection would be more likely to foster allocation legislation. Since both
Argentina and Brazil allow immediate reelection, these nations would foster more
allocation legislation than would Mexico.
Hypothesis 5: Representatives from smaller district magnitudes will be
more likely to utilize allocation responsiveness than will representatives
from larger district magnitudes.
The literature would support that the smaller the district magnitude, the
more responsive a legislator will be to the particular needs of that district.
Hypothesis 6: Representatives in Brazil will be more likely to
respond to their constituents through service responsiveness than
will representative in Argentina or Mexico.
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The highly professional bureaucracy present in Brazil, in conjunction with
the lower degree of legislative career building and the personal base necessary to
build political power in the states would be more likely to foster increased service
to the constituency than would the systems of Argentina or Mexico.
Hypothesis 7: Women will be more likely to utilize symbolic
responsiveness than will men.
As political outsiders, women will utilize symbolic representation to gain
political power at the grassroots level. Women are traditionally more inclined to
use and nourish grassroots support than are men (Bystydzienski and Sekhon
1999), and symbolic representation is a useful method for building this type of
support.
Data
The data for this portion of the study is derived from interviews and
surveys of deputies in the Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican Congresses. These
interviews were conducted between November 2002 and September of 2003, and
followed the same basic survey instrument (see Appendix B). This instrument
asked questions regarding the legislative and career goals of Deputies, the
Deputy’s constituency, and the Deputy’s perception of the structure of the
legislative and greater governmental system. The data consists of 37 interviews
with Deputies in the Mexican Congress, ten of whom are women, 21 interviews
with Deputies in the Argentine Congress, five of whom are women, and 20
interviews with Deputies in the Brazilian Congress, four of whom are women. In
addition to the interview data, a full data set which recorded the committee
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placement, bill output, leadership, party membership, sex, district characteristics
of all 1269 legislators in office in these nations at the time of this study is utilized.
Analysis
This chapter examines the data utilizing three methods. First, by using
cross tab analysis, I explore interviewed legislators’ identified modes of
constituency responsiveness. These tables show important trends particular to
national legislatures and gender. The cross tab analysis shows the frequency of
responses among different forms of constituent responsiveness, according to
nation and legislator sex, as well as the significance of these frequencies, as
expressed by a Chi2 analysis. These findings are expressed in Table 6-1 below.
Secondly, a logistic regression analysis is utilized to determine the
statistical significance of these trends. The logistic analysis expands the number
of independent variables to include specific institutional structures across nations.
The equation for this model is in Figure 6-1 and the outcome of the binary logistic
regression analyses for each mode of constituency responsiveness is found in
Table 6-2.
Finally, I use linear regressions to analyze the full data set with regard to
the variables of bill authorship. These dependent variables are useful as they both
add to our understanding of the interview data and demonstrate the actual
legislative activity across the universe of legislators in office, and also allow us to
examine differences in emphasis among legislators. One obvious omission in this
set of analyses is a dependent variable and its analysis that demonstrates the
proximate activity of service responsiveness. Data regarding the frequency of
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letters, communications with the bureaucracy, aid with constituent problems
could not be gathered, and so, analysis of this form of responsiveness is
dependent on the intent expressed by the interviewed legislators.
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Table 6-1: Constituency Responsiveness Cross Tab









Yes No Chi2 Yes No Chi2 Yes No Chi2 Yes No Chi2









Argentina 67% 33% 1.547 33% 67% 0.319 0% 100% 5.747** 19% 81% 1.506
Brazil 50% 50% 0.286 55% 45% 3.108 40% 60% 10.543*** 35% 65% 0.393
Mexico 51% 49% 0.406 32% 68% 1.081 14% 86% 0.478 32% 68% 0.588
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In expressing a form of responsiveness, gender is the factor most
correlated with a preference for a mode of responsiveness. While neither gender
nor particular countries were linked to symbolic responsiveness, policy
responsiveness, allocation responsiveness and service responsiveness are clearly
linked to differences in legislator sex. In addition to these findings regarding
gender, the country also has a correlation to use of service responsiveness.
Women are more likely than men to indicate a use of policy output as a
method to respond to the needs of their constituency. This is consistent with the
literature and corresponding hypotheses. Contrary to hypothesized results, policy
responsiveness is not statistically correlated to one type of legislative system over
another. While Argentine legislators are twice as likely to indicate policy use
than not, and Brazilian and Mexican legislators are evenly split, this does not
result in a significant correlation at the level of legislative system.
Allocation responsiveness is also highly correlated to gender. Men are
more likely to use allocation to respond to the needs of constituents than are
women. While this correlation is not hypothesized, and the national factors that
are hypothesized to correlate to allocation responsiveness did not statistically bear
out, this may correspond with a focus on geographic representation and functional
group representation. These foci were determined to be statistically correlated
with male deputies in the previous chapter.
Service responsiveness is statistically correlated to both gender and
legislative system. Men are more likely to utilize service to respond to
constituents, and among the interviewed women, not one woman cites service as a
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method for responding to constituents. Similarly, Argentine legislators do not cite
service as a mode of constituent response, and are statistically correlated with a
tendency away from service responsiveness. Brazilian legislators, however,
utilize service responsiveness and are statistically correlated with this type of
responsiveness.
Finally, the interview data does not shed light on any tendencies by
legislators, according to either their gender or their legislative system, to choose
symbolic responsiveness. A third of men and a quarter of women cite this mode
of responsiveness, demonstrating no statistical distinction according to gender.
While half the legislators from Brazil and Mexico, as compared to one quarter of
the legislators in Argentina, indicate this preference, it is not statistically
significant.
As discussed above, a binary logistic regression is also utilized to
determine the probability that deputies who share certain personal characteristics,
such as gender and ideology, or share similar institutional constraints, such as
national factors, or district characteristics, are more likely to choose to respond to
his or her constituency in a particular manner, whether that be policy, allocation,
service, or symbolic responsiveness. This analysis uses more independent
variables than the more simplistic cross tab analysis in order to pinpoint the
characteristics that correspond with particular types of responsiveness. The
equation for this model is presented in Figure 6-1 below.
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Ln[1/(1-p)] = α + b1X1 + b2X2 +….. + b7X7 [Figure 6-1]
where:
Ln[1/(1-p)] = Log of the Odds of an Identified Constituency Responsiveness
X1 = Woman*
X2 = Right Party
X3 = District magnitude
X4 = Percent Women in State Legislature
X5 = Argentina*
X6 = Brazil
X7 = Woman x Right Party*
* These independent variables are dropped from the analysis of service
responsiveness as no woman or Argentine legislator cited service as method they
used to respond to their constituencies. Due to these findings, high standard
errors were recorded and obscured the correlations that were present.
The results of the statistical analysis are found in Table 6-2 below and
demonstrate that, once again, it is gender that stands out as the most consistent of
the independent variables.
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Table 6-2: Constituency Responsiveness Logistic Regression4
Policy Allocation Service Symbolic
B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E) B (S.E.)
Constant -0.684 (.792) -0.571 (0.771) -1.858 (1.017)* -1.011 (0.808)
Woman 2.371 (1.134)** -2.551 (1.119)** ------ 0.634 (0.791)
Right Party -1.048 (0.620) -0.615 (0.295) 0.669 (0.785) 0.901 (0.654)
District Magnitude 0.033 (0.026) 0.002 (0.023) 0.008 (0.025) 0.036 (0.024)
% Women State Legislator 0.051 (0.052) 0.052 (0.051) -0.065 (0.057) -0.028 (0.051)
Argentina -0.277 (0.951) -0.640 (0.940) -------- -0.675 (0.961)
Brazil -0.598 (0.864) 0.564 (0.826) 1.733 (0.959)* -0.449 (0.864)
Woman x Right Party 0.385 (1.629) 1.056 (1.611)* ------- -1.904 (1.393)
Chi2 22.231*** 14.224* 11.526* 6.926
2 Log Likelihood 85.078 89.716 58.762 87.681
Nagelkerke R2 .332 .226 .231 .121
Valid N 78 78 78 78
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001
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Similarly to the findings of the cross tab analysis, gender is the most
significant variable across these analyses. Country only correlates to the
likelihood of service responsiveness. Similarly to the findings in focus, right
party women indicated different forms of constituency responsiveness than did
non-right party women. As in the cross tab analysis, symbolic representation
again yields no clear correlation to any of the factors.
The policy responsiveness model is highly significant with a Chi2 of
22.231. Like the cross tab analysis, the particular factor that is significant in this
model is gender. Women are significantly correlated with a higher likelihood to
choose to respond to the needs of their constituency through the development of
policy than are men (p<.001). While right party membership is nearly significant,
it is not quite. The negative slope associated with right party membership may
indicate something about party culture in these nations. Finally, the hypotheses
regarding the countries are not borne out. No country is more or less correlated
with policy output than the others.
The allocation responsiveness model is significant with a Chi2of 14.224.
Interestingly, there is no statistically significant probability that legislators from
one nation would respond to their constituents through allocation more so than
would legislators from another nation nor was there a significant relationship
between legislators from smaller district magnitude districts and an increase in
allocation responsiveness. Gender, however, has a statistical association with the
use of allocation responsiveness. Across the models, it is male legislators that
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have a higher probability of responding to their constituents through allocation
(p<.01).
The unusual patterns in the interview data required that the analysis of
service responsiveness omit variables including gender and Argentine legislators.
The data shows that the overall model is significant with a Chi2 of 11.526. The
Brazil country variable has a positive correlation with service responsiveness
(p<.05) and the constant, which would include both Mexican and Argentine
legislators is negatively and statistically correlated with service responsiveness
(p<.05). Two variables that have been used consistently, woman and Argentina,
are removed from this analysis. As no female legislator nor Argentine legislator
discussed service as a function of her or his responsiveness, these variables are
removed from the analysis to prevent the skewing of results due to high standard
errors, but it seems obvious that this results would indicate that men are more
likely to utilize service responsiveness than are women and that Argentine
legislators demonstrate a low incidence of service responsiveness.
The symbolic responsiveness model is not significant and there is no
significant variable. This analysis did not yield much insight as to the use of
symbolic responsiveness by legislators. The raw response numbers do indicate,
however, that this mode of response is utilized by a substantial number of men
and women and by legislators from all three countries.
These analyses show that across systems, gender is the most consistent
shortcut for determining a legislator’s preferred mode of constituency
responsiveness. In order to corroborate the validity of the interview data, an
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analysis utilizing legislative output was performed. Actual legislative output is a
variable that should complement the findings regarding a legislator’s intention in
the area of both representative focus and constituency responsiveness.
Constituency Responsiveness in Legislative Output
The interviews provided useful data concerning the preferences or intent
of legislators within the subject legislators. In order to expand on these findings
and pinpoint differences in emphasis among men and women and across systems
and institutional structures, it may be useful to look at the actual legislative output
of all 1269 deputies sitting at the time of the analysis. The total authorship
variable indicates the level of policy productivity among these legislators. In
addition, examining social, oversight, economic and security legislation output
indicates the policy emphasis of legislators. These four sets of analysis expand
upon and are complementary to the analyses of policy responsiveness above.
Allocation responsiveness is complemented by an examination of allocation bills.
These are bills that are aimed at projects within a legislator’s district.
Unfortunately, service responsiveness does not have a complementary data source
for analysis, but symbolic responsiveness does. An examination of symbolic bill
output provides insight into this area of responsiveness that the analysis of
legislator intent is unable to provide.
The degree and type of bill sponsorship indicates how deputies in these
Congresses respond to constituents. The following analyses complement the
constituency responsiveness patterns indicated in interviews, and provide a
different, and broader, perspective. These behaviors serve as variables that
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indicate the responsiveness of the entire universe of legislators sitting at the time
of this analysis. While these variables are somewhat less precise indicators of
legislative focus and activity than are the stated objectives of legislators, these
variables offer both a broad examination of behavior and concrete examples of
activity that is not available through the interview data. In terms of policy
responsiveness, four groups of policy are evident: social issues, oversight
legislation, economic issues and security issues.
Legislative bill production by individual legislators has increased in each
of these nations over the past decade (Original Government Documents:
Argentina Chamber of Deputies, Brazil Chamber of Deputies, and Mexico
Chamber of Deputies). This increase in bill production should be indicative of an
increase in policy responsiveness. An analysis of the number and type of bills
created by individual legislators indicates policy preferences, as does committee
activity. Policy preferences stem from personal goals and representative goals
and are associated with differences in ideology, sex, region, culture, and the
strength of the legislature. As a legislature gains in power Members will be more
proactive in the creation of legislation. Increased initiation of legislation and
increased committee self-selection demonstrate that individual power and thus,
the institutional power has increased in a representative body. A legislator’s
ability to gain power in a congress is not only limited by the power of the
institution as a whole, but also by their personal characteristics. This analysis will
demonstrate that personal characteristics and institutional constraints have a
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demonstrable correlation with differences in the amount and type of bill
sponsorship of legislators
Unlike the previous analyses, which utilize logistic binary regression, an
OLS regression is an essential tool for these analyses. The dependent variables
are quantitative, continuous, bound at 0, and vary across cases. While being
bound at 0 is not ideal, the characteristics of the data are such that this analysis is
useful and appropriate. In addition, the type of legislation authored is a
percentage of total authorship and is bound at 0 and 100. The following
hypotheses are derived from the literature.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Women will produce more legislation than will
men.
Women have been shown to be more policy oriented than men (Rosenthal
et al 2002). In addition, as women have been systematically excluded from the
informal avenues to accomplish their legislative goals, they will be more likely to
take advantage of what tools are available to them.
Hypothesis 2: The Argentine legislators will produce more
legislation than will members of the other subject legislatures.
As indicated in Chapter 4, the institution of the Argentine Congress is the
strongest among the three legislatures. This empowerment, in conjunction with
the greater availability of individual resources within the legislature, will lead to
more authorship by individual legislators.
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Hypothesis 3: More experienced legislators will author more
legislation than less experienced legislators.
Legislators who have more experience will be more familiar with the
policy process. This will result in a higher number of bills authored. Experienced
deputies serve as policy leaders as well. Experienced deputies are able to utilize
the resources at their disposal more effectively to produce greater amounts of
legislative output than are Deputies with less experience.
Hypothesis 4: Legislators from districts with higher magnitude
will produce more legislation than will legislators from smaller
districts.
The final variable that is expected to have an association with legislation
promulgation is district magnitude. It is expected that legislators from districts
with larger magnitude will utilize less of their resources to maintain district
relations, and as such, they will focus on legislative policy output more so than
will Deputies from districts with smaller magnitude.
Hypothesis 5: Female legislators will produce a greater percent
of social legislation than will male legislators.
The literature posits that the sex of a legislator is correlated with the type
of bills that are produced. In particular, scholars have found that women are more
likely to produce social welfare legislation and feminist legislation than are men.
The literature also suggests that social welfare policy is primarily aimed toward
women and their self-sufficiency (Skocpol 1992). Female legislators care more
about, place a higher priority on, and more actively pursue social welfare issues
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(Carroll, Dodson and Mandel 1991; Burrell 1997). As a whole, female legislators
are expected to place a higher priority upon policy that addresses the needs of
disadvantaged persons, women and children.
Hypothesis 6: Argentine legislators will produce a greater
percent of social legislation than the other two nations in this
study.
A more institutionalized legislature will be more responsive to its
constituents and produce more legislation that responds to individual welfare in
the nation. Argentina has the most institutionalized legislature out of these three
legislators, and as such, will produce a greater percentage of social legislation,
with Brazil following, and Mexico producing the least amount of social
legislation.
Hypothesis 7: Members of social committees will produce a
greater percentage of social legislation than will non-Members.
Members of social committees will focus more on social legislation than
will non-Members. The organizational structure of the legislatures creates
expertise in each policy area. As expertise increases, a legislator will choose to
write a greater proportion of legislation in his or her area of expertise. This will
be particularly true the more institutionalized a legislature is.
Hypothesis 8: More experienced Deputies will be more likely to
produce a higher percentage of oversight legislation.
Legislators who have more experience will be more active in addressing
issues in the executive. As they are more familiar with the governmental policies
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in place and the processes for change, they will create more oversight legislation.
Experienced deputies are able to utilize the resources at their disposal more
effectively oversee the bureaucracy than are deputies with less experience.
Hypothesis 9: Deputies from districts with a larger district
magnitude will be more likely to produce a higher percentage of
oversight legislation.
Deputies from districts with a higher magnitude will have more incentive
to devote resources to legislative concerns other than district connectivity. This
increase in district magnitude will produce deputies who are concerned with
larger governmental processes.
Hypothesis 10: Male legislators will produce a greater
percentage of economic and security legislation than will female
legislators.
Just as it is supposed that women place a greater emphasis on social
welfare and feminist legislation, it is also supposed that conversely, men place a
greater emphasis on economic and security legislation (Heath et al 2005).
Hypothesis 11: Argentina will be correlated with a higher
percentage of economic and security legislation than the other
two nations in this study.
A more institutionalized legislature will be more responsive to its
constituents and produce more legislation. Argentina has the most
institutionalized legislature out of these three legislators, and as such, will
produce a greater percentage of economic and security legislation, with Brazil
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The first analysis employs OLS regression analysis to compare the model
across data sets for the dependent variable “total legislative authorship.” Bill
production is a good complementary measure for policy responsiveness. It
indicates that deputies are empowered to utilize the tools available to them, and
are active in governance, but more importantly for our purposes, it indicates that
the deputies are able to use policy as an individual response for the benefit of their
constituencies, and are not merely subject to top-down leadership.
Social Issue Bills
Social legislation is legislation that directly benefits individuals. This
includes legislation that affects education, old age care, health, children’s welfare,
and poverty aid. This legislation has an effect on society as a whole with direct
benefits to individuals across districts, and is therefore a useful variable that
indicates responsiveness to the population. It is measured as the percentage of
legislation a deputy produces that is related to social issues.
Oversight Bills
An important function of legislatures in a congressional-presidential
system is executive oversight. An emphasis on oversight as a policy goal
indicates that a legislator has the resources and the experience, as well as the
empowerment, to attempt to balance the power between the executive and the
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legislative branches. This method of responsiveness is more indirect, and
indicates a form of policy responsiveness that is removed from the people. It is
measured as the percentage of legislation a deputy produces that is related to
oversight.
Economic and Security Bills
Legislation that is focused on the budget, economic issues, domestic
security, and foreign affairs are included in economic and security bills. This
method of responsiveness is both targeted to economic groups, and also provides
a method of response to one of the broadest concerns of government: security.
An emphasis on this form of responsiveness effects society as a whole, though
through different groups in society than those which are affected by social
legislation. It is measured as the percentage of legislation a deputy produces that
is related to economic and security issues. The equation for these models is
presented below in Figure 6-2.
Y= α + b1X1 + b2X2 +… +b8X8 + €  [Figure 6-2]
where:
Y = Number (or Percent) of Bills Authored
X1 = Woman
X2 = Right Party
X3 = District Magnitude
X3a = Social Committee Member*




X8 = Woman x Right Party
and
€ =  the error term 
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* The independent variable for social committee membership is only utilized in
the social bill percent analysis, as it may have an impact on this particular bill
output.
An OLS linear regression is utilized to determine the correlation between
the characteristics discussed above and the dependent variables of total bills
authored, percent of social bills authored, percent of oversight bills authored, and
percent of economic and security bills authored. The results of this analysis are
shown in Table 6-3 below.
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Table 6-3: Legislation Authorship Regression5
Number of Total
Bills




B (S.E.) B (s.e) B (s.e) B (s.e)
Constant 2.745 (1.454)* 0.124 (0.021)*** -0.137(0.068)* 0.483 (0.031)***
Woman 0.174 (1.684) 0.103 (0.024)*** 0.225 (0.077)*** -0.092 (0.036)**
Right Party -1.487 (1.124) -0.033 (0.016)* 0.028 (0.052) 0.010 (0.024)
District Magnitude 0.085 (0.034)** 0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001)**
Social Committee Member 0.107 (0.016)***
%Women State Legislature -0.075 (0.087) 0.001 (0.001) 0.009 (0.004)* -0.002 (0.002)
Experience 1.257 (1.067) 0.025 (0.015) 0.006 (0.049) 0.038 (0.023)
Argentina 22.141 (1.745)*** -0.036 (0.025) 1.813 (0.080)*** 0.254 (0.037)***
Brazil 6.032 (1.549)*** -0.057(0.023)** 0.096 (0.072) 0.156 (0.033)***
Woman x Right Party 4.421 (2.767) -0.005(0.039) -0.298(0.126)** -0.010 (0.059)
Adjusted R2 .20*** .09*** .48*** .11**
F statistic 38.870 13.747 140.684 19.371
Valid N 1269 1269 1269 1269
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001
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The total bill authorship model is statistically significant to the p<.001
level, and it has an adjusted R2 of .204, indicating it is a pretty good fit. The
model shows a correlation between country and individual legislator bill
promulgation. As discussed in earlier chapters, Argentina’s Congress has a more
institutionalized committee system, the number of bills produced from within the
Congress is higher, there is a more developed seniority system and a greater
distribution of power in the leadership than in the Brazilian or Mexican
legislatures. The linear regression model would suggest that these institutional
factors may be related to the increased level of bill authorship among individual
legislators in Argentina, as compared to other nations. The members of the
Brazilian Congress, while not as highly correlated to bill production as are
members of the Argentine Congress, are more strongly linked to individual levels
of bill authorship than are members of the Mexican Congress. While it cannot be
said definitively, this connection would also seem to be linked to the degree of
institutionalization within the Congresses. The Brazilian legislature, as discussed
earlier, has a more institutionalized committee system than the Mexican Congress,
the number of bills produced from within the Congress is greater, and the
possibility for reelection increases the use of seniority.
Bill production varies greatly across the three subject legislatures. It may
be that committee system institutionalization is the factor within a nation that is
responsible for the correlation between a nation and the level of individual
legislation sponsorship, however, this cannot be said authoritatively. In addition,
across these nations, legislators from districts of higher magnitude are positively
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correlated with a greater production of legislation. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that larger district magnitudes would be populated with legislators who
spend more time on legislation than legislators from smaller magnitude districts.
While gender is not significantly correlated with the amount of legislative output,
the slope is in the hypothesized direction. It appears that while women may be
more likely to produce legislation than men, the country and institutional setting
in which they are operating is a more critical factor in determining actual
legislative output.
The social bill percentage model has an adjusted R2 of .09 (p<.001). The
analysis bears out the expectations regarding social bill output, with the exception
of the hypothesis regarding the three countries’ relationship to social bill output
percent. Country, institutional, ideological, and gender are all linked to the
percent of legislation a legislator produces that is related to social issues.
Mexican legislators are statistically more likely to produce a higher percentage of
social legislation than Argentine and Brazilian legislators (p<.001), while
Brazilian legislators are statistically correlated with a lower percentage of social
legislation than Argentine and Mexican legislators (p<.01). Social committee
membership matters. Social committee members are associated with a higher
percentage of social bill output than other legislators (p<.001). Party ideology has
a relationship with the percent of social bills authored as well. Right party
members are associated with a lower percentage of social bill output than other
legislators (p<.05).
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Neither district magnitude, percent of women in the state legislature, right
party women nor experience has a statistically significant correlation with a
legislator’s percent of social legislation output. Female legislators, however, are
significantly correlated with a higher level of social legislation (p<.001). The
results of the analysis statistically support the hypothesis that women author and
support social legislation at a greater rate than do men. This complements the
finding that women are more likely to focus on social groups than are men, and it
indicates that gender is a factor that supersedes ideological, institutional and
country differences when it comes to social issue bill production.
The oversight bill model is highly significant. The adjusted R2 is .48 and
the model is significant to the p<.001 level. Surprisingly, district magnitude and
experience do not have a statically significant correlation to an increase in
oversight legislation. Interestingly, female Deputies are positively correlated with
oversight bill production (p<.001) level. It may be that women are less inclined
to negotiate in the informal avenues of executive branch relations, and they are
utilizing the formal tools available to them to attain policy and representative
goals. Women who are members of right parties, however, are negatively
correlated with oversight legislation production (p<.01). Right party membership
and gender interact, and women who are members of right parties produce a lower
percentage of bills which are oversight in nature than do other legislators.
The data suggests that individual Argentine legislators are correlated with
higher percentages of oversight legislation than are Brazilian or Mexican
legislators (p<.001), whereas Mexican legislators are less likely to produce
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oversight legislation (p<.05). This indicates that the Congress in Argentina is
highly institutionalized and it provides an opportunity for individual legislators to
check the executive in a formal and effective manner. Finally, legislators from
states which have higher levels of women in the state legislature are slightly more
likely to produce oversight legislation (p<.05). This model is highly significant
and indicates that differences in country, institutional and personal characteristics,
independently and in interaction, correlate significantly with the type of
legislation created.
The findings of the economic and security bill authorship model are
interesting, indicating that gender again has an important association to bill
authorship, along with country variables, and to a lesser extent, district
magnitude. The model had a .11 adjusted R2 indicating a good overall fit.
Gender was significantly linked to economic and security legislation, and the
slope was in the predicted direction, linking male legislators to greater economic
and security bill output (p<.01). All three nations are positively linked to
economic and security legislation output, although at varying degrees (p<.001). It
may be that this legislation should have been broken down to distinguish between
economic and security legislation, as this may have more clearly indicated
differences between countries. Finally, larger district magnitudes are associated




Allocation legislation is that legislation that has a direct relationship to a
representative’s geographic constituency. This variable is used to demonstrate
what institutional and personal characteristics have an association with legislation
meant to benefit specific districts. This form of allocation legislation is a useful
tool for a legislator to use to ensure reelection, but also an indication of the
connectivity between a representative and the electorate. This dependent variable
was calculated by a content analysis of legislation that targeted the geographic
district of the representative, and it is the percentage of bills that are directly
aimed at a legislator’s district. This does not account for the negotiations that
occur in large allocation bills, but it does demonstrate the degree of initiated
legislation that an individual aims at his or her district. The theoretical
hypotheses discussed above for the probability of allocation responsiveness are
applicable to this model as well.
Hypothesis 1: Representatives in Brazil will be more likely to
respond to their constituencies through allocation than will
representatives in Argentina or Mexico.
It would be expected that representatives that are bound to their districts
and who seek reelection from those districts would produce legislation to
facilitate that end. Representatives who have a greater degree of freedom from
their party will be more responsive through allocation legislation.
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Hypothesis 2: Representatives in Mexico will be less likely to
utilize allocation responsiveness than will representatives in
Argentina and Brazil.
The literature would support that those institutional structures that allow for
reelection would be more likely to foster allocation legislation. Since both
Argentina and Brazil allow immediate reelection, these nations would foster more
allocation legislation than would Mexico. The equation for this model is
presented below in Figure 6-3.
Y= α + b1X1 + b2X2 +… +b8X8 + €   [Figure 6-3]
where:
Y = Percent of Allocation Bills Authored
X1 =Woman
X2 = Right Party
X3 = District Magnitude




X8 = Woman x Right Party
and
€ =  the error term 
 
An OLS linear regression is utilized to determine the correlation between
the independent variables above, and the dependent variable, percent of allocation
bills sponsored. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 6-4 below.
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Right Party 0.008 (0.007)
District Magnitude -0.001 (0.000)***








*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001
While the interview data did not yield evidence of country or district
magnitude association with allocation responsiveness, the large-scale regression
data based upon content analysis of actual allocation legislation did yield a strong
statistical correlation. This model was highly significant with an adjusted R2 of
.13. As predicted, smaller district magnitude is statistically correlated with
legislators who write a greater percentage of allocation legislation, but the slope is
very small. A decrease in district magnitude is significantly linked to higher
numbers of allocation legislation (p<.001). Legislators from Argentina and Brazil
are positively and statistically significantly linked to an increased numbers of
allocation bills (p<.001), whereas Mexican legislators are negatively, though not
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significantly, correlated with allocation bills. The results of this analysis would
seem to support the literature, which suggests that the possibility of reelection and
a more decentralized federal system, as are present in Argentina and Brazil, and
not in Mexico (Mizrahi 2004), may be the underlying institutional structures that
support a greater percentage of allocation bills. As these factors were not
separated out from the other country characteristics present, however, this may
not be said definitively. This analysis does seem to indicate, however, that
countries with particular institutional structures, along with smaller district
magnitude condition the rate of allocation legislation individual members of a
Congress will produce.
While sex of the legislator does not prove to be a statistically significant
factor, the slope is in the predicted direction indicating a weak, if not statistical,
link between men and a greater rate of allocation legislation. Right party women
are also not significantly linked to a greater rate of production of allocation
legislation than other legislators, although there is a positive slope associated with
these legislators.
The use of two methods revealed interesting results. It may be that while
legislators across systems share an intent to respond allocatively to their
constituents, they do not have the incentive to produce the degree of allocation
responsiveness that a legislator dependent on electoral whims does. The sex of
the legislator, while a significant variable in the interviews, is not significant in
the regression analysis. This indicates that while women do not readily name
allocation as a method for responsiveness, they may be just as likely to produce
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allocation legislation. It is important that men appear to prioritize allocation as a
means of responsiveness, even if their legislative patterns are not indicative of a
statistically greater actual output. Finally, while intent frames how a legislator
uses his or her resources, this analysis indicates the very large degree to which
country factors and institutions constrain that intent.
Legislative Symbolic Responsiveness
Symbolic Legislation
Symbolic legislation includes declarations, commendations, dedications
and commemorations. These forms of legislative output are used to demonstrate
the degree of symbolic connectivity that is fostered by a representative. This
variable was calculated by a content analysis of legislation that did not create law
or policies, but rather, marked symbolic gestures or created symbolic
commemorations. The theoretical hypothesis discussed above for the probability
of symbolic responsiveness is applicable to this model as well.
Hypothesis 1: Women will be more likely to produce a greater
percentage of symbolic responsiveness than will men.
As political outsiders, women will utilize symbolic representation to gain
political power at the grassroots level. Women are traditionally more inclined to
use and nourish grassroots support than are men, and symbolic representation is a
useful method for building this type of support.
Hypothesis 2: Brazilian and Argentine legislators will produce a
greater percent of symbolic legislation than will Mexican
legislators.
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The reelection possibilities in Brazil and Argentina provide a more likely
environment for the use of symbolic legislation. In order to get reelected to their
seat, these deputies would be more likely to create highly visible manifestations
of their work, even though it has little substantive value.
The equation for this model is presented below in Figure 6-4.
Y= α + b1X1 + b2X2 +… +b8X8 + € [Figure 6-4]
where:
Y = Percent of Symbolic Bills Authored
X1 = Woman
X2 = Right Party
X3 = District Magnitude




X8 = Woman x Right Party
and
€ = the error term
OLS linear regression is utilized to determine the correlation between the
institutional and personal variables above and the dependent variable, number of
symbolic legislation bills authored. The results are shown in Table 6-5 below.
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Right Party 0.030 (0.054)
District Magnitude -0.002 (0.002)








*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001
This model was highly significant, with an adjusted R2 of .34. The
analysis demonstrates that women are more likely to produce a greater percentage
of symbolic legislation than are men (p<.01). This finding is consistent with the
literature. Women are more likely to see their role as a symbolic representation of
government to others than are men. In keeping with this idea, legislators from
states with higher levels of women in the state legislature also respond to their
constituencies in a more symbolic manner (p<.01). This analysis additionally
points to country factors that are more conducive to the production of symbolic
legislation. Argentine legislators produce a significantly greater percentage of
symbolic legislation than do Brazilian and Mexican legislators (p<.001), whereas
212
Mexican legislators are significantly linked to a lower percentage of symbolic
legislation (p<.05). This finding may indicate that Argentine legislators use
legislation to increase the efficacy of the public, and use their offices to provide
legislation that strengthens the link between government and the people. Acting
to increase constituent links is consistent with both a more institutionalized
legislature and with an electoral system that allows for reelection, so it may be
these factors which are responsible for the high correlation between Argentine
legislators and the rate of symbolic legislation.
Discussion
In terms of responsiveness, there is obviously an element missing that
would complete this discussion. To whom are these legislators responsive? This
study examines only one side of the dyadic relationship between legislator and
constituent. These analyses, however, yield important insight into the types of
legislative responsiveness used in certain institutional settings by male and female
legislators. The four types of responsiveness are policy, allocation, service, and
symbolic, and there appear to be patterns in the type of responsiveness a legislator
utilizes according to his or her gender, institutional settings, and country.
The different responsiveness analyses above utilize hypotheses and
variables that the representation and legislative behavior literature indicate are
appropriate. While the analyses bear out the hypotheses in several cases, they are
not consistently proved. The analyses do, however, demonstrate that gender has a
consistent relationship with differences in responsiveness, as do country,
institutions and ideological factors.
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In this chapter, hypotheses are put forward regarding a legislator’s type of
responsiveness. For the sake of cohesion, these hypotheses are grouped according
to each aspect of responsiveness. Policy responsiveness is analyzed through the
use of a cross tab analysis and a logistic regression analysis of legislator’s
responses. In addition, an analysis of policy responsiveness through individual
level bill authorship is also utilized. Thirteen hypotheses concerning policy
responsiveness are presented, including four that focus on differences in gender.
Hypotheses concerning gender include: women will be more likely to utilize
policy responsiveness than will men, they will produce more legislation in total
than will men, and they will produce a greater percent of social legislation than
will men. In addition, the hypothesis is put forth that men will produce a greater
percent of economic and security legislation than will women. The analyses
support all these hypotheses, and yield statistically significant results in all but
one analysis.
The cross tab analysis and logistic regression analyses significantly show
that women are more likely to utilize policy responsiveness than are men. While
the relationship between sex and total legislation produced is not quite significant,
the positive direction of the slope does indicate a relationship between women and
bill production. Women are statistically more likely to utilize social legislation to
respond to constituents than are men. Male legislators produce a higher
percentage of their overall legislation which is economic and security oriented
than do women. Finally, the analysis of oversight legislation, which had no
hypothesized relationship with legislator sex, does demonstrate a statistically
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significant likelihood that women will produce a greater percentage of their bills
that are oversight in nature than will men. Interestingly, right party women are
associated significantly and negatively with oversight bill authorship.
In addition to the hypotheses regarding a relationship between legislator
sex and policy responsiveness, four hypotheses are put forth concerning the
relationship between country and policy responsiveness. In particular, it is
hypothesized that Argentine legislators will be more likely to respond through
policy than will Brazilian or Mexican legislators, and that they will be correlated
with higher levels of bill production, higher percentages of social bill production,
and higher percentages of economic and security legislation than will legislators
from Brazil and Mexico. While the indication of higher levels of policy
responsiveness among Argentine legislators is only seen in the percentages of the
cross tab analysis, and is not significantly shown in either the cross tab analysis or
the logistic regression analysis, the legislation output hypotheses are somewhat
borne out.
Greater percentages of Argentine legislators indicate that they utilize
policy responsiveness than is indicated in either Brazil or Mexico, but neither the
cross tab nor the logistic regression show this to be a significant correlation.
Argentine legislators are significantly linked to the highest number of individual
member legislation output, followed by Brazilian legislators, with Mexican
legislators linked to the lowest bill output. Argentina does not, however, have
higher percentages of bill output that are concerned with social issues. Mexican
legislators are significantly associated with a higher percentage of social bill
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authorship, while Brazilian legislators are significantly associated with a lower
percentage of social bill authorship. The rate of economic and security bills
produced is significant in all three nations, with Mexican legislators producing a
slightly greater percentage of economic and security bills than Argentine and
Brazilian legislators. Finally, an unhypothesized link is apparent between
Argentine legislators and oversight legislation. Argentine legislators produce a
significantly higher percentage of bills that are oversight in nature, while Mexican
legislators show a significant association with lower percentages of oversight
legislation.
District magnitude is another variable that the literature would suggest
should be correlated with policy responsiveness. The literature would indicate
that legislators from districts with a higher magnitude will be more likely to
produce more total legislation and a greater percentage of oversight legislation
than legislators from lower magnitudes. The analyses support that legislators
from larger district magnitudes will produce more legislation than other
legislators, it does not, however, support the hypothesis regarding an increased
percentage of oversight bills. While unhypothesized, the analysis does show that
there is a slight connection between legislators from larger districts and a greater
percentage output of economic and security bills.
Three final variables are associated with policy responsiveness.
Experience is hypothesized to be correlated with a greater production of
legislation and with a higher rate of oversight bills produced, but neither of these
hypothesized connections proves to be significant. The final variable
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hypothesized is of an institutional nature, committee membership on social
committees. Members of social committees are statistically associated with
greater authorship rates of social legislation than are non-members. One other
variable, right party membership, is not hypothesized to correspond to policy
responsiveness but, does in fact have a relationship with social bill production.
Right party members produce a lower percentage of social legislation than do
other legislators.
In policy responsiveness it is gender that is most connected to both the
indication of use and to differences in the way policy is used. Women are more
likely to indicate policy as a preferred form of responsiveness, and more likely to
produce higher rates of social and oversight legislation than men. Men are more
likely to produce higher rates of economic and security legislation. Country
differences are also very important in these analyses. Argentina’s much higher
output is numerically, but not statistically reflected in the legislators’ indications
of responsiveness, and the individual policy output in Argentina is more focused
on oversight of the executive than it is in either Brazil or Mexico. This is
particularly interesting as Argentina was the only non-divided government at the
time of this study.
The second set of hypotheses concern allocation responsiveness. Only
three hypotheses were put forth regarding allocation. The first two hypotheses,
that Brazilian legislators will be more likely to utilize allocation legislation than
legislators in Argentina or Mexico, and that Mexican legislators will be less likely
to utilize allocation legislation than legislators in Argentina or Brazil, are
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numerically, but not statistically, proven in the cross tab analysis, and are not
significant in the logistic regression. When these hypotheses are applied to the
percent of allocation bills produced, they are again, partially proven. Both
Brazilian and Argentine legislators produce allocation bills at about the same
statistically significant rate, while Mexican legislators are not statistically linked
to allocation bill production. The third hypothesis, that a legislator from a smaller
district magnitude will be more likely to utilize allocation responsiveness is
demonstrated significantly in the analysis of allocation bill production rate.
In terms of allocation responsiveness, no hypotheses were put forth
regarding difference between male and female legislators. There does, however,
appear to be a distinction between men and women. The interviewed male
legislators were significantly linked to a greater tendency to utilize allocation
responsiveness. In terms of actual legislation percentages, however, these
preferences did not translate into significant differences between male and female
legislators. While the negative slope does indicate a weak relationship between
male legislators and a higher percentage of allocation legislation, it would appear
that the constraints of the institution were more instrumental in determining how
prolific a legislator would be in producing allocation legislation.
The role of service responsiveness is difficult to determine. Service does
not translate into legislation, rather, it is in the form of calls, meetings, and aid
with forms and access to government service. As a result, only the interviewed
legislator’s preferences can be ascertained. While no hypothesis regarding gender
is put forth, a trend is very evident: only male legislators refer to the use of
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constituency service as a response to the needs of their constituents. Women do
not mention this as a means to communicate or meet the needs of their
constituents. In addition, Argentine legislators also appear to eschew this means
of responsiveness, no Argentine legislators indicate this as a method of
constituency response. As was hypothesized, the cross tab analysis and the
logistic regression analyses show a significant link between Brazilian legislators
and the utilization of this form of responsiveness. This would indicate that both
country factors and gender play a role in determining the likelihood that a
legislator will utilize service responsiveness.
Finally, two hypotheses are given in regard to symbolic responsiveness.
The first is that women will be more likely to utilize symbolic responsiveness
than will men, and the second is that Argentine and Brazilian legislators will be
more likely to respond symbolically than will Mexican legislators. While the
analysis of interview responses did not yield significant results regarding an
association with either gender or country, the analysis of the percent of symbolic
bills produced did. The two measures of symbolic responsiveness are very
different. In interviews, men often spoke of their presence and reputation among
the electorate in a personal way, while women clearly were more focused on
producing legislation. It may be that the interview questions did not provide an
adequate opportunity for discussion of symbolic responsiveness, and as this
analysis did not measure the type, duration, and frequency of other symbolic acts,
it did not provide a thorough picture of symbolic responsiveness. Symbolic
legislation is a more formal and distant method of symbolic responsiveness than
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are personal appearances. The analysis of percent of symbolic legislations
produced shows that female legislators significantly produce a higher percentage
of symbolic legislation. In addition, Argentine legislators have a significantly
higher percentage of bills that are symbolic in nature than do Brazilian and
Mexican legislators. Indeed, Mexican legislators are negatively and statistically
linked to symbolic bill production.
The most significant findings regarding constituency responsiveness are
presented in bulleted form below:
♦ Women are more likely to utilize policy responsiveness than are
men, as is seen in the cross tab analysis and logistic regression
analysis.
♦ Women’s policy responsiveness focuses more on social bills and
oversight bills than does men’s policy responsiveness.
♦ Men’s policy responsiveness focuses more on economic and
security bills than does women’s policy responsiveness.
♦ Argentine legislators focus more on policy responsiveness than do
Brazilian and Mexican legislators, as is seen numerically in the
cross tab analysis, as well as in the bill production analysis.
♦ Argentine legislator’s policy responsiveness focuses more on
oversight bills than do Brazilian or Mexican legislator’s policy
responsiveness.
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♦ Mexican legislator’s policy responsiveness focuses more on social
issue bills than do Argentine or Brazilian legislator’s policy
responsiveness.
♦ Men are more likely to utilize allocation responsiveness, as is seen
in the cross tab analysis and the logistic regression analysis.
♦ Right party women are more likely to utilize allocation
responsiveness than are other legislators, as is seen in the logistic
regression analysis and the allocation bill analysis.
♦ Brazilian and Argentine legislators are more likely to utilize
allocation responsiveness than are Mexican legislators, as is shown
by the allocation bill analysis.
♦ Men are more likely to utilize service responsiveness than are
women, as is indicated by the cross tab analysis.
♦ Brazilian legislators are more likely to utilize service
responsiveness than are Argentine and Mexican legislators, as is
indicated by the cross tab analysis and the logistic regression
analysis.
♦ Women are more likely to utilize symbolic responsiveness than are
men, as is indicated by the percent of symbolic bill analysis.
♦ Argentine legislators are more likely to utilize symbolic
responsiveness than are legislators from Brazil and Mexico, as is
indicated by the percent of symbolic bill analysis.
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♦ Mexican legislators are less likely to utilize symbolic
responsiveness than are legislators from Argentina and Brazil, as in
indicated by the percent of symbolic bill analysis.
♦ A higher district magnitude has a small, but statistically
significant, correlation with greater production of legislation and a
greater percentage of economic and security bills produced.
♦ A lower district magnitude has a small, but statistically significant,
correlation with a greater percentage of allocation legislation
produced.
The emphasis a legislator places on different forms of constituency
responsiveness varies according to gender, and the institutional structures in
which he or she operates. Responsiveness is but one aspect of representative
behavior. A legislator’s foci and goals are important determinants of legislative
behavior as well. Understanding the goals or motivations of legislators completes
the picture of how a legislator will behave in the context of the representative
system.
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Chapter 7: Representative Goals
A legislator’s goals regarding his or her future career shape the way that
he or she represents constituencies. Questions regarding Representative Goals
were answered in terms of legislative goals and career aspirations. The interview
data was analyzed to determine whether any patterns were evident regarding the
behavior of legislators. The goals of legislators in these countries were similar,
but somewhat different than the goals that Fenno (1973) postulated were present
in the United States. In particular, a finding that institution building was a critical
goal in all three nations indicates that the degree of power and institutionalization
of legislatures may condition the formation of goals.
Four Types of Representative Goals
The representative goals of legislators are defined by Fenno (1973) as
good public policy, reelection (modified in this analysis as continued public
office), and institutional power (or personal power). In addition to these three
goals, interview responses prompted the addition of institution building as a goal
among the legislators in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Deputies in each of these
three strengthening legislatures emphasized this as an important goal.
Good Public Policy
A goal of good public policy, as outlined by Fenno (1973), requires that
one of the chief motivations of a legislator is the creation of public policy. For
this measure, deputies’ responses regarding their goals, solely, were utilized. For
example, in Argentina, one legislator responded that an important goal was to
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create legislation that alleviated social pressures such as unemployment, health,
education, and rights for children, while another stated more generally, “to create
the laws most necessary in this historical period.” While in Brazil, one legislator
stated that a goal was to “construct legislation that articulates and meets the needs
of the people.” In Mexico, a legislator stated, “My goal is to create the best laws,
good laws, for the country…” Another was more specific, “My goal is gender
equality through the reform of electoral procedures and affirmative action.”
While some were specific and others more general, a clear goal to create good
public policy was enunciated.
Continued Public Service
While the U.S. model posits a specific career path, reelection and
continuation in the Congress, the lack of reelection in Mexico, and evidence from
Brazil (Samuels 2003) indicate that legislators cannot or do not build careers in
the Congress in these nations. Instead of a dependent variable based upon goals
of reelection, a desire for future public service has instead been recorded.
Evidence has been presented in the literature that would indicate that these
countries may yield very different career paths. Samuels (2003) has remarked on
the paths that are built in states in Brazil, while Nacif (2003) has remarked on the
careers Mexican Deputies make in the party. While nuances in the career paths
these legislators would choose are highly interesting, they do not go directly to
this work, and so, are excluded from this discussion. The vast majority of the
interviewees desired a future in public service, with only a few exceptions.
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Personal Power
This representative goal refers to the goals of attaining higher office
within the government, institution or party. Interviewed legislators indicated
gubernatorial, presidential and other office-holding goals, but did not
systematically indicate a desire for institutional power. As these Congresses grow
in strength, deputies will more often seek internal institutional power as well. No
particular pattern emerged from this analysis. This variable, however, was
difficult to quantify, as discussed earlier. While legislators indicated
overwhelmingly that they would prefer to remain in public office, this is not
sufficient to show that they wished to acquire personal power. Very few indicated
a specific ascending path, and it may be that this is a response that is difficult to
obtain in a short interview setting.
Institutional Reform
This variable is derived from the literature as well as from the interview
data. Nava Polina and Yáñez López note that the vast majority of legislation
sponsored over time by deputies in Mexico is concerned with institutional reform
(2004). In addition, the legislators in each of these nations repeatedly referred to
goals of institution building and increasing the public’s accessibility to the
legislature. In Mexico, one legislator stated his goal was to “Raise the bar. Make
the legislature a more powerful and respected position, make the Congress a more
powerful branch.” Or as another stated, “to insure that Congress attains a better
perception in the public.” Other deputies just cited the goal of institution building
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as creating “equilibrium in government.” The more capable a deputy is of using
the system to accomplish goals, the less likely they will favor reform.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Women will be more likely to have the goal of
policy promulgation than will men.
The literature on differences between female and male legislators indicates
that women will utilize policy more often than men in order to accomplish
legislative goals (Rosenthal, ed. 2002).
Hypothesis 2: Deputies in Argentina will be more likely to have
policy goals than will Deputies from Mexico or Brazil.
Argentina has the most highly institutionalized committee system and
produces the most legislation among these nations. The institutional structures
available for policy creation are more developed in Argentina, and thus,
Argentine legislators will be more likely to have a goal of policy formation.
Hypothesis 3: Deputies in Mexico will be less likely to have
future public service goals than will deputies from Argentina or
Brazil.
Mexico has the legislative system least structured to accommodate goals
of future public service. The Brazilian and Argentine legislatures both allow for
reelection and building of careers in and through the legislature, while the lack of
reelection limits public service career building through the legislature.
226
Hypothesis 4: Deputies in larger district magnitudes will be
more likely to have future public service goals than will other
legislators.
Higher magnitude districts give more latitude to parties in assigning seats.
Since persons who have an interest in building a public service career will be
given more support by the parties than will amateur legislators, they will be more
likely found in the higher magnitude districts.
Hypothesis 5: Deputies in larger district magnitudes will be
more likely to have personal power goals than will deputies in
smaller district magnitudes.
Persons who are interested in building personal power will have more
support from the parties, and thus, will be more likely to seek office in higher
district magnitudes.
Hypothesis 6: Deputies with more experience are more likely to
have personal power goals than deputies who have less
experience.
As legislators gain public service experience, their goals will increasingly
concern personal power. They will have more freedom for personal power goal
achievement than less experienced legislators (Parker 1992).
Hypothesis 7: Deputies in Argentina and Mexico will be more
likely to have institutional reform goals than will deputies in
Brazil. .
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The Brazilian system, as a whole, offers more freedom for deputies to
make careers and achieve goals than does the Mexican or Argentine system, and
thus, institutional reform will be less in the interest of Brazilian legislators.
Hypothesis 8: Legislators with more experience will be more
likely to have institutional reform goals than will other
legislators.
As legislators gain public service experience, they will be both more
comfortable within the legislative system and more likely to recognize areas that
could benefit from reform.
Hypothesis 9: Women will be more likely to utilize group
processes, to include committees and party avenues to achieve
goals, whereas men will be more likely to utilize individual
processes to accomplish goals, to include individual relationships
and ministry relationships.
The literature on leadership and work style indicates that female
legislators will utilize group processes, while male legislators are more likely to
use individual processes (Rosenthal 1998).
Hypothesis 10: Argentine legislators will be more likely to utilize
group processes, to include committees and party avenues to
achieve goals than will Brazilian and Mexican legislators.
The more institutionalized a legislature, the more the members will utilize
formal processes to accomplish goals. These formal processes include the
organizational structures of committees and parties. As Argentina is the most
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institutionalized legislature, the members will be more likely to utilize these
processes to accomplish the goals of representation.
Data
The data for this portion of the study is derived from interviews and
surveys of deputies in the Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican Congresses. These
interviews were conducted between November 2002 and September of 2003, and
followed the same basic survey instrument. This instrument asked questions
regarding the legislative and career goals of Deputies, the Deputy’s constituency,
and the Deputy’s perception of the structure of the legislative and greater
governmental system. The data consists of 37 interviews with Deputies in the
Mexican Congress, ten of whom are women, 21 interviews with Deputies in the
Argentine Congress, five of whom are women, and 20 interviews with Deputies in
the Brazilian Congress, four of whom are women. In addition to the interview
data, a full data set which recorded the committee placement, bill output,
leadership, party, sex, district characteristics of all 1269 legislators in office in
these nations at the time of this study is utilized.
Analysis
This chapter examines the data utilizing three methods. First, by using a
cross tab analysis, the representative goals indicated by interviewed legislators is
depicted. These tables show important trends particular to national legislatures
and gender. The cross tab analysis shows the frequency of responses among
different representative goals and the policy avenues chosen according to nation
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and legislator sex, as well as the significance of these frequencies, as expressed by
a Chi2 analysis. These findings are expressed in Table 7-1 and 7-4, respectively.
Secondly, a logistic regression analysis is utilized to determine the
statistical significance of these trends. The logistic analysis expands the number
of independent variables to include specific institutional structures across nations.
The outcome of the binary logistic regression analyses for each type of
representative goals is found in Table 7-2. A binary logistic regression analysis of
preferred work style is included in this chapter as it demonstrates how legislators
achieve their representative goals, the results of this analysis is found in Table 7-
3. This is further expanded in the policy avenue analysis shown in Table 7-5.
Finally, a set of linear regressions are utilized to analyze the full data set
of 1269 legislators and the relationship of these legislators to institutional reform
bill authorship. This dependent variable is useful as it adds to our understanding
of the interview data and demonstrates the actual legislative activity across the
universe of legislators in office. This analysis serves as a complement to the
analysis of indicated preferences of legislators for institutional reform.
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Table 7-1: Representative Goals Cross Tab









Yes No Chi2 Yes No Chi2 Yes No Chi2 Yes No Chi2









Argentina 52% 48% 3.393* 90% 10% 0.497 43% 57% 0.040 43% 57% 0.004
Brazil 25% 75% 1.388 100% 0% 4.416* 45% 55% 0.176 30% 70% 1.669
Mexico 32% 68% 0.367 72% 28% 6.071** 38% 62% 0.296 49% 51% 1.160
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The cross tab analysis indicates that both gender and country are linked to
particular representative goals. Women are more likely to state a goal of policy
formulation, as are Argentine legislators. In addition, Brazilian legislators are
more likely to express the goal of future public service, whereas Mexican
legislators are less likely to express this goal. The personal power goal seems to
be nearly equally indicated across the categories. Finally, while not quite
significant, Brazilian legislators appear to be less likely to express an institutional
reform goal. These correlations are more fully addressed in the binary logistic
regression that follows. The equation for this model is presented in Figure 7-1
below.
Ln[1/(1-p)] = α + b1X1 + b2X2 +….. + b6X6 [Figure 7-1]
where:
Ln[1/(1-p)] = Log of the Odds of an Identified Representative Goal
X1 = Woman
X2 = Right Party
X3 = Experience
X4 = District Magnitude
X5 = Argentina
X6 = Brazil
The data shows that two of the models were significant. The particular
factors that are significant in these equations are legislator sex, district magnitude,
and the national legislative structure of Brazil. The results of the statistical
analysis are shown in Table 7-2 below:
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Table 7-2: Logistic Regression of Representative Goals8
Good Public Policy Continued Public
Service
Personal Power in the
Institution
Institution Reform
B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.)
Constant -0.993 (0.553) 0.218 (0.771) -0.514 (0.503) 0.241 (0.509)
Woman 1.216 (0.579)* 0.930 (0.957) -0.050 (0.551) -0.082 (0.568)
Right Party -0.785 (0.563) 1.190 (0.818) -0.174 (0.503) -0.833 (0.523)
Experience 0.645 (0.542) -0.734 (0.776) 0.284 (0.488) 0.015 (0.507)
District Magnitude -.005 (.026) 0.281 (0.136)* 0.007 (0.022) .032 (.023)
Argentina 0.718 (0.658) -0.062 (0.961) 0.050 (0.613) -0.653 (0.638)
Brazil -0.338 (0.846) ---- (all yes) 0.061 (0.755) -1.872 (.841)*
Chi2 12.404* 11.766* 0.890 7.022
-2 Log Likelihood 89.437 47.976 104.714 99.255
Nagelkerke R2 .20 .26 .02 .11
Valid N 78 78 78 78
p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001
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The model for the public policy goal is significant with a Chi2 of 12.404.
In addition, the fit of this model is good, as demonstrated by the approximated R2
of .20. The institutional variables did not have the predicted significance,
whereas gender is significantly linked to a representative goal of public policy
(p<.05). Women are more likely to indicate a goal of producing public policy
than are men, and this is consistent with women’s preferred method of
responsiveness as well.
The model for continued public service is also significant, and has an
approximated R2 of .26. An institutional factor, district magnitude, and a country,
Brazil, both stand out in this analysis. Legislators elected from larger district
magnitudes are more likely to cite continued public service as a goal than are
legislators elected from smaller district magnitudes. In addition, although it had
to be dropped from the equation, as all legislators responded “yes,” it is clear that
Brazilian legislators are more likely to have a goal of continued public service
than are legislators from either Argentina or Mexico.
While the interviewed legislators do not seem to indicate any pattern in
personal power goals, a correlation does exist concerning institutional reform. As
is hypothesized, Brazilian legislators are less likely than Argentine or Mexican
legislators to cite institutional reform goals (p<.05). It appears that legislators
from Brazil have a significant relationship with the formation of particular
representative goals. Both the correlation to continued public service and the
lesser correlation to institutional reform may be due to the greater degree of self-
determination that Brazilian legislators enjoy in relationship to Argentine and
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Mexican legislators. These institutional factors, however, are not distinguished
from the overall label of “country,” and thus, this cannot be said definitively.
Another method by which to examine representative goals is through the
process that legislators utilize to accomplish goals. Along with committee
membership and place in the leadership structure, policy output and policy
avenues demonstrate how effective an individual can be in performing his or her
representative functions. In order to understand the effect on representation, the
following analyses will examine what factors in particular are associated with
different processes in order to accomplish representative goals. An OLS analysis
is conducted measuring the correlation of a legislator’s sex, experience, district
factors, right party membership, country and the interaction thereof on the use of
legislative processes.
Work Style
An important aspect of a representative’s goals is the method a legislator
chooses to accomplish the work of representation. A legislator may work
individually or prefer to use group processes to accomplish goals. The question
utilized to determine a legislator’s work style was “How do you prefer to work
within the Congress, as a team or an individual?” As discussed above in the
context of committees, the literature indicates that women will be more likely to
utilize group processes than will men. Consistent with this analogy, it would
seem that the more institutionalized the committee system within a legislature, the
more likely a deputy will choose to use group processes rather than individual to
accomplish his or her goals. While this institutional factor is not distinguished out
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from the umbrella of “country,” this would lead one to hypothesize that legislators
from Argentina would be more likely to choose group processes than will
legislators from other nations. The equation for the model is in Figure 7-2 below.
Ln[1/(1-p)] = α + b1X1 + b2X2 +….. + b5X5 [Figure 7-2]
where:
Ln[1/(1-p)] = Log of the Odds of an Individual Work Style
X1 = Woman




The data shows that the model was significant, and the particular factor
that is significant in this equation is legislator sex. The slopes associated with the
nations are not in the predicted direction, and no other variables are statistically
significant. The results of the statistical analysis are shown in Table 7-3 below:









-2 Log Likelihood 87.385
Nagelkerke R2 .28
Valid N 78
*p <.05,**p <.01,***p <.001
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The model is significant with a Chi2 of 17.763. In addition, the fit of these
models are good, as demonstrated by the approximated R2 of .28. While the
variables associated with national legislative factors do not have the predicted
significance, the factor associated with gender is highly significant. Women are
statistically less likely to utilize individual methods to obtain their goals within
the legislature than are men (p<.001). This final analysis corroborates the trends
demonstrated in the preferred process use of legislators to achieve representative
goals.
Policy Avenues
Legislative institutions as well as personal characteristics condition how a
legislator will choose to pursue his or her representative goals. There are many
policy avenues that a legislator may utilize to accomplish their policy goals in the
congress. The interviewed legislators cited committee use, party use, individual
relationships, and ministry use as methods for accomplishing their representative
goals. Each avenue is analyzed using a cross tab analysis and a binary logistic
regression analysis.
Committee Avenue
Both gender and national legislative institution are expected to be linked
to a committee avenue. Women, who work in groups more so than do men are
more likely to utilize a committee system to accomplish goals than would men.
The role of institutional structure correlates with a statement that was echoed by
several legislators in both Brazil and Mexico, “I prefer to work in a team, but it is
impossible here.” This is consistent with the evidence regarding the
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institutionalization of the three legislatures. Strong committee systems will
provide more usable methods for policy attainment (Polsby 1968). The Brazilian
and the Mexican legislature are not as highly professionalized in terms of staff,
seniority and specialization as is the Argentine legislature.
Party Avenue
Legislators may choose to use the party to accomplish their representative
goals. It would seem likely that legislators in stronger party systems are more
likely to use the party than are legislators in weak party systems. Additionally,
the literature would support the hypothesis that women are more likely to use the
party to accomplish goals than are men (Rosenthal 1998), as the party may
provide group processes, and also because women are more loyal party members
than are men (Constantini 1990).
Individual Relations Avenue
The third potential tool of a legislator is the use of individual relations to
accomplish representative goals. The literature would posit that men would be
more likely to use personal networks than would women to accomplish their
representative goals (Rosenthal 1998). In addition, the literature would lead to the
hypothesis that more professionalized legislatures would rely less on individual
relationships among deputies than would less institutionalized legislatures (Polsby
1968).
Ministry Avenue
The final method that legislators utilize to accomplish goals is ministry
relations and negotiation. This method is likely to be utilized in Brazil much
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more so than it is utilized in either Argentina or Mexico due to the symbiotic
relationship between the bureaucracy and the congress in Brazil. As it is an
individual process, it is also much more likely to be used by men than by women
(Rosenthal 1998). A table demonstrating the cross tab analysis of the deputies’
responses is found below in Table 7-4.
239
Table 7-4: Policy Avenue Cross Tab
Committee Avenue Party Avenue Individual Relationship
Avenue
Ministry Avenue
Yes No Chi2 Yes No Chi2 Yes No Chi2 Yes No Chi2









Argentine 76% 24% 5.153* 33% 67% 2.245 14% 86% 6.449** 0% 100% 5.225**
Brazilian 50% 50% 0.286 10% 90% 2.195 50% 50% 1.893 45% 55% 12.519***
Mexican 46% 54% 2.399 22% 78% 0.001 43% 57% 1.108 11% 89% 1.131
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The committee avenue analysis indicates that gender has a strong
correlation with the preference for the use of committee, as does national
legislative characteristics. Women are more likely than men to prefer to utilize
committee systems to accomplish goals. The data demonstrates that Argentine
legislators are also statistically more likely to utilize committees to accomplish
goals than legislators in Brazil and Mexico. The greater institutionalization of the
Argentine system would support greater reliance upon committees to accomplish
goals.
The party avenue analysis provided fewer correlations. Both sex and
national legislative structure have no statistical association with the use of party to
accomplish representative goals. Legislators do not seem to consistently use
parties as tools to accomplish their representative goals.
The use of the individual relationship avenue is statistically correlated to
national legislative structures. It appears that the institutional culture in the
Brazilian and the Mexican Congresses are more likely to foster the use of
individual relationships to accomplish representative actions than is the Argentine
legislature. As the Argentine legislature is the most professional of these
legislatures, it is expected that formal rather than informal routes would be used.
The use of the ministry avenue to accomplish goals is correlated to both
gender and institutional factors. While the ministry tool was utilized rarely, men
were far more likely to cite the use of ministries in order to accomplish their
representative goals. Brazilian legislators are correlated with a higher likelihood
of using the ministries to accomplish their goals. The symbiotic relationship that
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exists between Congress and the Ministries, in addition to the relative power of
the ministries and the less institutionalized committee system provides an
explanation for why this route is used most often in Brazil. Argentine legislators
are significantly less likely to utilize ministry relationships than are legislators
from Brazil or Mexico.
A statistical analysis of policy avenue use was conducted using a binary
logistic regression. The equation for the model is presented in Figure 7-3 below.
Ln[1/(1-p)] = α + b1X1 + b2X2 +….. + b5X5 [Figure 7-3]
where:
Ln[1/(1-p)] = Log of the Odds of an Identified Policy Avenue
X1 = Woman




The data shows that the models yield significant results. The results of the
statistical analysis are shown in Table 7-5 below:
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Table 7-5: Policy Avenue Logistic Regression10
*p <.05**p <.01,***p <.001
Committee Party Individual Ministry
B (s.e.) B (s.e.) B (s.e.) B (s.e.)
Constant -0.807 (0.536) -0.826 (0.568) -0.076 (0.509) -2.671 (0.824)***
Woman 1.282 (0.629)* -0.939 (0.732) -0.513 (0.626) -1.047 (1.136)
Right Party 0.422 (0.538) -0.540 (0.603) -0.015 (0.545) 0.184 (0.822)
Experience 0.073 (0.505) 0.145 (0.606) 0.285 (0.511) 0.384 (0.695)
Argentina 1.358 (0.686)* 0.576 (0.658) -1.762 (0.812)** -------- (all no)
Brazil 0.543 (0.794) -1.302 (0.899) -0.185 (0.613) 2.357 (0.794)***
Chi2 9.082* 5.828 8.330* 15.210**
-2 Log Likelihood 98.227 75.963 94.615 55.078
Nagelkerke R2 .15 .11 .14 .30
Valid N 78 78 78 78
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The committee policy avenue model is significant with a Chi2 of 9.082.
The estimated R2 is .15. Both gender and country have an association with
preferences for process use. Committee use is associated with a higher likelihood
that women will utilize the committee to accomplish goals (p<.05). This is
consistent with the hypothesis that women, who work in groups more so than do
men, would utilize a committee system to accomplish goals more so than would
men.
In addition, Argentine legislators are statistically correlated with
committee use (p<.05). It would appear that committees are a critical tool for
Argentine legislators, more so than they are for Brazilian and Mexican legislators.
While this is consistent with the hypothesis that Argentine legislators, as members
of a more institutionalized legislature, are more likely to utilize committees to
accomplish their representative goals, it cannot be stated authoritatively that it is
the institutional factor which is responsible for this correlation.
The Chi2of 5.828 demonstrates that the party use model is not significant,
and, in addition, no variables are significant. It appears that no patterns
indicating party use is discernable across the gender or other variables.
While the individual relationship model was statistically significant with a
Chi2 of 8.330, only the variable indicating a legislator in the Argentine Congress
yielded a statistically significant finding regarding individual relationship use.
Members of the Argentine legislature are statistically less likely than members of
the Mexican or Brazilian legislature to rely on the use of individual relations in
order to accomplish policy and representative goals (p<.01). While the country
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variable is the only significant variable, the negative correlation between women
and individual relationship use corresponds with the cross tab analysis to indicate
gender differences. While not quite statistically significant, men appear to be
more likely to utilize individual relationships to accomplish goals than do women.
The model regarding ministry use is highly significant, with a Chi2 of
15.210, and a simulated R2 of .30. While the model did not yield a statistically
significant finding for a legislator’s sex or right party membership, there is a clear
indication that men are much more likely to cultivate ministry relationships than
are women. The country variables demonstrate that legislators in Brazil are
significantly linked to Ministry (p<.001), while Mexican and Argentine legislators
are negatively correlated with these type of relationships (p<.001). Brazilian
legislators are more likely to utilize ministry relationships to accomplish
legislative goals than are legislators from Argentina or Mexico. The development
of Ministry relations is a tool on which Brazilian Deputies depend, but this tool is
not truly utilized by deputies from Argentina or Mexico to accomplish their
representative goals.
Country factors are clearly correlated and condition what tools deputies
use to accomplish goals. Statistically this is demonstrated in the case of Brazil in
terms of a higher probability of ministry use than is present in Argentina or
Mexico. Additionally, Argentine legislators are statistically more likely to use a
committee to accomplish their legislative goals than are Deputies in either Mexico
or Brazil. Further, the data seems to indicate that in Argentina, the legislators
have a tendency away from the use of individual relationships to accomplish
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goals. While it may be surmised that the policy avenues utilized in these nations
are related to degree of committee system institutionalization and the relative
strength of the ministries, it cannot be said that these institutional factors are
responsible for the correlations in policy avenue use.
The use of policy avenues by legislators was primarily determined by the
country variables, but the sex of the legislator was a significant factor in terms of
committee use. Women are statistically correlated with a higher likelihood to
utilize committees to accomplish goals than are men. In addition, the interview
data seems to indicate that women have a tendency, though not statistically
significant, to use individual relationships and Ministry relationships less so than
do men. These tendencies corroborate the findings of an individual work style of
men as opposed to the group work style of women.
Institutional Reform Legislation
Many of the legislators interviewed identified a common goal: the
reformation of the government and a strengthening of the Congress. They
expressed a desire to serve their constituency by increasing accountability and
proving to be diligent stewards of the public trust. In addition, the literature
asserts that this is a potential goal (Nava Polina and Yáñez López 2003:48). One
form of policy output that would measure these representative goals is legislation
aimed at institutional reform. This variable was calculated by a content analysis
of legislation that created legislation aimed at institutional reform, both in the
Congress and in other branches of the government. It is expected, as discussed
above, that the degree of individual policy maker freedom in the Brazilian system
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will result in less institutional reform legislation. It is further a logical hypothesis
that districts that have increased levels of equality would produce representatives
with a higher predilection toward the creation of reform legislation. A final
hypothesis would be that members with more experience would be more likely to
write legislation that is institutional in nature. The equation for this model is
presented below in Figure 7-4.
Y= α + b1X1 + b2X2 +… +b8X8 + € [Figure 7-4]
where:
Y = Number of Institutional Reform Bills Authored
X1 =Woman
X2 = Right Party
X3 = District Magnitude




X8 = Woman x Right Party
and
€= the error term 
 As with the previous examinations of legislative output, an OLS linear
regression is utilized to determine the correlation between the institutional and
personal characteristics discussed above and the dependent variable, percent of
institutional reform legislation bills authored. The results of the statistical
analysis are shown in Table 7-6 below.
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Right Party -0.218 (0.113)*
District Magnitude 0.001 (0.003)








*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001
This model had an adjusted R2 of only .09, but it was highly significant
(p<.001). The members of Left or Centrist parties are statistically more likely to
write reform legislation (p<.01) than Right Party members. This finding echoes
the sentiments of the interviewed legislators, and is unrelated to the place of the
parties in terms of power. While Mexico had a Right party President and a split
majority in the Congress, Argentina and Brazil had Presidents from the center or
from the left, respectively. Legislators from Argentina and Mexico were
statistically correlated with individually authoring a higher percentage of
institutional reform than legislators from Brazil (p<.001). The interview
preferences of legislators are consistent with their legislative production. Finally,
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as hypothesized, legislators with more experience were statistically correlated
with a greater likelihood of producing institutional reform legislation.
Discussion
Gender, country, district magnitude, and experience are associated with
what goals representatives prioritize. A legislator must choose what processes he
or she will use to accomplish these representative goals. Representatives
determine how they will use their time, to what groups they will respond, and how
they will accomplish tasks in conjunction with these goals.
These analyses highlight some important patterns. Women and members
of the Argentine Congress are more likely to have goals of making good public
policy. The achievement of policy goals is accomplished through the use of
different processes. In Brazil, this is accomplished more through ministry use
than is present in Argentina or Mexico. Additionally, Argentine legislators are
statistically more likely to use a committee to accomplish their legislative goals
than are deputies in Brazil and Mexico and statistically less likely to use
individual relationships to further legislative goals than are legislators in Brazil or
Mexico. The use of different policy avenues by legislators was not only a
function of country, but also of gender. Men are more likely to use an individual
work style. This is seen in the policy avenues women and men use. Women are
more likely to utilize committees than are men. In addition, there is a strong
indication that women have a tendency to use individual relationships and
Ministry relationships less so than do men.
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An analysis of personal power goals did not yield any statistically
significant findings. The lack of findings may be explained in any number of
ways. It may be that the interview instrument was insufficient to ascertain
personal power goals, or that more time with the legislator is necessary, or merely
that the priority set for attainment of personal power is highly individual.
Institutional reform goal patterns were examined through preferences and
the analysis of reform legislation. Members of right parties are less likely to
express a preference for reform and are statistically less likely to write reform
legislation, regardless of the place the parties hold in terms of power. Mexican
legislators had the highest correlation with a goal of institutional reform goal
among the legislative systems, and were also significantly linked to the
production of reform legislation. Argentine legislators, however, were even more
likely to produce reform legislation. Brazilian legislators, in contrast, have a
statistically significant lesser likelihood of favoring reform, and similarly, have a
statistically significant negative correlation with reform legislation.
The most significant findings regarding constituency responsiveness are
presented in bulleted form below:
♦ Women are more likely to have a goal of good public policy than
are men, as indicated by the cross tab analysis and logistic
regression analyses.
♦ Argentine legislators are more likely to have goals of making good
public policy than are legislators from Brazil or Mexico, as
indicated by the cross tab analysis.
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♦ Brazilian legislators are more likely to have a goal of continued
public service than are legislators from Argentina and Mexico, as
indicated by the cross tab analysis.
♦ Mexican legislators are less likely to have a goal of continued
public service than are legislators in Argentina and Brazil, as
indicated by the cross tab analysis.
♦ Legislators from larger district magnitudes are more likely to have
a goal of continued public service than are other legislators, as is
indicated by the logistic regression analysis.
♦ Brazilian legislators are less likely to have a goal of institutional
reform than Argentine and Mexican legislators, as is indicated by
the logistic regression analysis, and the institutional reform bill
analysis.
♦ Argentine and Mexican legislators are more likely to have a goal
of institutional reform than are Brazilian legislators, as is indicated
by the institutional reform bill analysis.
♦ Legislators who have more experience are more likely to have a
goal of institutional reform than are other legislators, as is
indicated by the institutional reform bill analysis
♦ Women are more likely to use group processes than are men, as is
indicated by the work style analysis.
♦ Men are more likely to use individual processes than are women,
as is indicated by the work style analysis.
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♦ Women are more likely to use committees than are men, as is
indicated by the cross tab analysis and logistic regression analysis.
♦ Argentine legislators are more likely to use committees than are
legislators from Brazil and Mexico, as is indicated by the cross tab
analysis and logistic regression analysis.
♦ Men are more likely to use individual relationships than are
women, as is indicated numerically in the cross tab analysis.
♦ Argentine legislators are less likely to use individual relationships
than legislators from Brazil and Mexico, as is indicated by the
cross tab analysis.
♦ Men are more likely to use ministry relationships than are women,
as is indicated by the cross tab analysis.
♦ Brazilian legislators are more likely to use ministry relationships,
as is indicated by the cross tab analysis and logistic regression
analysis.
These goals and the processes for achieving goals are essential elements of
representation. Goal priorities are also somewhat related to the focus and
responsiveness priorities that are evident in differences in gender and in the
legislatures of Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. The final chapter of this
dissertation will draw this information together and attempt to draw conclusions
about the findings in terms of the role of gender, institutions, personal
characteristics and country factors and their interaction in forming an individual
Representative Method.
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Chapter 8: Representation Implications
“In a democratic government, the right of decision belongs to the majority,
but the right of representation belongs to all” (Ernest Naville 1865). Legislatures
are designed to both represent and to provide the means of translating the power
and the will of the people into governance. Elected representatives must decide
who they will represent, how they will represent, and why it is that they represent.
These three facets of the Representative Method: Representative Focus,
Constituency Responsiveness, and Representative Goals, are consistently and
significantly related to a legislator’s gender. While institutional characteristics,
country factors and the interaction of gender with these factors are also
intermittently significant, they do not have the strength of relationship that gender
has with particular elements of the Representative Method. The component parts
of the Representative Method, when considered together, provide a complete
picture of a legislator’s representation, and the relationships between these
component parts point to two possible ideal types of Representative Method. The
strong correlations of gender to each aspect of representation indicate that
descriptive representation has substantive representation implications.
The findings of this research provide constructive insight for scholars of
representation. In particular, gender is determined to be of critical importance to
representative behavior. In addition to this personal characteristic, experience and
party membership also have some relationship to representative behaviors. Three
institutional factors are effectively separated from the country contexts. These
institutions include district factors, such as the percentage of women in the state
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legislature and district magnitude, and committee membership. While institutions
are hypothesized to be closely related to representative behavior, the findings in
this work show only an inconsistent relationship. Finally, the particular
characteristics of the nations of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are often linked to
differences in representative behavior. While these relationships may be surmised
to be linked to the institutional differences across the three legislatures, it is
impossible to determine this definitively. It seems apparent that a much larger
sample of countries is necessary to isolate each of the institutional components for
study. As stated above, those institutional characteristics that are separated out of
the context of “country” do yield a few significant findings, although certainly
less than expected. Across the analyses, it is gender that is the most consistently
significant variable.
While it was expected that personal and institutional characteristics would
lead to the isolation of ideal types of Representative Methods that were correlated
to these factors, this has proven impossible. Indeed, it may be that representation
at the individual level is just that, individual, and thus, difficult to quantify. There
are, however, patterns that do exist. These patterns, as indicated above, link
personal, institutional and country variables to individual components of the
Representative Method. In addition, there are clear correlations between the
component parts that indicate two ideal types of the Representative Method. The
models for these correlations and the ideal types will be presented following a
discussion of the implications evident for representation studies.
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Finally, this chapter will expound upon the proposition that descriptive
representation is an integral part of substantive representation. Drawing upon the
findings of the focus, responsiveness, and goals analyses, as well as the analyses
of the correlations between these components, the case is established that gender
makes a critical difference in representative behavior. It would appear from these
analyses, that descriptive representation provides much more than role models
and efficacy among the public. It would appear that the election of women to
elective office is necessary to achieve a legislature which, through its members,
focuses on all segments of society, is responsive in a variety of ways to the needs
of its constituents, and seeks to achieve the goals necessary to ensure that true
representation occurs.
Indicators of Representative Behavior
There are several factors that are readily important in a discussion of
representative behavior. As noted throughout this dissertation, gender in
particular has a vital relationship to a legislator’s representative activity. While
other personal characteristics, institutional factors, and the particular traits of a
country are also somewhat related to differences to representation, none of these
factors are as consistently significant as gender. These findings have important
implications for the study of representative behavior. A discussion of each of the
variables utilized in this dissertation, the relationship of those variables to




Women and men approach representation from different angles. While
women are more likely to focus on social groups, and to a lesser extent, parties,
men focus on geographic constituencies as well as functional groups. In addition,
women are likely to respond to their constituents through policy and symbolic
activity, while men are more likely to respond to their identified constituencies
through allocation and service. Finally, women are more likely to have a goal of
making good public policy, while women and men were equally likely to have
goals of continued public service, individual power, and institutional reform. The
processes women and men utilize to achieve their representative goals are also
distinct. Women were more likely to use group processes such as committees and
the party, while men were more likely to use individual processes such as
individual relationships and ministry relationships. Gender has a more consistent
and significant relationship with representative behavior than do experience, party
ideology, district equality factors, district magnitude, committee membership, and
country factors.
Focus
Important differences in representative focus are linked to gender. Indeed,
every focus category indicated tendencies regarding gender, and all but party were
significantly related to a legislator’s gender. Women frame social groups as their
constituency focus more so than do men. Men, in contrast, are more likely to
focus on geographic groups and functional groups than are women. An important
exception to this is that right party women are significantly more likely to focus
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on functional groups than are other legislators. Finally, while men showed a clear
tendency away from party focus in the cross tab percentages, and half of women
showed a tendency toward this focus, this was not quite a significant finding in
either the cross tab analysis or the logistic regression analysis.
If women and men see the world differently, as these analyses seem to
indicate, what are the broader themes that we can draw from these differences in
vision? First, it seems apparent that women legislators look beyond the
boundaries of their district, whether they are focusing on social groups or party,
that focus is broad and encompasses societal and ideological issues rather than
men’s more narrow focus on the concerns of a particular geographic area and of a
particular sector of business. Women seem to focus on a more universal
constituency than do men, whereas men appear to focus on “hometown” issues.
The fight over resources and favorable regulations for particular areas and sectors
requires that a legislator’s focus be narrow. It is interesting that what might be
considered “private sphere” concerns are more encompassing of society than are
the more traditional conflicts of politics: land, resources, and commerce.
Secondly, there is the implication that without both men and women in elected
office, particular groups would not receive their fair share of attention on the
agenda and in political discourse. While there are certainly men who focus on
social groups, just as there are women who focus on geographic groups, it is less
likely that a man will focus on social groups, and less likely that a woman would
focus on social groups, and thus, it is likely that without equality in descriptive
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representation of women and men that insufficient attention and representation
will be given to some parts of society.
Responsiveness
Women and men also demonstrate differences in the way they respond to
constituents and the processes they utilize in their response. Men are more likely
to cite service responsiveness or allocation responsiveness than are women.
Rather, women prefer to use policy and symbolic responsiveness more so than do
men. Right party women are more likely to utilize allocation responsiveness than
are other legislators, as is seen in the logistic regression analysis and the
allocation bill analysis. In addition, women, regardless of committee
membership, produce more social legislation than do men. Men’s policy
responsiveness focuses more on economic and security bills than does women’s
policy responsiveness. Finally, while women generally are more likely to
produce oversight legislation than do men, right party women are less likely to
produce oversight legislation than are other legislators.
Differences in methods of response have important implications for the
study of representative behavior. Male and female legislators appear to continue
to have different scopes of representation. The use of policy and symbolic
responsiveness indicates a more expansive method of responsiveness than the
narrower use of allocation and service. It would appear that particular forms of
responsiveness fit with particular areas of focus. Again, the implication is that the
clear differences in responsive behavior require that both women and men serve
as representatives, to ensure that all of society receives resolutions to their issues.
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Goals
In terms of goals: policy, continued public service, personal power, and
institution building, men and women are very similar. There is one difference,
however, that does stand out. Women are more likely to have a goal of good
public policy than are men. In the other three areas, women and men are equally
likely to enunciate the goal. While only policy stood out among goals, the
processes by which men and women prefer to achieve their representative goals
differ. Women are more committed to group processes, while men are much
more likely to prefer to work individually. This is consistent with the analyses of
specific processes as well. These analyses indicate that women are more likely to
use committees and party than are men, while men are more likely to use
individual relationships and ministry relationships than are women.
The goals analysis indicates that just as women are more likely to focus
more and respond more expansively than are men, they are also more likely to be
more inclusive in the goals and processes they utilize. While institutional reform,
like good public policy, is arguably also a more inclusive goal, personal power
and continued public service are indisputably individual. Women’s utilization of
group processes more so than individual processes continues a trend of more
inclusive and expansive representative behavior. Women are more likely to
expand their representative behavior and act cooperatively through broad-based
policies intended for the universal elements of society. Men are more likely to
concentrate their representative behavior and act as individual advocates through
targeted responses aimed specific and bounded sectors of society.
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The role of gender in focus, responsiveness and goals is incontestable.
The persistent connection between differences in gender and differences in
representative behavior is evident throughout the model. A discussion of other
personal, institutional and country factors is found in the following paragraphs,
and while these factors are of significance to legislative behavior, it is gender that
has the most consistent and critical role in the construction of a legislator’s
Representative Method.
Right Parties
Party ideology plays an important role in the policy decisions a legislator
makes, it also appears that it has a connection with a legislator’s representative
behavior. As indicated above in the discussion on gender, one of the most
significant relationships that party ideology has with representative behavior is
how it interacts with gender. Women right party members, in several analyses,
exhibited important differences from other women. Right party women were
more likely than other legislators to focus on functional groups, were more likely
to utilize allocation responsiveness than were other legislators, and were less
likely to author oversight legislation than were other legislators. In addition, right
party membership alone was a significant factor in the social bill and institutional
reform analysis. In each case, right party members were associated with a lower
likelihood of producing social or institutional reform bills.
The implications of this are party ideology has a role in representative
behavior. While right party women are more similar to other women than
dissimilar, the differences do indicate that they may, like men, have a narrower
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focus and utilize more targeted responses. Secondly, while right party members
only showed negative relationships with social and institutional reform bill
authorship, and right party women showed a negative relationship with oversight
legislation, this trend demonstrates that right party members as a whole are more
likely to focus on policies that are more targeted and more likely to support the
existing structures of government.
Experience
Within a legislature, the ability to gain experience and leadership is
dependent upon the possibility for continuing in public service. The more time a
legislator is able to spend gaining expertise in legislative or other public service
offices, the more impact they will have on the content and passage of policy.
Experience, however, does not appear to be a critical factor in these analyses.
The only area of representative behavior in which experience exhibits a distinct
difference is in the analysis of an institutional reform goal. More experienced
legislators are more likely to author institutional reform legislation.
The limited connection between experience and representative behavior
may be a function of the coding for these analyses. All former public service
experience, elected and non-elected, is included. This may cloud the field, and it
may be that in future analyses only elective office experience should be included,
and perhaps, only elective legislative experience should be included. In any case,
the connection between experience and leadership and the connection between
experience and an institutional reform goal indicates that experienced legislators
are interested, and capable, of creating institutional change of great consequence.
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Women in State Legislatures
It was believed that district characteristics would be closely related to
representative behavior. In the case of the percentage of the state legislative seats
that are held by women, a measure utilized as a proxy for the level of gender
equality in the state, only two analyses demonstrated a significant connection.
Legislators from districts with higher gender equality are more likely to utilize
oversight and symbolic legislation than are other legislators. This indicates that a
legislator’s representative behavior may have a connection to the characteristics
of his or her constituency, in other words, the use of symbolic responsiveness may
be related to a desire to ensure efficacy in the public. The need for this type of
responsiveness may be made evident by the greater presence of women in office
at the district level.
District Magnitude
Unexpectedly, district magnitude does not have an association with a
legislator’s focus. It does, however, appear to be connected to responsiveness and
goals. A legislator from a higher district magnitude is connected to higher
legislative production and the production of more economic and security bills. In
addition, legislators from smaller district magnitudes are more likely to produce
more allocation legislation. Finally, legislators from larger district magnitudes are
more likely to have a goal of continued public service than are other legislators.
The number of legislators elected from a district may be instrumental in
determining how those legislators respond, and what representative goals they
seek while in office.
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Committee Memberships
While these analyses did not use committee membership systematically, as
may have been more appropriate, social committee membership was not related to
a social group focus. It was, however, related to the authorship of social policy.
This indicates that while a legislator may not focus on a constituency, his or her
committee placement may result in higher percentages of legislation that focuses
on that particular constituency. This indicates that the committee placement of a
legislator may condition his or her representative behavior.
Role of Country
While this dissertation does examine the institutional characteristics
present in a nation: the party system, the federal system, the legislative-executive
relationship, the electoral system, the use of quotas, and the institutionalization of
the legislature, which includes committee strength, bill authorship and
centralization of the leadership, some of these elements were inseparable from the
umbrella of “country.” A larger study which incorporated ten or more nations
should be able to place values on each of these institutions and analyze the role of
said institutions in representative behavior, but such was not possible here. As a
result, while I may infer from the findings a connection to particular institutional
structures, ultimately, I can only accurately state that one country or another is
linked to particular representative behaviors. The following section discusses the
connections between the Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican legislators to




Argentine legislators exhibit important differences from Brazilian and
Mexican legislators in terms of focus, responsiveness and goals. The Argentine
legislators are significantly more likely to focus on party than are other
legislators. Argentine legislators are also more likely to utilize policy
responsiveness than other legislators, which includes greater total bill authorship
and a greater emphasis on oversight. In addition, Argentine legislators are more
likely to utilize symbolic responsiveness. Among representative goals, Argentine
legislators are more likely to have a goal of making good public policy than other
legislators and they, along with Mexican legislators, demonstrate a positive
connection to a goal of institutional reform. Finally, Argentine legislators are
more likely to use committee processes to accomplish their representative goals
and less likely to use individual relationships than are legislators from other two
nations.
While it is likely that the institutional settings in Argentina are responsible
for many of these connections, as discussed above, it is not possible to
authoritatively argue that it is a particular institution that is responsible for the
representative behavior of Argentine legislators. It may, however, be argued that
an Argentine focus on party, a broad ideological view of constituency, reflects the
strength of the party system. It may be argued that the greater use of policy and
symbolic responsiveness again reflects a broader view of constituency, but also
may be a product of a more institutionalized legislature that allows individual
legislators to utilize policy to respond to constituents, oversee the executive, and
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increase the efficacy of the public. The goal of good public policy and of
institutional reform again may suggest that Argentine legislators have a more
inclusive view of representation, as may also be indicated by the preference for
committee processes. It may, however, be related to the degree of
institutionalization of the legislature.
Brazil
Brazilian legislators are also related to differences in representative focus,
responsiveness, and goals. Brazilian legislators are more likely to focus on
functional groups, and less likely to focus on party than are legislators from
Argentina or Mexico. In terms of responsiveness, Brazilian legislators are more
likely to utilize service than are other legislators. In addition, Brazilian legislators
are more likely to have a goal of continued public service, and less likely to have
a goal of institutional reform than are legislators from Argentina and Mexico.
Finally, Brazilian legislators are more likely to use the process of ministry
relationships to further their representational goals.
Again, while it is not possible to definitively determine why Brazilian
legislators exhibit these particular representative behaviors, we may speculate that
these are related to the institutional configuration in Brazil. A focus on functional
groups, which are more localized, would indicate a more narrow view of
constituency, but also may reflect the strength of the federal system in Brazil. In
addition, the tendency away from a party focus might again be related to a view of
constituency that is less extensive, but it may be a reflection of the relatively weak
party system. The utilization of service could again be related to a more
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individualistic and limited view of constituency, but it may also be associated
with the strength of the ministries and the weakness of the committee system.
Finally representative goals that are more likely to include future public service,
and less likely to include institutional reform may be connected to more a
individualistic culture, but it may be related to an institutional system that fulfills
a legislator’s needs for advancement.
Mexico
As in Argentina and Brazil, legislators in Mexico demonstrated
appreciable differences in representative behavior. While Mexican legislators are
not associated with a particular representative focus, they are associated with
particular forms of responsiveness and goals. Mexican legislators are more likely
to respond through social issue bills than are other legislators. In addition, they
are less likely to utilize symbolic responsiveness than are legislators from
Argentina and Brazil. Finally, Mexican legislators are less likely to have a goal of
continued public service than are legislators in Argentina and Brazil, and, like,
Argentine legislators, are more likely to have a goal of institutional reform than
are Brazilian legislators.
While institutional differences cannot be linked to these differences
definitively, it may be argued that Mexican legislators, who operate in a lowly
institutionalized legislature, are more likely to behave as independent social
crusaders and thus, utilize their time in office not for the purpose of creating
strong links to segments of society, but rather to create social legislation and
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attempt to reform the government. This may also be linked to the strong
traditions against reelection, and thus, career public service in Mexico.
Role of Institutions
As discussed above, it is not possible from the scarcity of data to
determine whether the differences in institutional configurations are responsible
for the relationship that legislators from these countries may demonstrate to
particular representative behaviors. It is appropriate, however, to speculate on the
role that these institutions may have in creating a legislator’s Representative
Method. The following paragraphs are meant merely as a guide for future
research in this area. An important institution in this study is legislative
institutionalization. In addition, the greater the autonomy from the executive, the
more this institutionalization can take hold. The ability to respond to the
constituents is dependent on the resources a legislator has. It would be expected
that as degree of institutionalization increases, representatives gain resources of
expertise, staff and discretion-maximization. This, in turn, results in a stronger
reliance on committees for the promulgation of responsive behavior, which is in
the form of greater policy output. More institutionalized legislatures should
produce legislators who utilize committees, prefer to respond through policy, and
author more legislation.
In contrast, if a legislature not highly institutionalized a legislator will
utilize other processes to respond to constituents, and will utilize different forms
of responsiveness. For example, if a professional bureaucracy exists, lesser-
institutionalized legislatures will produce legislators which utilize ministry
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connections rather than policy initiation to attain representative goals. In
addition, these professionalized bureaucracies shape responsiveness. Members in
systems that have a more professional bureaucracy will have a more service-
oriented responsiveness than will deputies from systems with a less professional
bureaucracy.
When a professional bureaucracy is not an option, legislators in less
institutionalized legislatures will utilize other processes to attain goals. One
important process is the use of individual relationships. Less institutionalized
committee systems will produce legislators who utilize individual relationships in
order to gain representative goals.
The next factor of importance is the role of a decentralized federal system.
It is expected that this institutional structure may be associated with differences in
focus as well as differences in responsiveness. Due to the nature of the
constituencies and the decentralization of power to states, it is expected that
members of more decentralized federal systems should utilize a more geographic
focus and a more allocation based responsiveness than should deputies from more
centralized federal systems.
Party system strength should have a strong association with the type of
responsiveness a legislator utilizes as well. Strong parties may dictate the manner
in which legislators respond to their constituents. The creation of a uniform party
culture of responsiveness is only possible when legislators only option of public
office is through party membership and loyalty. Thus, in stronger party systems,
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legislators will be more likely to focus on party, and more likely to respond to
constituents according to their particular party culture.
The Representative Method
As discussed throughout this dissertation, it was expected that the analyses
would indicate particular developmental, cultural, institutional and personal
characteristics that led to a legislator having a certain type of representative
method. The expected patterns, however, are not readily discernable. While this
may be due to the paucity of developmental, cultural, and institutional data that
could be effectively separated from the context of a country, it may just be that
representation is a highly individual choice that is not as related to institutional
structures as has been hypothesized. In either case, clear trends were evident
concerning the relationship of gender to particular representative behaviors, and
countries exhibited clear relationships as well.
It may be, however, that focus, responsiveness and goals are related one to
another. This would indicate that there are Representative Method ideal types. In
order to determine if any correlation exists between the facets of the
Representative Method, I utilize a logistic regression. While I would expect that
there is some relationship between the component parts, such as broader, more
inclusive foci, responsiveness, and goals being interrelated, as well as narrower,
exclusive foci responsiveness, and goals being interrelated, the literature does not
indicate any direct relationships between the behaviors. I do not think it is
necessary to present the full tables of these analyses, however, the three equations
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that are utilized in the binary logistic regressions are presented in figures 8-1, 8-2,
and 8-3 below:
Ln[1/(1-p)] = α + b1X1 + b2X2 +….. + b4X4 [Figure 8-1]
where:
Ln[1/(1-p)] = Log of the Odds of an Identified Focus
X1 = Policy Responsiveness
X2 = Allocation Responsiveness
X3 = Service Responsiveness
X4 = Symbolic Responsiveness
Ln[1/(1-p)] = α + b1X1 + b2X2 +….. + b4X4 [Figure 8-2]
where:
Ln[1/(1-p)] = Log of the Odds of an Identified Responsiveness
X1 = Policy Goal
X2 = Future Public Service Goal
X3 = Personal Power Goal
X4 = Institutional Reform Goal
Ln[1/(1-p)] = α + b1X1 + b2X2 +….. + b4X4+ €  [Figure 8-3]
where:
Ln[1/(1-p)] = Log of the Odds of an Identified Goal
X1 = Social Group Focus
X2 = Functional Group Focus
X3 = Party Focus
X4 = Geographic Focus
Between the components, a brief correlation analysis is utilized, and two
ideal types of representative method are apparent. Using logistic regressions
with each foci as a dependent variable, and each form of responsiveness as an
independent variable, several connections are revealed. Specifically, the
dependent variable of Social Group Focus is positively associated with the
independent variable of Policy Responsiveness (p<.05), and negatively associated
with the independent variable of Allocation Responsiveness. In addition, the
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dependent variable of Geographic Focus is positively associated with the
independent variables of Allocation Responsiveness and Service Responsiveness
(p<.10), and negatively associated with Policy Responsiveness and Symbolic
Responsiveness (p<.01). All other focus dependent variables have no significant
relationships.
In the analyses that utilize each form of responsiveness as a dependent
variable and each goal as an independent variable, connections are also evident.
There is a positive and significant link between the dependent variable of Policy
Responsiveness and the independent variable of Policy Goal (p<.001), as well as
negative links between the dependent variable of Allocation Responsiveness and
the independent variables of Policy Goal (p<.01) and Institutional Reform Goal
(p<.01). There are no other significant links between Responsiveness and Goals.
Finally, the relationship between goals and focus only reveals a single
negative relationship. Social Group Focus is negatively associated with a
Personal Power Goal (p<.10). There are no other significant associations between
Focus and Goals.
A representative’s behavior is a function of many different factors that
cannot all be quantified or isolated. While it is obvious that a person’s
representative priorities are individual in nature, that does not mean that patterns
cannot be discerned amid his or her characteristics. These two possible ideal type
methods are particularly interesting in the context of the findings in this
dissertation. Each of the component parts of these methods are strongly linked to
gender, but are not consistent with any one country or institution or other personal
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factor. Thus, it may be possible to surmise that one of these Representative
Methods could be associated with a female legislator, while the other could be
associated with a male legislator.
From the evidence in the model and the correlations established above, we
may speculate on the particular Representative Methods that women would
embrace as opposed to the Representative Method that a man is more likely to
utilize. Female legislators are much more likely to have a Representative Method
that is of a Social Group/Policy/Policy type, while male legislators are much more
likely to have a Representative Method that is of a Geographic/Allocation-
Service/Public Service-Personal Power type. These are clearly only two types of
Representative Method, however, the relationships between facets, in addition to
the strong associations of the correlated facets with gender, provide important
insight into the differences between the representative behavior of men and
women. Furthermore, it provides evidence that the descriptive representation of
women, in addition to men, is necessary to ensure that all segments of society are
substantively represented.
Conclusion
Gender has a significant role in determining a legislator’s method of
representation. While developmental, cultural, institutional and other personal
characteristics may have significant relationships with representative behavior, it
is the consistent differences between women and men that are most instrumental
in a legislator’s Representative Method. This strongly indicates that descriptive
representation is an integral part of substantive representation. The evidence
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provided by the analyses of focus, responsiveness and goals demonstrates that
descriptive representation of women provides much more than just role models
and efficacy among historically excluded groups. It would appear that descriptive
representation is necessary to achieve a legislature which, through its members,
focuses on all segments of society, is responsive in a variety of ways to the needs
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Appendix A: Sample Solicitation Letter
Dear Deputy ___________:
My name is Melody Huckaby. I study legislative politics at the University
of Oklahoma, Carl Albert Center. I am writing my doctoral thesis, the subject of
which concentrates on the legislative processes in several national governments. I
would like to speak to you about how you perceive your role as a legislator
generally, what your goals are, and how these goals aid you in the policy area of
*****.
The interview will only take 10 to 20 minutes of your time and would be a
great help in my research. I reside in ******** and I would like to meet with you
within the next two months, prior to **********. I am available every day of the
week from 7:00 to 20:00.
Enclosed with this letter are questions with which broadly cover the topic
of my thesis. I would prefer to discuss these topics with you personally, but if
that is not possible, perhaps another method would be possible. As a second
option, I would like to speak with a member of your staff regarding these topics,
and as a third possibility, perhaps you could provide me with written answers to
the attached questions.
In my thesis, the identity of those legislators interviewed will be
anonymous. In addition, the notes from the interviews will be kept strictly
confidential. The interview instrument is coded so that only I can distinguish
between legislators. I understand that your time is valuable, and this is a
completely voluntary study. Should you not wish to participate in this survey,
you may refuse. If there is any question you do not wish to discuss, then the
interview will not include that question, further, should you wish to stop the
interview at any time, there is no obligation to continue.
Your help is greatly appreciated. It will aid in the greater understanding of
the ********* Legislature and legislative politics in general. If you are interested
in participating in this study, please contact me. I can be reached by telephone at
******, through e-mail at ************and through the post at
***********************. Again, thank you for your time and your help in this
research.
With best regards,
Melody R. Huckaby, J.D.
Doctoral Candidate in Political Science, Carl Albert Center, University of
Oklahoma.
For questions regarding your rights as a participant, contact the Institutional
Review Board at irb@ou.edu
289
Appendix B: Survey Instrument
Role and Career of the Deputies
1. What has been your most important project this year?
In your public career?
2. What is your most important goal as a Deputy?
3. Do you work better individually or in a team with other legislators?
4. Would you like to continue working in public service in the future? In what
capacity?
Represented
1. Do you believe that you are working for a particular group or cause?
2. Who are your constituents? Describe them.
3. How do you identify with your constituents?
4. What do you believe to be your constituents most important need?
5. How do you incorporate this need in your legislative work?
Power and Organization of the Legislature
1. What legislative processes or methods are most useful for the achievement of
your legislative goals?
2. Which of these processes are the least efficient?
3. Are there groups, other than parties, which work together in the Congress? For
example, ideological groups, state delegations, women, ethnic groups, etcetera.
4. How do you view the role or the power of the legislature in relationship to the
executive?
5. Which results do you expect this legislature to achieve?
What is the best method for it to achieve these goals?
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Appendix C: Explanation of Variables
For the data set of 1269 legislators the following variables are utilized in
the actual regressions presented: interviewed, woman, right party membership,
district magnitude, social committee membership, leadership, number of bills
authored, percent of social bills authored, percent of symbolic bills authored,
percent of oversight bills authored, percent of institutional reform bills authored,
percent of allocation bills authored, state percent women in the legislature,
experience summed (to include previous elected and appointed positions in public
service), country, the interaction of women and country, and the interaction of
women and right party. For the 78 interviewed data cases, additional variables
are used. The additional variables from the interviews are operationalized as
follows:
-social group focus: 0, no emphasis, 1, emphasizes some social group
-functional group focus: 0, no emphasis, 1, emphasizes economic groups
-party focus: 0, no emphasis, 1, emphasizes party
-geographic focus: 0, no emphasis,1, emphasizes geographic area
-policy responsiveness: 0, no priority 1, gives policy, projects, priority
-service responsiveness: 0, little service 1, ombudsman
-allocation responsiveness: 0, no emphasis 1, emphasis on district needs/ projects
-symbolic responsiveness: 0, no emphasis 1, indicates role model function
-committee use: : 0, no use 1, emphasizes use of committee to get things done
-party use: 0, no use 1, emphasizes use of party to get things done
-ministry use: 0, no use 1, emphasizes use of ministry to get things done
-individual relationship use: 0, no use 1, emphasizes individual relationships
-work style: 0, team 1, leader or individual
-goal to create policy: 0, no, 1 yes
-continued public service: 0, no public future, 1 political career seeker
-institution building: 0 does not emphasize, 1 emphasizes
-personal power: 0 does not seek, 1 seeks
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Appendix D: Original Government Document Cites
Argentina: Camara de Diputados. 2005. Original Government Documents.
ONLINE at http://www.hcdn.gov.ar
Brazil: Camara dos Deputados. 2005. Original Government Documents ONLINE
at http://www.diputados.gov.br
Brazil: Camara dos Deputados. 2005. “Anuario Estadistico do Processo
Legislativo 2005.” Original Government Documents ONLINE at
http://www.diputados.gov.br
International Parliamentary Union. 1986. ONLINE http://www.ipu.org/. Original
documents.
International Parliamentary Union. 1999. ONLINE http://www.ipu.org/.
Original documents.
International Parliamentary Union. 2001. ONLINE http://www.ipu.org/. Original
documents.
International Parliamentary Union. 2005. ONLINE http://www.ipu.org/. Original
documents.
Mexico: Camara de Diputados. 2005. Original Government Documents. ONLINE
at http://www.camaradediputados.gob.mx/
“Social Security Programs Throughout the World - 1999." Washington D.C.:
Social Security Administration. ONLINE at
http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/ssptw99.html on 3/5/00.
United States Library of Congress. 2005. ONLINE at http://thomas.loc.gov
World Factbook. 1982. Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency.
World Factbook. 1985. Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency.
World Factbook. 1990. Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency.
World Factbook 1995. Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency.
World Factbook. 2000. Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency (accessed
from http://www.cia.gov/worldfactbook.html on 2/0/00).
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Appendix E: Representative Method Model











Appendix F: Method and Project
While I attempted throughout this work to give a description of the
methods employed, I recognize that in utilizing an array of approaches, these may
seem an overwhelming jumble. In order to address this concern, I am utilizing
this appendix to consolidate the discussion of the various methods in one place,
separate from the text. The methods utilized for this research include field
research in form of observations and interviews, comparative systems analyses,
content analysis of legislation, cross tab analyses, binary logistic regressions and
ordinary least squares regressions. The many different methods were used to
better triangulate the data’s relationship to representative behavior.
Research Method Overview
Field research is by its nature qualitative and of course the observations
are not purely objective, my personal outlook and the patterns that appear to me
are the observations presented here. This method was somewhat structured,
however, due to time constraints and also in order to instill some uniformity of
measurement across interviews and across legislatures. While “soaking and
poking” (Fenno 1978) would certainly be a valuable method for ascertaining the
complex nature of how a legislator approaches representation, the systematic use
of an interview instrument which focused on groups of themes is also a strong
method. This research was somewhat exploratory, but it operated within the
bounds of the legislative representation literature. The goal of this project was to
examine representation across several different systems in order to ascertain what
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factors are related to how a legislator represents. In the course of these
interviews, a number of responses invited further questions and discussions, but
of course, as this work focuses on representation, many of these responses, such
as deputy career paths, which are worthy of future research, are not addressed in
the data presented here.
The observations of the legislative environment and the legislative
interviews serve as the backbone of this research, but other data sources and
methods were critical as well. The other qualitative measures include
comparative systems analysis and content analysis. Comparative systems
analyses included examinations of the developmental, cultural, and institutional
characteristics of the three subject countries: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
These are included in chapters three and four, and so, will not be discussed here.
The process utilized to achieve the content analysis of legislation was extensive.
The resources were available both from the libraries of the three legislatures and
from the legislative websites. In order to accomplish this goal, I analyzed all of
the legislation produced by the 1269 legislators who were in office from the fall
of 2002 until June of 2003 during their respective terms in Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico. This will be discussed in some depth on the following pages. Finally,
three quantitative methods were utilized: cross tab analyses, binary logistic
regression and ordinary least squares regression. The three different statistical
tools were utilized in order to adequately address differences in the dependent
variables being analyzed, and in the case of the cross tab analyses, to show
numerical trends in addition to statistically significant correlations.
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What Brought Me to This Research
As an undergraduate political science student, my studies focused on four
areas of the political science discipline: the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Congress,
Comparative Institutions, and Democracy Studies. After I returned to the
discipline, after a sojourn as an attorney, I was awarded a fellowship by the Carl
Albert Center. My intention was to study comparative legislatures. While this
research was certainly centered on the legislative institution, it was a long and
winding road that brought me to the study of representation. As graduate students
spend a great time reading, discussing what they have read with other graduate
students and together constructing “brilliant” research agendas, the like of which
have never been seen before, it is inevitable that one such session should lead to a
question, “How many women are in Congress anyway?” The startlingly low
percentage led to another question, “What does the rest of the world look like?”
and a discovery that the U.S. lagged far behind in the descriptive representation of
women. This seemed incongruous and so further questions arose. Answers such
as electoral structure, quotas, and the role of culture seemed to partially explain
the differences, but other questions came from these answers. In particular, I
wondered if it really mattered. The evidence seemed to say, “sort of.” Initially, I
planned on trying to answer the “Does it really matter?” question by examining
representation not only in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, but also in the United
States, India, Canada, Australia, Germany and Nigeria. The common
denominator was that each of these nations has a federal system that would have
allowed for more variation within the nations themselves, and I could also
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manage in all those languages. While the Carl Albert Center was certainly
generous, other funding that would have been necessary to accomplish this study
was not procured, thus, I chose the three systems that had the most in common.
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico all have similar levels of development, similar
cultural mores, their legislatures had recently grown in strength, they all had quota
systems, each of them had some form of proportional representation, each of them
had a presidential system, and as mentioned above, all were federal systems.
In approaching this research, the literature on legislatures and legislative
representation led me to theorize that both institutional and personal
characteristics would be critical to a complete understanding of individual
representative behavior. While these suppositions may, in fact, be sustainable,
this research could not sufficiently isolate all those institutional characteristics.
The legislative, electoral and constitutional institutions that are unique to a
particular country cannot be separated from the moniker of “country” without a
larger sample of nations. Thus, while legislators from each of these countries are
clearly associated with different representative behavior, I can merely state that
country has a consistent and significant relationship with distinct representative
behaviors. This is frustrating, because while I can conjecture concerning what
institutional characteristics within a country might be associated with particular
differences in representative behavior, I cannot definitively demonstrate that
institutions matter in determining or conditioning a legislator’s representative
method. The institutional constructs that I could isolate were those that varied
within a country. The institutional constraints of district magnitude, descriptive
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composition of state legislatures, and committee membership all yielded one or
two significant links to representative behavior. As 24 different quantitative
analyses are present in this work, it is apparent that none of the aforementioned
institutional differences have a consistently significant relationship to
representative behavior.
In terms of personal characteristics, the literature would suggest that
experience, ideology, and gender are all relevant to a discussion of representation.
In addition to these three, the literature would suggest that race, ethnicity, and
religion would also be characteristics relevant to representation. Regrettably, I
was unable to gather sufficient data concerning these characteristics, and they are
not utilized in this study. This is unfortunate, as recent scholarship would indicate
that race, ethnicity and gender often interact in the representative context. In
keeping with the literature, I expected to find that as legislator acquired
experience, he or she would have evolved foci, means of responsiveness, and
goals. This element, surprisingly, did not have much of a relationship to
representative behaviors. Likewise, it was expected that ideology would
condition a person’s representative behavior, particularly in the area of focus, but
only rarely was a legislator’s party membership found to be significantly
connected representative behavior. Ideology as it interacts with gender, however,
has a much more consistent relationship with representative behavior. This is
demonstrated in focus, responsiveness and in representative goals. While it was
not unexpected that gender would be a significant factor in representative
behavior, the extent of that significance was remarkable. Even though country
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variables are also consistently significant, the factors that matter cannot be
isolated. Even if it were possible to do so, in this analysis, gender continues to be
of the most consistent importance to representative behavior. Overall, this
research demonstrates that women are connected to particular types of focus,
responsiveness and goals, while men are connected to other types of focus,
responsiveness and goals.
Getting the Interview
As an outsider in each of these nations, I could not insinuate myself into
the daily life of a representative, unfortunately “going native” was impossible.
So, in order to have contact with the legislators, it was necessary that I have
greater quantity of data points so that the limited time I had was spent getting the
information from as many people as possible. In order to accomplish this, I sent
out a letter (see Appendix A) and attached to the letter was a survey instrument
(see Appendix B). Every deputy who was in office at the time of my residence in
that nation received the letter and survey instrument. In Argentina and Mexico,
these letters were of course written in Spanish, while in Brazil, the letter and
survey instrument was written in Portuguese. In Mexico, the letters were hand
delivered to the deputies, while in Argentina and Brazil the letters were sent via
electronic mail. The difference in ease of obtaining an interview indicates that
while time consuming and expensive initially, the hand delivery of requests was,
by far, the best method for contacting potential interviewees. As a staffer in
Brazil pointed out by showing me the e-mail inbox he was sorting through,
dozens of requests for academic interviews come through electronic mail every
299
week. A personal presence or the more formal use of hand delivery was much
more effective in gaining audience with a deputy. In Argentina, it was necessary
to make follow-up calls asking for appointments to get many of the interviews,
and in Brazil, it was necessary to walk into the deputies’ offices and make
appointments in order to get half of my interviews. In Mexico, neither one of
these were necessary, deputies called to make appointments to see me.
While this was clearly a much more self-selected sample than the
randomness that is advocated in social science research, the sample did get a
pretty representative sample across the nations. In total, 41 of the deputies
interviewed were from Centrist or Left parties, while 37 were from Right parties.
This is an over sample of Right party legislators, as only 39.4% of the members in
these houses were from right parties as opposed to the interviewed proportion of
47.4%. In addition, while the overall number of women I interviewed was
proportional to women in office in the countries at the time, women in Brazil and
Mexico were slightly over sampled, as 20% and 27%, respectively, of the
legislators interviewed were women, and Argentina was slightly under sampled,
as only 24% of the legislators interviewed were women. I did intend to over
sample women in each country in order to get a greater number of diversity, but in
Argentina, I was unable to meet my goal.
In addition to trying to proportionally interview legislators according to
ideology and gender, I also tried to interview legislators from as many states and
different sized districts as possible. While I was moderately successful,
interviewing legislators from 81% of the states across these nations, I was unable
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to interview someone from every state. In terms of district magnitude, 23 of my
interviews came with deputies from single member districts, a proportion of
29.5%, this is a slight over sample, as the proportion of legislators who serve in
single member districts are only 23.6%. of the total legislators in office in the
three countries at this time. Legislators serving districts with a magnitude of 2-5
made up 32% of my sample, as opposed to 25.5% in the eligible pool. Finally, I
under sampled the legislators from the largest districts, as those with a district
magnitude greater than five should have been 50.9% of my sample, but only made
up 39.5% of the interviewed legislators.
Ideally, I would have liked to have interviewed 50 legislators from each
nation, which would have provided a sample of 20% of the legislators in
Argentina, and 10% of the legislators in Brazil and Mexico, but I was also unable
to realize these goals. In Argentina, the electoral cycle made it impossible for me
to speak to many of the deputies who were in the process of running for reelection
while dealing with their legislative duties, and so I recognize that my timing was
off by a couple of months, nonetheless, I did interview 20 legislators, and I
received one survey instrument for a total of 21 or 8% of the body. Brazil was the
place where I had the most difficulty in gaining an audience, and this may be a
factor of many things, Brazilian legislators spent much more time in their districts
than did legislators in Argentina and Mexico, additionally, as indicated above, the
novelty of academic research seemed to have run its course, and it may just be
that the deputies had heard rumors of the sad state of my Portuguese language
skills. For whatever reason, while I was able to spend a lot of time in the
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congress, I was only able to interview 20 legislators in Brazil, or 4%. Again, in
Mexico I did come the closest to the goal of 50 with 35 legislators interviewed,
and two returning surveys for a total of 37 or 8% of the legislature, and indeed, if
it were not for very persistent protestors at the doors of the Congress, I was
scheduled to interview five more legislators in the final days of the session.
As I mentioned above, the interviews, with the exception of three, were
conducted in the language of the country. The three deputies who spoke with me
in English volunteered to do so, and I was grateful. While I was certainly nervous
about interviewing these men and women in languages in which I am functional,
but not fluent, and in many cases, I was glad to have my digital recorder to catch
phrases that I missed while taking notes, each interview was a privilege and
pleasure in which to participate. When you turn a conversation into a data point,
you lose the excitement in the eye or the emphatic way that a preference was
stated. I tried to include as many quotes as possible within the text of this
dissertation in order to demonstrate the differences in responses, but I often left
deputies’ offices wishing I could spend the day with him or her, simply because
they were interesting. Unfortunately, in each of these cases, I only had one shot.
They were busy people and I was on a limited schedule, so I tried to get as much
out of every interview as possible. While I was able to build rapport with staffers
in Mexico and with a few legislators in both Brazil and Mexico, this was clearly
limited by time and while it included a few lunches and a few hours at a district
office, for the most part, I had to approach these interviews cold, without a great
deal of knowledge about the legislator, and he or she had much less knowledge
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about me. I asked questions as they followed the survey instrument so there
would be consistency in the question wording (and also possibly because I was
relying on them to aid in conveying confidence in my language skills), but I also
asked follow up questions whenever appropriate. The survey instrument includes
a few questions that stray a bit from the subject of this dissertation. These
questions were asked in order to get a better feeling for the institution and the
relationships within the institution, and the responses I received indicated other
important areas for research. Indeed, the analyses of the responses regarding
career decisions, for example, are very interesting, but could not be fit into the
context of this study.
Finally, the time I spent in the legislatures themselves was illuminating, in
both Brazil and Mexico a legislator took me on the floor of the Chamber, and I sat
in on committee meetings in these two nations as well. Since both of these
congresses were easy to enter and allowed a great deal of freedom of movement, I
spent time in party offices, committee offices, the library, the dining room and the
other open spaces within the complexes. This allowed me to do quite a bit of
background work while I was in the process of interviewing and it allowed me to
view the role of staff and the relationships between deputies, their staff and other
deputies. The Argentine Congress was not as open, and thus, I was unable to
assess the practices and relationships in that institution in the same way I was able
to in Brazil and Mexico.
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Content Analysis
In order to analyze the legislation that was produced by individual
legislators in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, each legislator’s bill authorship was
researched. While the text of all bills can be acquired through the congressional
libraries in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, it is much easier to do this search
utilizing the data bases on each website. Once a person’s name is retrieved, one
must set a limit on the period to be examined. While the terms in these nations
overlapped, they did not necessarily cover the same time period. In addition, for
the purpose of this research, I limited this search to authored, not co-authored
legislation. For each legislator, a list that includes a summary and access to the
full bill authored are available. After this first step was completed, I then
examined the legislative content for that legislator before I turned to the next
legislator on the list.
In order to quantify the contents of the bill, each piece of legislation was
assigned a label according to the content of the bill. These labels include: social
legislation, economic legislation, domestic security legislation, military and
diplomatic legislation (trade was included with the economic legislation),
institutional reform legislation, oversight legislation, and symbolic legislation.
Several areas were more difficult to address: Environmental bills were included in
social legislation, while bills dealing with technical budget issues were sometimes
included in economic legislation (if related to taxation or injection of money) and
other times were classified as “other.” This was a long and individual process, I
felt that as long as I coded consistently it would provide justifiable variables.
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Quantitative Methods
This study utilizes three types of quantitative methods: cross tab analyses,
ordinary least squares regressions and binary logistic regressions. Each of these
methods was chosen as the most appropriate method for statistically analyzing the
data. The cross tab analyses provided insight into the numbers of women and
numbers of deputies in each nation that aligned themselves with a particular
subset of either focus or responsiveness or goals. The ordinary least squares were
utilized in those analyses that had a dependent variable that was not bound by 1,
and it was also used in the analyses of percentages. The binary logistic regression
was utilized for the analyses whose dependent variables were either 0 or 1.
Cross tab analysis, as indicated above, provides descriptive statistics
concerning the percent of responses in each category, as well as a chi-squared
analysis which indicates whether numerical differences are of statistical
significance
Ordinary Least Squares regression and Logistic regression are both
included among the statistical models called generalized linear models (Agresti
1996). There are peculiarities of data, however, that make one analysis more
appropriate than the other. In particular the character of the dependent and
independent variables determine which of these analyses are more appropriate.
An OLS regression is utilized in the bill authorship cases because the
dependent variables are quantitative and vary across cases. While the percentage
analyses are bounded at 0 and 1, they are not dichotomous, and thus, are
inappropriate for a binary logistic regression, which requires that the dependent
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variable be dichotomous. In addition, the dependent variable for total bill
authorship is only bound at 0. Finally, the independent variables could
appropriately have a linear relationship with the dependent variables, and thus, it
is appropriate to use this form of analysis (Lewis-Beck 1980).
If the goal is to predict a discrete outcome, such as group membership, one
may use binary logistic regression to do so. The independent variables can
include any combination of bounded continuous, discrete, and dichotomous
variables (Agresti 1996). This model is used when the dependent variable is
dichotomous, so that for each response there are only two possibilities: yes or no.
A dichotomous variable may be called a Bernoulli or binary dependent variable,
thus, “binary logistic regression” (ibid). There is no mathematical assumption
about the character or distribution of the independent variables, so the
independent variables in a logistic regression can take any form. The independent
variables do not have to be normally distributed, linearly related or of equal
variance within each group because the relationship between the dependent and
independent variables is not a linear function in logistic regression (ibid). The
logistic regression function is used, which is the log of the odds that a particular
relationship exists.
“The goal of logistic regression is to correctly predict the category for
individual cases using the most parsimonious model” (Agresti 1996:2). To
accomplish this goal, a model is created that includes all relevant independent
variables. While stepwise regression, or adding and subtracting independent
variables one at a time, is useful for the exploratory phase of research, it is not
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recommended for theory testing. Since this dissertation tests hypotheses of the
relationships between variables, I did not use this method. Logistic regression
both predicts group membership and, since logistic regression calculates the
probability of failure, the results of the analysis are in the form of an odds ratio,
which provides knowledge of the relationships and strengths among the variables.
Both of these aspects of logistic regression were important in the analyses I
utilized. The analyses not only tell us if there is a relationship, it also tells us how
strong it is.
Conclusion
The many different approaches I utilize in this dissertation are meant to
provide the most comprehensive picture of the legislatures and representative
behavior in these nations. What becomes apparent in this discussion, however, is
the need for both the expansion of this study and the fine-tuning of the variables
to provide the most accurate picture of representation. While this appendix is
written to explain more fully the methods utilized, in many ways, it merely




1 This analysis utilized other independent variables that are not reported here. These variables
were not significant and were removed from this table. The excluded variables include the state
literacy rate for women, and interaction variables that include women’s interaction with
experience, women’s interaction with the state percent women in legislature, women’s interaction
with the state literacy rate for women, women’s interaction with Argentina, women’s interaction
with Brazil, Argentina’s interaction with district magnitude, and Brazil’s interaction with district
magnitude. In addition, separate analyses were run for each country, but the results rarely differed
from the larger model, and so are not reported here.
2 This analysis utilizes the countries of Argentina and Mexico rather than Argentina and Brazil.
This analysis differs from all others in this respect, and it is due to the particular differences
between Mexican women and their success in attaining leadership as opposed to the women in
Argentina and Brazil. In order to demonstrate this connection, an interaction terms for women and
Mexico and women and Argentina. The interaction variables for women and country did not yield
any other particularly significant differences. Many of the independent variables and interaction
variables that the literature would indicate may have a significant relationship with the dependent
variable did not in fact have a significant relationship. Logistic regressions were also analyzed at
the country level, utilizing more independent variables and a different combination of variables.
The results of these regressions are not reported here, rather, this table reflects a regression that
was run using only the independent variables listed. The other regressions may have included the
following independent variables: the literacy rate for women in each state, the interaction of
women and experience, the interaction of women and the literacy rate for women in their state,
and the interaction of country and district magnitude.
3 Many of the independent variables and interaction variables that the literature would indicate
may have a significant relationship with the dependent variable did not in fact have a significant
relationship. Binary logistic regressions were also analyzed using more independent variables, a
different combination of variables, and distinguished within individual country tables The results
of these regressions are not reported here, rather, this table reflects a regression that was run using
only the independent variables listed. The other analyses included: the literacy rate for women in
each state, the interaction of women and experience, the interaction of women and the percentage
of women in the state legislature, the interaction of women and the literacy rate for women in their
state, the interaction of country and women, the interaction of country and district magnitude.
4 Many of the independent variables and interaction variables that the literature would indicate
may have a significant relationship with the dependent variable did not in fact have a significant
relationship. Logistic regressions were also analyzed at the country level, utilizing more
independent variables and a different combination of variables. The results of these regressions
are not reported here, rather, this table reflects a regression that was run using only the
independent variables listed. The other regressions may have included the following independent
variables: the literacy rate for women in each state, the interaction of women and experience, the
interaction of women and the percentage of women in the state legislature, the interaction of
women and the literacy rate for women in their state, the interaction of country and women, the
interaction of country and district magnitude.
5 Many of the independent variables and interaction variables that the literature would indicate
may have a significant relationship with the dependent variable did not in fact have a significant
relationship. Logistic regressions were also analyzed at the country level, utilizing more
independent variables and a different combination of variables. The results of these regressions
are not reported here, rather, this table reflects a regression that was run using only the
independent variables listed. The other regressions may have included the following independent
variables: the literacy rate for women in each state, the interaction of women and experience, the
interaction of women and the percentage of women in the state legislature, the interaction of
women and the literacy rate for women in their state, the interaction of country and women, the
interaction of country and district magnitude.
6 Many of the independent variables and interaction variables that the literature would indicate
may have a significant relationship with the dependent variable did not in fact have a significant
308
relationship. Binary logistic regressions were also analyzed using more independent variables, a
different combination of variables, and distinguished within individual country tables The results
of these regressions are not reported here, rather, this table reflects a regression that was run using
only the independent variables listed. The other analyses included: the literacy rate for women in
each state, the interaction of women and experience, the interaction of women and the percentage
of women in the state legislature, the interaction of women and the literacy rate for women in their
state, the interaction of country and women, the interaction of country and district magnitude.
7 Many of the independent variables and interaction variables that the literature would indicate
may have a significant relationship with the dependent variable did not in fact have a significant
relationship. Binary logistic regressions were also analyzed using more independent variables, a
different combination of variables, and distinguished within individual country tables The results
of these regressions are not reported here, rather, this table reflects a regression that was run using
only the independent variables listed. The other analyses included: the literacy rate for women in
each state, the interaction of women and experience, the interaction of women and the percentage
of women in the state legislature, the interaction of women and the literacy rate for women in their
state, the interaction of country and women, the interaction of country and district magnitude.
8 Many of the independent variables and interaction variables that the literature would indicate
may have a significant relationship with the dependent variable did not in fact have a significant
relationship. Binary logistic regressions were also analyzed using more independent variables, a
different combination of variables, and distinguished within individual country tables
Throughout the goals section, the variable right party women is not utilized. It was not significant
and it obscured the significance of other factors. The results of these regressions are not reported
here, rather, this table reflects a regression that was run using only the independent variables
listed. The other analyses included: the literacy rate for women in each state, the interaction of
women and experience, the interaction of women and the percentage of women in the state
legislature, the interaction of women and the literacy rate for women in their state, the interaction
of right party and women, the interaction of country and women, the interaction of country and
district magnitude.
9 Many of the independent variables and interaction variables that the literature would indicate
may have a significant relationship with the dependent variable did not in fact have a significant
relationship. Binary logistic regressions were also analyzed using more independent variables, a
different combination of variables, and distinguished within individual country tables
Throughout the goals section, the variable right party women is not utilized. It was not significant
and it obscured the significance of other factors. The results of these regressions are not reported
here, rather, this table reflects a regression that was run using only the independent variables
listed. The other analyses included: the literacy rate for women in each state, the interaction of
women and experience, the interaction of women and the percentage of women in the state
legislature, the interaction of women and the literacy rate for women in their state, the interaction
of country and women, the interaction of country and district magnitude.
10 Many of the independent variables and interaction variables that the literature would indicate
may have a significant relationship with the dependent variable did not in fact have a significant
relationship. Throughout the goals section, the variable right party women is not utilized. It was
not significant and it obscured the significance of other factors. Binary logistic regressions were
also analyzed using more independent variables, a different combination of variables, and
distinguished within individual country tables The results of these regressions are not reported
here, rather, this table reflects a regression that was run using only the independent variables
listed. The other analyses included: the literacy rate for women in each state, the interaction of
women and experience, the interaction of women and the percentage of women in the state
legislature, the interaction of women and the literacy rate for women in their state, the interaction
of country and women, the interaction of country and district magnitude.
11 Many of the independent variables and interaction variables that the literature would indicate
may have a significant relationship with the dependent variable did not in fact have a significant
relationship. Logistic regressions were also analyzed at the country level, utilizing more
independent variables and a different combination of variables. Throughout the goals section, the
variable right party women is not utilized. It was not significant and it obscured the significance
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of other factors. The results of these regressions are not reported here, rather, this table reflects a
regression that was run using only the independent variables listed. The other regressions may
have included the following independent variables: the literacy rate for women in each state, the
interaction of women and experience, the interaction of women and the percentage of women in
the state legislature, the interaction of women and the literacy rate for women in their state, the
interaction of country and women, the interaction of country and district magnitude.
